

# Contents

Foreword by Denis Noble	xiii
Acknowledgements	xvii
Introduction	1
Part I Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Historical and Conceptual Roots	9
1 The Early Growth of Neuroscientific Knowledge: The Integrative Action of the Nervous System	11
1.1 Aristotle, Galen and Nemesius: The Origins of the Ventricular Doctrine	12
1.2 Fernel and Descartes: The Demise of the Ventricular Doctrine	23
1.3 The Cortical Doctrine of Willis and its Aftermath	30
1.4 The Concept of a Reflex: Bell, Magendie and Marshall Hall	33
1.5 Localizing Function in the Cortex: Broca, Fritsch and Hitzig	38
1.6 The Integrative Action of the Nervous System: Sherrington	41
2 The Cortex and the Mind in the Work of Sherrington and his Protégés	43
2.1 Charles Sherrington: The Continuing Cartesian Impact	43
2.2 Edgar Adrian: Hesitant Cartesianism	47
2.3 John Eccles and the 'Liaison Brain'	49
2.4 Wilder Penfield and the 'Highest Brain Mechanism'	57
3 The Mereological Fallacy in Neuroscience	68
3.1 Mereological Confusions in Cognitive Neuroscience ( <i>Crick, Edelman, Blakemore, Young, Damasio, Frisby, Gregory,         Marr, Johnson-Laird</i> )	68

3.2	Methodological Qualms <i>(Ullman, Blakemore, Zeki, Young, Milner, Squire and Kandel, Marr, Frisby, Sperry)</i>	74
3.3	On the Grounds for Ascribing Psychological Predicates to a Being	81
3.4	On the Grounds for Misascribing Psychological Predicates to an Inner Entity <i>(Damasio, Edelman and Tononi, Kosslyn and Ochsner, Searle, James, Libet, Humphrey, Blakemore, Crick)</i>	85
3.5	The Inner <i>(Damasio)</i>	88
3.6	Introspection <i>(Humphrey, Johnson-Laird, Weiskrantz)</i>	90
3.7	Privileged Access: Direct and Indirect <i>(Blakemore)</i>	92
3.8	Privacy or Subjectivity <i>(Searle)</i>	94
3.9	The Meaning of Psychological Predicates and How they are Learnt	97
3.10	Of the Mind and its Nature <i>(Gazzaniga, Doty)</i>	103
Part II Human Faculties and Contemporary Neuroscience: An Analysis		109
Preliminaries		111
1	Brain–Body Dualism	111
2	The Project	114
3	The Category of the Psychological	117
4	Sensation and Perception	121
4.1	Sensation <i>(Searle, Libet, Geldard and Sherrick)</i>	121
4.2	Perception <i>(Crick)</i>	125
4.2.1	Perception as the causation of sensations: primary and secondary qualities <i>(Kandel, Schwartz and Jessell, Rock)</i>	128
4.2.2	Perception as hypothesis formation: Helmholtz <i>(Helmholtz, Gregory, Glynn, Young)</i>	135
4.2.3	Visual images and the binding problem <i>(Sherrington, Damasio, Edelman, Crick, Kandel and Wurtz, Gray and Singer, Barlow)</i>	137
4.2.4	Perception as information processing: Marr’s theory of vision <i>(Marr, Frisby, Crick, Ullman)</i>	143

5	The Cognitive Powers	148
5.1	Knowledge and its Kinship with Ability	148
5.1.1	<i>Being able to</i> and <i>Knowing how to</i>	149
5.1.2	Possessing Knowledge and Containing Knowledge ( <i>LeDoux, Young, Zeki, Blakemore, Crick, Gazzaniga</i> )	151
5.2	Memory ( <i>Milner Squire and Kandel</i> )	154
5.2.1	Declarative and non-declarative memory ( <i>Milner, Squire and Kandel</i> )	155
5.2.2	Storage, retention and memory traces ( <i>LeDoux, Squire and Kandel; Gazzaniga, Mangun and Ivry; James, Köhler, Glynn; Bennett Gibson, and Robinson; Damasio</i> )	158
6	The Cogitative Powers	172
6.1	Belief ( <i>Crick</i> )	172
6.2	Thinking	175
6.3	Imagination and Mental Images ( <i>Blakemore, Posner and Raichle, Shepard</i> )	180
6.3.1	The logical features of mental imagery ( <i>Galton, Richardson, Kosslyn and Ochsner, Finke, Luria, Shepard, Meudell, Betts, Marks, Shepard and Metzler, Cooper and Shepard, Posner and Raichle</i> )	187
7	Emotion	199
7.1	Affections ( <i>Rolls, Damasio</i> )	199
7.2	The Emotions: A Preliminary Analytical Survey	203
7.2.1	Neuroscientists' confusions ( <i>LeDoux, Damasio, James</i> )	207
7.2.2	Analysis of the emotions	216
8	Volition and Voluntary Movement	224
8.1	Volition	224
8.2	Libet's Theory of Voluntary Movement ( <i>Libet, Frith et al.</i> )	228
8.3	Taking Stock	231

Part III	Consciousness and Contemporary Neuroscience: An Analysis	237
9	Intransitive and Transitive Consciousness	239
9.1	Consciousness and the Brain <i>(Albright, Jessell, Kandel and Posner, Edelman and Tononi; Glynn, Greenfield, Llinás, Gazzaniga, Searle, Johnson-Laird, Chalmers, Dennett, Gregory, Crick and Koch, Frisby)</i>	239
9.2	Intransitive Consciousness <i>(Searle, Dennett)</i>	244
9.3	Transitive Consciousness and its Forms	248
9.4	Transitive Consciousness: A Partial Analysis	253
10	Conscious Experience, Mental States and Qualia	261
10.1	Extending the Concept of Consciousness <i>(Libet, Baars, Crick, Edelman, Searle, Chalmers)</i>	261
10.2	Conscious Experience and Conscious Mental States	263
10.2.1	Confusions regarding unconscious belief and unconscious activities of the brain <i>(Searle, Baars)</i>	268
10.3	Qualia <i>(Searle, Chalmers, Glynn, Damasio, Edelman and Tononi, Nagel, Dennett)</i>	271
10.3.1	'How it feels' to have an experience <i>(Searle, Edelman and Tononi, Chalmers)</i>	274
10.3.2	Of there being <i>something which it is like</i> . . . <i>(Nagel)</i>	277
10.3.3	The qualitative character of experience	281
10.3.4	<i>Thises and thuses</i> <i>(Chalmers, Crick)</i>	282
10.3.5	Of the communicability and describability of qualia <i>(Nagel, Edelman, Glynn, Sperry)</i>	284
11	Puzzles about Consciousness	293
11.1	A Budget of Puzzles	293
11.2	On Reconciling Consciousness or Subjectivity with our Conception of an Objective Reality <i>(Searle, Chalmers, Dennett, Penrose)</i>	294
11.3	On the Question of how Physical Processes can give rise to Conscious Experience <i>(Huxley, Tyndall, Humphrey, Glynn, Edelman, Damasio)</i>	302

11.4	Of the Evolutionary Value of Consciousness ( <i>Chalmers, Barlow, Penrose, Humphrey, Searle</i> )	307
11.5	The Problem of Awareness ( <i>Johnson-Laird, Blakemore</i> )	314
11.6	Other Minds and Other Animals ( <i>Crick, Edelman, Weiskrantz, Baars</i> )	316
12	Self-Consciousness	323
12.1	Self-Consciousness and the Self	323
12.2	Historical Stage Setting: Descartes, Locke, Hume and James	324
12.3	Current Scientific and Neuroscientific Reflections on the Nature of Self-Consciousness ( <i>Damasio, Edelman, Humphrey, Blakemore, Johnson-Laird</i> )	328
12.4	The Illusion of a 'Self' ( <i>Damasio, Humphrey, Blakemore</i> )	331
12.5	The Horizon of Thought, Will and Affection	334
12.5.1	Thought and language ( <i>Damasio, Edelman and Tononi, Galton, Penrose</i> )	337
12.6	Self-Consciousness ( <i>Edelman, Penrose</i> )	346
Part IV	On Method	353
13	Reductionism	355
13.1	Ontological and Explanatory Reductionism ( <i>Crick, Blakemore</i> )	355
13.2	Reduction by Elimination ( <i>P. M. and P. S. Churchland</i> )	366
13.2.1	Are our ordinary psychological concepts theoretical? ( <i>P. M. Churchland</i> )	367
13.2.2	Are everyday generalizations about human psychology laws of a theory? ( <i>P. M. Churchland</i> )	370
13.2.3	Eliminating all that is human ( <i>P. M. and P. S. Churchland, Dawkins</i> )	372
13.2.4	Sawing off the branch on which one sits	376
14	Methodological Reflections	378
14.1	Linguistic Inertia and Conceptual Innovation ( <i>P. S. Churchland</i> )	379
14.2	The 'Poverty of English' Argument ( <i>Blakemore</i> )	386

14.3	From Nonsense to Sense: The Proper Description of the Results of Commissurotomy ( <i>Crick, Sperry, Gazzaniga, Wolford Miller and Gazzaniga, Doty</i> )	388
14.3.1	The case of blind-sight: misdescription and illusory explanation ( <i>Weiskrantz</i> )	393
14.4	Philosophy and Neuroscience ( <i>Glynn, Edelman, Edelman and Tononi, Crick, Zeki</i> )	396
14.4.1	What philosophy can and what it cannot do	399
14.4.2	What neuroscience can and what it cannot do ( <i>Crick, Edelman, Zeki</i> )	405
14.5	Why it Matters	408
Appendices		411
Appendix 1 Daniel Dennett		413
1	Dennett's Methodology and Presuppositions	415
2	The Intentional Stance	419
3	Heterophenomenological Method	427
4	Consciousness	431
Appendix 2 John Searle		436
1	Philosophy and Science	436
2	Searle's Philosophy of Mind	443
3	The Traditional Mind–Body Problem	449
Index		453