Contents

Acknowledgments xiii Introduction xv
Sources and Acknowledgments xxiii
PART I Introduction 1
Introduction to Part I 3
Chapter 1 Are the Social Sciences Really Inferior? 5 Fritz Machlup
Chapter 2 What Would an Adequate Philosophy of Social Science Look Like? 21 Brian Fay and J. Donald Moon
PART II Explanation, Prediction, and Laws 37
Introduction to Part II 39
Chapter 3 The Function of General Laws in History 43 Carl G. Hempel
Chapter 4 The Theory of Complex Phenomena 55 F. A. Hayek
Chapter 5 A Possible Distinction between Traditional Scientific Disciplines and the Study of Human Behavior 71 Michael Scriven
Chapter 6 Psychology as Philosophy 79 Donald Davidson
Chapter 7 General Laws and Explaining Human Behavior 91 Brian Fay

Chapter 8 Defending Laws in the Social Sciences 111 Harold Kincaid
Chapter 9 Complexity and Social Scientific Laws 131 Lee C. McIntyre
Chapter 10 Reflexive Predictions 145 George D. Romanos
PART III Interpretation and Meaning 157
Introduction to Part III 159
Chapter 11 Human Nature and Human History 163 R. G. Collingwood
Chapter 12 The Rationale of Actions 173 William Dray
Chapter 13 Interpretation and the Sciences of Man 181 Charles Taylor
Chapter 14 Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture 213 Clifford Geertz
Chapter 15 Hermeneutics and the Hypothetico-Deductive Method 233 Dagfinn Føllesdal
Chapter 16 Another Look at the Doctrine of <i>Verstehen</i> 247 Jane Roland Martin
Chapter 17 Taylor on Interpretation and the Sciences of Man 259 Michael Martin
PART IV Rationality 281
Introduction to Part IV 283
Chapter 18 Some Problems about Rationality 285 Steven Lukes

Chapter 19 The Status of Rationality Assumptions in Interpretation and in the Explanation of Action 299 Dagfinn Føllesdal
Chapter 20 The Nature and Scope of Rational-Choice Explanation 311 Jon Elster
Chapter 21 The Principle of Charity and the Problem of Irrationality (Translation and the Problem of Irrationality) 323 David K. Henderson
PART V Functional Explanation 343
Introduction to Part V 345
Chapter 22 The Logic of Functional Analysis 349 Carl G. Hempel
Chapter 23 Function and Cause 377 R. P. Dore
Chapter 24 Functional Explanation: In Marxism 391 G. A. Cohen
Chapter 25 Functional Explanation: In Social Science 403 Jon Elster
Chapter 26 Assessing Functional Explanations in the Social Sciences Harold Kincaid 415
PART VI Reductionism, Individualism, and Holism 429
Introduction to Part VI 431
Chapter 27 Social Facts 433 Emile Durkheim
Chapter 28 Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences 441 J. W. N. Watkins

Chapter 29 Methodological Individualism Reconsidered 451 Steven Lukes
Chapter 30 Methodological Individualism and Social Explanation 459 Richard W. Miller
Chapter 31 Microfoundations of Marxism 479 Daniel Little
Chapter 32 Reduction, Explanation, and Individualism 497 Harold Kincaid
Chapter 33 Social Science and the Mental 515 Alan J. Nelson
PART VII Objectivity and Values 529
Introduction to Part VII 531
Chapter 34 "Objectivity" in Social Science and Social Policy 535 Max Weber
Chapter 35 Neutrality in Political Science 547 Charles Taylor
Chapter 36 The Value-Oriented Bias of Social Inquiry 571 Ernest Nagel
Chapter 37 The Philosophical Importance of the Rosenthal Effect 585 Michael Martin
Chapter 38 Psychology Constructs the Female 597 Naomi Weisstein
Chapter 39 Reasoning about Ourselves: Feminist Methodology in the Social Sciences 611 Alison Wylie 611
Chapter 40 A Method for Critical Research 625 Donald E. Comstock

	RT VIII oblems of the Special Sciences 641
	roduction to Part VIII 643
The	apter 41 e Methodology of Positive Economics 647 Iton Friedman
If E	apter 42 conomics Isn't Science, What Is It? 661 xander Rosenberg
Act	apter 43 tions, Reasons, and Causes 675 nald Davidson
Spe	apter 44 recial Sciences (or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis) 687 by Fodor
Nar	apter 45 Tative Explanations: The Case of History 701 l A. Roth
The	apter 46 2 Autonomy of Historical Understanding 713 is O. Mink
On	opter 47 the Possibility of Lawful Explanation in Archaeology 733 rrilee H. Salmon
Evic	opter 48 dential Constraints: Pragmatic Objectivism in Archaeology 747 on Wylie
Bibl Inde	iography 767 ex 773