Contents

List of Figures		:
Li	st of Tables	x
In	troduction	1
	The Collegial Organization and its Generic Social Mechanisms	2
	A Broadly Conceived Structural Approach	
	Outline of the Book	10
	Beyond Embeddedness Studies of Knowledge-Intensive Firms	16
1.	A Structural Theory of Collective Action among Peers	19
	A Contractual Basis: The Example of Partnerships as an	
	Institutional Form	19
	Beyond Contracts: The Neo-Weberian Approach to Collegial	
	Organizations	22
	Behavioural Assumptions and Resulting Social Mechanisms	24
	Collegial Organizations as Production and Exchange Systems	33
	Collegial Organizations as Lateral Control Regimes	41
	Collegial Organizations and the Regulatory Mechanism	45
2.	Spencer, Grace & Robbins	52
	Corporate Law Firms: An Institutional Form	52
	What do Corporate Lawyers Do?	54
	Division of Work and Interdependence	56
	Spencer, Grace & Robbins	58
	SG&R in its Context: The Market for Legal Services in the Region	61
	SG&R's Partnership Agreement	63
	Informal Rules	72
	The Example of Departmentalization	74
	Relations between Offices in a Multi-City Firm	75
	Workflow: Intake and Assignments	78
	Associate Training, Workflow, and Career	81
	Built-in Pressures to Grow and Strategic Planning	84
	Elusive Committees and Selected Members with Status	87
3.	Niches and Status in the Firm: A Specific Exchange System	91
	Looking at the Production Structure as a Complex Exchange System	91
	Three Production Resources: Co-workers' Goodwill,	
	Advice, and Friendship	93

viii Contents

	Long-term Individual Interests, Identifications,	
	and Bounded Solidarity	99
	Niches in the Organizational Exchange System:	
	A View at the Structural Level	101
	Status in the Organizational Exchange System: Niches and Power	106
	Confirming the Existence of Niches: A View at the Dyadic Level	114
	The Firm as a Work-Related Generalized Exchange System	124
	Desolidarization of Associates	127
4.	Economic Performance and Quality Control	132
	Economic Performance: What Makes Tenured Partners Work?	133
	Professional Performance: Quality Control for	
	Knowledge-Intensive Organizations	149
	Informally Distributed Knowledge and Competition for	
	the Authority to Know	160
	Advice Flows, Distribution, and Concentration of	
	Professional Authority	162
	Distributed Knowledge and Economic Performance	166
	Short Cuts for Competitive Advantage among Associates	167
5.	Too Many Chefs?	170
	Unbounded Status Auctions and the Collegial Blend of Relationships	170
	Economic Mitigation of Status Competition	171
	Cultivating and Mitigating Status Competition:	
	The Blending Process	173
	Social Mitigation of Status Competition:	
	A Multiplex Social Mechanism	175
	The Interplay of Resources among Members	175
	The Social Structure of Barter	180
6.	Organizational Integration: A Montesquieu Structure	182
	Centrifugal Forces and Cross-Boundary Exchanges: Relational Stitches	182
	Two Forms of Solidarity: Welfare and Patronage in	
	Managing Workflow	185
	Schedulers and Rainmakers	187
	Teaming Up and Out?	193
	RED Sets out of Niches: A Montesquieu Structure	194
	Status Heterogeneity and the Balance of Powers among Oligarchs in Collegial Structures	199
7	•	201
/.	Pressuring Partners Back to Good Order: A Lateral Control Regime	201
	Ethnographic Evidence of Lateral Sanctioning	203
	A Structural View on the Second-Order Free-rider Problem	205

Contents	ix
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Methodology	206
Conceptions of how Expectations Converge on	
Levers and on Targets	209
Social Niches and Lateral Control	211
Protectors of the Common Good: Status and Lateral Control	227
Leverage Styles: The Importance of Seniority for Collective	
Responsibility	238
The Social Structure of Collective Responsibility	239
8. Multi-Status Oligarchs and the Negotiation of Precarious Values	242
Policy Issues and Underlying Value Orientations	243
Polarization of Policy Preferences and Status Quo	252
Formal and Informal Regulatory Deliberations	255
The Oligarchs Framing Deliberation on Precarious Values	261
Status Inconsistency and Status Quo:	
Stifled Entrepreneurial Values	263
The Structural Basis of Normative Order	265
Conclusion	267
The Scope of the Collegial Form	267
Holding One's Own in the Company of Peers	270
The Ethical Problem of Conflicts of Interests	273
Appendices	276
A. Fieldwork and Questionnaire	276
B. Density Tables for Figure 3.1 across the Co-Workers', Advice, and	
Friendship Networks of all the Lawyers in the Firm	279
C. Definition of Variables Presented in Table 3.3	281
D. Professional Authority and the Distribution of the Authority to Know	282
E. Presentation of Multirelational p* Models	286
F. A Montesquieu Structure: Spotting RED ('Ready-for-Easy-Defection') Subsets	288
G. Overall Distribution of the Significant Effects on Each Respondent's Choices of Levers Analysed Separately in Chapter 7	291
H. Specialization of the Main Levers: Procedure Followed to	271
Construct Figure 7.6	293
I. Who Guards the Guardians? Procedure Used to Build Figure 7.7	295
J. Partners' Influence Network: Density Table for Figure 8.2	297
Notes	299
References	319
Name Index	335
Subject Index	338

List of Figures

3.1.	Overall view of transfers and exchanges of resources in the firm:	
	The co-workers', advice, and friendship networks	
	superimposed	103
3.2.	Configurations corresponding to p^* model parameters	125
4.1.	Advice seeking in the firm	163
6.1.	Relational stitches: Strong ties cross-cutting internal	
	boundaries in the firm	184
6.2.	Access to cooperative colleagues: A Montesquieu structure	195
7.1.	Partner 35's expectations concerning leverage in the firm	212
7.2.	Partner 33's expectations concerning leverage in the firm	213
7.3.	Partner 20's expectations concerning leverage in the firm	214
7.4.	Partner 18's expectations concerning leverage in the firm	228
7.5.	Partner 32's expectations concerning leverage in the firm	229
7.6.	Specialization of main sanctioners	232
7.7.	Who guards the guardians?	237
8.1.	Polarization of policy preferences among partners	252
8.2	Attention allocation in partnership meetings	259

List of Tables

3.1.	Correlations between indicators of status in the firm	106
3.2.	Distribution of members per variable	118
3.3.	p_2 estimates of the effect of various characteristics of partners	
	and associates on their selections of co-workers, advisers,	
	and friends	119
3.4.	Relational substructures in the firm: Pseudolikelihood estimates	
	for three univariate p* models	126
4.1.	Variables explaining economic performance	140
4.2.	The importance of Blau-ties: Correlation table for performance	
	measurements in 1990 and most frequent types of combination of	
	ties among dyads of actors	143
5.1.	Multiplexity of ties in the firm: Parameter estimates for	
	final multivariate p* model	177
7.1.	Effects of selected dimensions of firm formal structure	
	on the choices of levers	216
7.2.	An example of the effects of an individual partner's	
	pre-existing ties on his choices of levers: The case of Partner 14	218
7.3.	Selection of levers: Conditions under which respondents	
	invest their own relational capital to exercise lateral	
	control for the common good	219
7.4.	Table of odds ratios of the nine sub-tables of Table 7.3	220
7.5.	Logit analysis of the effect of relationships between	
	respondents and targets and between targets and	
	levers on respondents' choices of levers among	
	their own friends, co-workers, and advisers	221
7.6.	Distribution of the different types of two-step control	
	paths, according to the type of tie that is used in each step	223
7.7.	Log-linear modelling of ties between respondents, targets,	
	and levers	226
7.8.	Effect of partners' importance in the firm on the number	
	of times they are chosen as levers	234
8.1.	Correlations between dimensions of status among partners	262
8.2.	Correlations between having one or several forms of	
	inconsistent dimensions of status and preferences with	
	regard to changes in management policies	263