

# Table of contents

<b>Acknowledgements</b>	xi
<b>Introduction</b>	13
<b>Part A      Models of political economic interaction</b>	
<b>Chapter 1    Survey of models</b>	
1.1 Introduction	23
1.2 The political business cycle	24
1.2.1 The Kaleckian political business cycle	24
1.2.2 The Nordhaus political business cycle	26
1.2.3 The political business cycle with rational expectations	34
1.3 Partisan theory	36
1.3.1 Hibbs's partisan cycle	37
1.3.2 Partisan cycles with rational expectations	41
1.4 Institutional interaction	44
1.4.1 Comparative political economics	45
1.4.2 Strategic interaction in an institutional context	55
1.5 Conclusion	66
<b>Chapter 2    Reconsideration of models surveyed</b>	
2.1 Introduction	68
2.2 Macroeconomic theory	68
2.3 Political theory	73
2.4 Evaluation and conclusion	81

## **Part B Political economic interaction in the Netherlands**

### **Chapter 3 Partisan politics in the Dutch economy**

3.1 Introduction	87
3.2 Political parties and ideology	88
3.3 Macroeconomic outcomes	99
3.4 Economic policy	107
3.5 Conclusion	110

### **Chapter 4 Electoral politics in the Dutch economy**

4.1 Introduction	113
4.2 Elections in the Netherlands	115
4.3 Macroeconomic outcomes	117
4.4 Economic policy	122
4.5 Conclusion	130

### **Chapter 5 Institutional interaction in the Netherlands: 1973-1994**

5.1 Introduction	132
5.2 Analytical framework	133
5.3 The main characteristics of Dutch institutions and political actors	138
5.4 Institutional interaction in the Netherlands	145
5.4.1 Cabinet Den Uyl (1973-1977)	145
5.4.2 Cabinet Van Agt I (1977-1981)	152
5.4.3 Cabinets Van Agt II and III (1981-1982)	156
5.4.4 Cabinets Lubbers I and II (1982-1989)	159
5.4.5 Cabinet Lubbers/Kok (1989-1994)	166
5.5 Conclusion	170

<b>Summary and concluding comments</b>	175
<b>List of abbreviations</b>	187
<b>List of symbols</b>	189
<b>References</b>	193
<b>Nederlandse samenvatting</b>	215
<b>Curriculum Vitae</b>	223