

# Contents

Introduction <i>Kenneth J. Koford and Jeffrey B. Miller</i>	1
<b>Part 1. A Theory of the Function of Norms in Economic Organizations</b>	
Habit, Custom, and Norms in Economics <i>Kenneth J. Koford and Jeffrey B. Miller</i>	21
<b>Part 2. Can the “Rational Egoist” Model Be Expanded to Include Norms?</b>	
Amending the Economist’s “Rational Egoist” Model to Include Moral Values and Norms, Part 1: The Problem <i>William B. Griffith and Robert S. Goldfarb</i>	39
Amending the Economist’s “Rational Egoist” Model to Include Moral Values and Norms, Part 2: Alternative Solutions <i>Robert S. Goldfarb and William B. Griffith</i>	59
The Trouble with Norms <i>Timothy J. Brennan</i>	85
Norms versus Laws: Economic Theory and the Choice of Social Institutions <i>Mark A. Cohen</i>	95
Comments <i>Dennis C. Mueller</i>	103
Response to Our Commentators <i>William B. Griffith and Robert S. Goldfarb</i>	107

<b>Part 3. Experimental Evidence on the Nature of Social Norms</b>	
Covenants without the Sword: The Role of Promises in Social Dilemma Circumstances <i>John M. Orbell, Alphons J. van de Kragt, and Robyn M. Dawes</i>	117
Alternative Social Science Perspectives on “Social Dilemma” Laboratory Research <i>Richard M. Weiss</i>	135
Comment on “Covenants without the Sword” <i>Robert P. Inman</i>	143
<b>Part 4. Evolutionary Selection of Social Norms</b>	
Social Forces in the Workplace <i>Robert H. Frank</i>	151
Biological versus Cultural Indicators of Ability and Honesty <i>Kenneth J. Koford</i>	181
<b>Part 5. Applying Norms in Organizations and Professions</b>	
Corporate Crimes and Innovative Punishments <i>Peter A. French</i>	203
Appropriate Sanctions for Corporate Offenders: Comment on French’s “Principle of Responsive Adjustment” <i>Mark A. Cohen</i>	221
Bargaining and Contract <i>Jules L. Coleman, Steven Maser, and Douglas Heckathorn</i>	227
Contributors	257