

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION	v
PREFACE	xv

PART I.

THE INDEFINABLES OF MATHEMATICS.

CHAPTER I.

DEFINITION OF PURE MATHEMATICS.

1. Definition of pure mathematics	3
2. The principles of mathematics are no longer controversial	3
3. Pure mathematics uses only a few notions, and these are logical constants	4
4. All pure mathematics follows formally from twenty premisses	4
5. Asserts formal implications	5
6. And employs variables	5
7. Which may have any value without exception	6
8. Mathematics deals with types of relations	7
9. Applied mathematics is defined by the occurrence of constants which are not logical	8
10. Relation of mathematics to logic	8

CHAPTER II.

SYMBOLIC LOGIC.

11. Definition and scope of symbolic logic	10
12. The indefinables of symbolic logic	10
13. Symbolic logic consists of three parts	11

A. The Propositional Calculus.

14. Definition	13
15. Distinction between implication and formal implication	14
16. Implication indefinable	14
17. Two indefinables and ten primitive propositions in this calculus	15
18. The ten primitive propositions	16
19. Disjunction and negation defined	17

B. *The Calculus of Classes.*

	PAGE
20. Three new indefinables	18
21. The relation of an individual to its class	19
22. Propositional functions	19
23. The notion of <i>such that</i>	20
24. Two new primitive propositions	20
25. Relation to propositional calculus	21
26. Identity	23

C. *The Calculus of Relations.*

27. The logic of relations essential to mathematics	23
28. New primitive propositions	24
29. Relative products	25
30. Relations with assigned domains	26

D. *Peano's Symbolic Logic.*

31. Mathematical and philosophical definitions	26
32. Peano's indefinables	27
33. Elementary definitions	28
34. Peano's primitive propositions	29
35. Negation and disjunction	31
36. Existence and the null-class	32

CHAPTER III.

IMPLICATION AND FORMAL IMPLICATION.

37. Meaning of implication	33
38. Asserted and unasserted propositions	34
39. Inference does not require two premisses	35
40. Formal implication is to be interpreted extensionally	36
41. The variable in a formal implication has an unrestricted field	36
42. A formal implication is a single propositional function, not a relation of two	38
43. Assertions	39
44. Conditions that a term in an implication may be varied	39
45. Formal implication involved in rules of inference	40

CHAPTER IV.

PROPER NAMES, ADJECTIVES AND VERBS.

46. Proper names, adjectives and verbs distinguished	42
47. Terms	43
48. Things and concepts	44
49. Concepts as such and as terms	45
50. Conceptual diversity	46
51. Meaning and the subject-predicate logic	47
52. Verbs and truth	47
53. All verbs, except perhaps <i>is</i> , express relations	49
54. Relations <i>per se</i> and relating relations	49
55. Relations are not particularized by their terms	50

CHAPTER V.

DENOTING.

	PAGE
56. Definition of denoting	53
57. Connection with subject-predicate propositions	54
58. Denoting concepts obtained from predicates	55
59. Extensional account of <i>all, every, any, a</i> and <i>some</i>	56
60. Intensional account of the same	58
61. Illustrations	59
62. The difference between <i>all, every</i> , etc. lies in the objects denoted, not in the way of denoting them	61
63. The notion of <i>the</i> and definition	62
64. The notion of <i>the</i> and identity	63
65. Summary	64

CHAPTER VI.

CLASSES.

66. Combination of intensional and extensional standpoints required	66
67. Meaning of <i>class</i>	67
68. Intensional and extensional genesis of classes	68
69. Distinctions overlooked by Peano	68
70. The class as one and as many	69
71. The notion of <i>and</i>	72
72. <i>All men</i> is not analyzable into <i>all</i> and <i>men</i>	73
73. There are null class-concepts, but there is no null class	76
74. The class as one, except when it has one term, is distinct from the class as many	77
75. <i>Every, any, a</i> and <i>some</i> each denote one object, but an ambiguous one	77
76. The relation of a term to its class	78
77. The relation of inclusion between classes	79
78. The contradiction	80
79. Summary	80

CHAPTER VII.

PROPOSITIONAL FUNCTIONS.

80. Indefinability of <i>such that</i>	82
81. Where a fixed relation to a fixed term is asserted, a propositional function can be analyzed into a variable subject and a constant assertion	83
82. But this analysis is impossible in other cases	84
83. Variation of the concept in a proposition	86
84. Relation of propositional functions to classes	88
85. A propositional function is in general not analyzable into a constant and a variable element	88

CHAPTER VIII.

THE VARIABLE.

	PAGE
86. Nature of the variable	89
87. Relation of the variable to <i>any</i>	89
88. Formal and restricted variables	91
89. Formal implication presupposes <i>any</i>	91
90. Duality of <i>any</i> and <i>some</i>	92
91. The class-concept <i>propositional function</i> is indefinable	92
92. Other classes can be defined by means of <i>such that</i>	93
93. Analysis of the variable	93

CHAPTER IX.

RELATIONS.

94. Characteristics of relations	95
95. Relations of terms to themselves	96
96. The domain and the converse domain of a relation	97
97. Logical sum, logical product and relative product of relations	98
98. A relation is not a class of couples	99
99. Relations of a relation to its terms	99

CHAPTER X.

THE CONTRADICTION.

100. Consequences of the contradiction	101
101. Various statements of the contradiction	102
102. An analogous generalized argument	102
103. Variable propositional functions are in general inadmissible	103
104. The contradiction arises from treating as one a class which is only many	104
105. Other <i>prima facie</i> possible solutions appear inadequate	105
106. Summary of Part I	106

PART II.

NUMBER.

CHAPTER XI.

DEFINITION OF CARDINAL NUMBERS.

	PAGE
107. Plan of Part II	111
108. Mathematical meaning of definition	111
109. Definition of numbers by abstraction	112
110. Objections to this definition	114
111. Nominal definition of numbers	115

CHAPTER XII.

ADDITION AND MULTIPLICATION.

112. Only integers to be considered at present	117
113. Definition of arithmetical addition	117
114. Dependence upon the logical addition of classes	118
115. Definition of multiplication	119
116. Connection of addition, multiplication and exponentiation	119

CHAPTER XIII.

FINITE AND INFINITE.

117. Definition of finite and infinite	121
118. Definition of α_0	121
119. Definition of finite numbers by mathematical induction	123

CHAPTER XIV.

THEORY OF FINITE NUMBERS.

120. Peano's indefinables and primitive propositions	124
121. Mutual independence of the latter	125
122. Peano really defines progressions, not finite numbers	125
123. Proof of Peano's primitive propositions	127

CHAPTER XV.

ADDITION OF TERMS AND ADDITION OF CLASSES.

	PAGE
124. Philosophy and mathematics distinguished	129
125. Is there a more fundamental sense of number than that defined above ?	130
126. Numbers must be classes	131
127. Numbers apply to classes as many	132
128. One is to be asserted, not of terms, but of unit classes	132
129. Counting not fundamental in arithmetic	133
130. Numerical conjunction and plurality	133
131. Addition of terms generates classes primarily, not numbers	135
132. A term is indefinable, but not the number 1	135

CHAPTER XVI.

WHOLE AND PART.

133. Single terms may be either simple or complex	137
134. Whole and part cannot be defined by logical priority	137
135. Three kinds of relation of whole and part distinguished	138
136. Two kinds of wholes distinguished	140
137. A whole is distinct from the numerical conjunction of its parts	141
138. How far analysis is falsification	141
139. A class as one is an aggregate	141

CHAPTER XVII.

INFINITE WHOLES.

140. Infinite aggregates must be admitted	143
141. Infinite unities, if there are any, are unknown to us	144
142. Are all infinite wholes aggregates of terms ?	146
143. Grounds in favour of this view	146

CHAPTER XVIII.

RATIOS AND FRACTIONS.

144. Definition of ratio	149
145. Ratios are one-one relations	150
146. Fractions are concerned with relations of whole and part	150
147. Fractions depend, not upon number, but upon magnitude of divisibility	151
148. Summary of Part II	152

PART III.

QUANTITY.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE MEANING OF MAGNITUDE.

	PAGE
149. Previous views on the relation of number and quantity	157
150. Quantity not fundamental in mathematics	158
151. Meaning of magnitude and quantity	159
152. Three possible theories of equality to be examined	159
153. Equality is not identity of number of parts	160
154. Equality is not an unanalyzable relation of quantities	162
155. Equality is sameness of magnitude	164
156. Every particular magnitude is simple	164
157. The principle of abstraction	166
158. Summary	167
<i>Note</i>	168

CHAPTER XX.

THE RANGE OF QUANTITY.

159. Divisibility does not belong to all quantities	170
160. Distance	171
161. Differential coefficients	173
162. A magnitude is never divisible, but may be a magnitude of divisibility.	173
163. Every magnitude is unanalyzable	174

CHAPTER XXI.

NUMBERS AS EXPRESSING MAGNITUDES: MEASUREMENT.

164. Definition of measurement	176
165. Possible grounds for holding all magnitudes to be measurable	176
166. Intrinsic measurability	177
167. Of divisibilities	178
168. And of distances	179
169. Measure of distance and measure of stretch	181
170. Distance-theories and stretch-theories of geometry	181
171. Extensive and intensive magnitudes	182

CHAPTER XXII.

ZERO.

172. Difficulties as to zero	184
173. Meinong's theory	184
174. Zero as minimum	185
175. Zero distance as identity	186
176. Zero as a null segment	186
177. Zero and negation	186
178. Every kind of zero magnitude is in a sense indefinable.	187

CHAPTER XXIII.

INFINITY, THE INFINITESIMAL, AND CONTINUITY.

	PAGE
179. Problems of infinity not specially quantitative	188
180. Statement of the problem in regard to quantity	188
181. Three antinomies	189
182. Of which the antitheses depend upon an axiom of finitude	190
183. And the use of mathematical induction	192
184. Which are both to be rejected	192
185. Provisional sense of continuity	193
186. Summary of Part III	194

PART IV.

ORDER.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE GENESIS OF SERIES.

187. Importance of order	199
188. <i>Between</i> and separation of couples	199
189. Generation of order by one-one relations	200
190. By transitive asymmetrical relations	203
191. By distances	204
192. By triangular relations	204
193. By relations between asymmetrical relations	205
194. And by separation of couples	205

CHAPTER XXV.

THE MEANING OF ORDER.

195. What is order?	207
196. Three theories of <i>between</i>	207
197. First theory	208
198. A relation is not <i>between</i> its terms	210
199. Second theory of <i>between</i>	211
200. There appear to be ultimate triangular relations	211
201. Reasons for rejecting the second theory	213
202. Third theory of <i>between</i> to be rejected	213
203. Meaning of separation of couples	214
204. Reduction to transitive asymmetrical relations	215
205. This reduction is formal	216
206. But is the reason why separation leads to order	216
207. The second way of generating series is alone fundamental, and gives the meaning of order	216

CHAPTER XXVI.

ASYMMETRICAL RELATIONS.

	PAGE
208. Classification of relations as regards symmetry and transitiveness	218
209. Symmetrical transitive relations	219
210. Reflexiveness and the principle of abstraction	219
211. Relative position	220
212. Are relations reducible to predications?	221
213. Monadistic theory of relations	222
214. Reasons for rejecting this theory	222
215. Monistic theory and the reasons for rejecting it	224
216. Order requires that relations should be ultimate	226

CHAPTER XXVII.

DIFFERENCE OF SENSE AND DIFFERENCE OF SIGN.

217. Kant on difference of sense	227
218. Meaning of difference of sense	228
219. Difference of sign	228
220. In the cases of finite numbers	229
221. And of magnitudes	229
222. Right and left	231
223. Difference of sign arises from difference of sense among transitive asymmetrical relations	232

CHAPTER XXVIII.

ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OPEN AND CLOSED SERIES.

224. What is the difference between open and closed series?	234
225. Finite closed series	234
226. Series generated by triangular relations	236
227. Four-term relations	237
228. Closed series are such as have an arbitrary first term	238

CHAPTER XXIX.

PROGRESSIONS AND ORDINAL NUMBERS.

229. Definition of progressions	239
230. All finite arithmetic applies to every progression	240
231. Definition of ordinal numbers	242
232. Definition of "nth"	243
233. Positive and negative ordinals	244

CHAPTER XXX.

DEDEKIND'S THEORY OF NUMBER.

	PAGE
234. Dedekind's principal ideas	245
235. Representation of a system	245
236. The notion of a <i>chain</i>	246
237. The chain of an element	246
238. Generalized form of mathematical induction	246
239. Definition of a singly infinite system	247
240. Definition of cardinals	247
241. Dedekind's proof of mathematical induction	248
242. Objections to his definition of ordinals	248
243. And of cardinals	249

CHAPTER XXXI.

DISTANCE.

244. Distance not essential to order	252
245. Definition of distance	253
246. Measurement of distances	254
247. In most series, the existence of distances is doubtful	254
248. Summary of Part IV	255

PART V.

INFINITY AND CONTINUITY.

CHAPTER XXXII.

THE CORRELATION OF SERIES.

249. The infinitesimal and space are no longer required in a statement of principles	259
250. The supposed contradictions of infinity have been resolved	260
251. Correlation of series	260
252. Independent series and series by correlation	262
253. Likeness of relations	262
254. Functions	263
255. Functions of a variable whose values form a series	264
256. Functions which are defined by formulae	267
257. Complete series	269

CHAPTER XXXIII.

REAL NUMBERS.

	PAGE
258. Real numbers are not limits of series of rationals	270
259. Segments of rationals	271
260. Properties of segments	272
261. Coherent classes in a series	274
<i>Note</i>	274

CHAPTER XXXIV.

LIMITS AND IRRATIONAL NUMBERS.

262. Definition of a limit	276
263. Elementary properties of limits	277
264. An arithmetical theory of irrationals is indispensable	277
265. Dedekind's theory of irrationals	278
266. Defects in Dedekind's axiom of continuity	279
267. Objections to his theory of irrationals	280
268. Weierstrass's theory	282
269. Cantor's theory	283
270. Real numbers are segments of rationals	285

CHAPTER XXXV.

CANTOR'S FIRST DEFINITION OF CONTINUITY.

271. The arithmetical theory of continuity is due to Cantor	287
272. Cohesion	288
273. Perfection	290
274. Defect in Cantor's definition of perfection	291
275. The existence of limits must not be assumed without special grounds	293

CHAPTER XXXVI.

ORDINAL CONTINUITY.

276. Continuity is a purely ordinal notion	296
277. Cantor's ordinal definition of continuity	296
278. Only ordinal notions occur in this definition	296
279. Infinite classes of integers can be arranged in a continuous series	298
280. Segments of general compact series	299
281. Segments defined by fundamental series	300
282. Two compact series may be combined to form a series which is not compact	303

CHAPTER XXXVII.

TRANSFINITE CARDINALS.

	PAGE
283. Transfinite cardinals differ widely from transfinite ordinals	304
284. Definition of cardinals	304
285. Properties of cardinals	306
286. Addition, multiplication and exponentiation	307
287. The smallest transfinite cardinal \aleph_0	309
288. Other transfinite cardinals	310
289. Finite and transfinite cardinals form a single series by relation to greater and less	311

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

TRANSFINITE ORDINALS.

290. Ordinals are classes of serial relations	312
291. Cantor's definition of the second class of ordinals	312
292. Definition of ω	314
293. An infinite class can be arranged in many types of series	315
294. Addition and subtraction of ordinals	317
295. Multiplication and division	318
296. Well-ordered series	319
297. Series which are not well-ordered	320
298. Ordinal numbers are types of well-ordered series	321
299. Relation-arithmetic	321
300. Proofs of existence-theorems	322
301. There is no maximum ordinal number	323
302. Successive derivatives of a series	323

CHAPTER XXXIX.

THE INFINITESIMAL CALCULUS.

303. The infinitesimal has been usually supposed essential to the calculus	325
304. Definition of a continuous function	326
305. Definition of the derivative of a function	328
306. The infinitesimal is not implied in this definition	329
307. Definition of the definite integral	329
308. Neither the infinite nor the infinitesimal is involved in this definition	330

CHAPTER XL.

THE INFINITESIMAL AND THE IMPROPER INFINITE.

309. A precise definition of the infinitesimal is seldom given	331
310. Definition of the infinitesimal and the improper infinite	331
311. Instances of the infinitesimal	332
312. No infinitesimal segments in compact series	334
313. Orders of infinity and infinitesimality	335
314. Summary	337

CHAPTER XLI.

PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE INFINITESIMAL.

	PAGE
315. Current philosophical opinions illustrated by Cohen	338
316. Who bases the calculus upon infinitesimals	338
317. Space and motion are here irrelevant	339
318. Cohen regards the doctrine of limits as insufficient for the calculus	339
319. And supposes limits to be essentially quantitative	340
320. To involve infinitesimal differences	341
321. And to introduce a new meaning of equality	341
322. He identifies the inextensive with the intensive	342
323. Consecutive numbers are supposed to be required for continuous change	344
324. Cohen's views are to be rejected	344

CHAPTER XLII.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONTINUUM.

325. Philosophical sense of continuity not here in question	346
326. The continuum is composed of mutually external units	346
327. Zeno and Weierstrass	347
328. The argument of dichotomy	348
329. The objectionable and the innocent kind of endless regress	348
330. Extensional and intensional definition of a whole	349
331. Achilles and the tortoise	350
332. The arrow	350
333. Change does not involve a state of change	351
334. The argument of the measure	352
335. Summary of Cantor's doctrine of continuity	353
336. The continuum consists of elements	353

CHAPTER XLIII.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INFINITE.

337. Historical retrospect	355
338. Positive doctrine of the infinite	356
339. Proof that there are infinite classes	357
340. The paradox of Tristram Shandy	358
341. A whole and a part may be similar	359
342. Whole and part and formal implication	360
343. No immediate predecessor of ω or a_0	361
344. Difficulty as regards the number of all terms, objects, or propositions	362
345. Cantor's first proof that there is no greatest number	363
346. His second proof	364
347. Every class has more sub-classes than terms	366
348. But this is impossible in certain cases	366
349. Resulting contradictions	367
350. Summary of Part V	368

PART VI.

SPACE.

CHAPTER XLIV.

DIMENSIONS AND COMPLEX NUMBERS.

	PAGE
351. Retrospect	371
352. Geometry is the science of series of two or more dimensions	372
353. Non-Euclidean geometry	372
354. Definition of dimensions	374
355. Remarks on the definition	375
356. The definition of dimensions is purely logical	376
357. Complex numbers and universal algebra	376
358. Algebraical generalization of number	377
359. Definition of complex numbers	378
360. Remarks on the definition	379

CHAPTER XLV.

PROJECTIVE GEOMETRY.

361. Recent threefold scrutiny of geometrical principles	381
362. Projective, descriptive and metrical geometry	381
363. Projective points and straight lines	382
364. Definition of the plane	384
365. Harmonic ranges	385
366. Involutions	386
367. Projective generation of order	388
368. Möbius nets	389
369. Projective order presupposed in assigning irrational coordinates	390
370. Anharmonic ratio	390
371. Assignment of coordinates to any point in space	391
372. Comparison of projective and Euclidean geometry	392
373. The principle of duality	392

CHAPTER XLVI.

DESCRIPTIVE GEOMETRY.

374. Distinction between projective and descriptive geometry	393
375. Method of Pasch and Peano	394
376. Method employing serial relations	395
377. Mutual independence of axioms	396
378. Logical definition of the class of descriptive spaces	397

	PAGE
379. Parts of straight lines	397
380. Definition of the plane	398
381. Solid geometry	399
382. Descriptive geometry applies to Euclidean and hyperbolic, but not elliptic space	399
383. Ideal elements	400
384. Ideal points	400
385. Ideal lines	401
386. Ideal planes	402
387. The removal of a suitable selection of points renders a projective space descriptive	403

CHAPTER XLVII.

METRICAL GEOMETRY.

388. Metrical geometry presupposes projective or descriptive geometry	404
389. Errors in Euclid	404
390. Superposition is not a valid method	405
391. Errors in Euclid (continued)	406
392. Axioms of distance	407
393. Stretches	408
394. Order as resulting from distance alone	409
395. Geometries which derive the straight line from distance	410
396. In most spaces, magnitude of divisibility can be used instead of distance	411
397. Meaning of magnitude of divisibility	411
398. Difficulty of making distance independent of stretch	413
399. Theoretical meaning of measurement	414
400. Definition of angle	414
401. Axioms concerning angles	415
402. An angle is a stretch of rays, not a class of points	416
403. Areas and volumes	417
404. Right and left	417

CHAPTER XLVIII.

RELATION OF METRICAL TO PROJECTIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE GEOMETRY.

405. Non-quantitative geometry has no metrical presuppositions	419
406. Historical development of non-quantitative geometry	420
407. Non-quantitative theory of distance	421
408. In descriptive geometry	423
409. And in projective geometry	425
410. Geometrical theory of imaginary point-pairs	426
411. New projective theory of distance	427

CHAPTER XLIX.

DEFINITIONS OF VARIOUS SPACES.

	PAGE
412. All kinds of spaces are definable in purely logical terms	429
413. Definition of projective spaces of three dimensions	430
414. Definition of Euclidean spaces of three dimensions	432
415. Definition of Clifford's spaces of two dimensions	434

CHAPTER L.

THE CONTINUITY OF SPACE.

416. The continuity of a projective space	437
417. The continuity of a metrical space	438
418. An axiom of continuity enables us to dispense with the postulate of the circle	440 ✓
419. Is space prior to points ?	440
420. Empirical premisses and induction	441
421. There is no reason to desire our premisses to be self-evident	441
422. Space is an aggregate of points, not a unity	442

CHAPTER LI.

LOGICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST POINTS.

423. Absolute and relative position	445
424. Lotze's arguments against absolute position	446
425. Lotze's theory of relations	446
426. The subject-predicate theory of propositions	448
427. Lotze's three kinds of Being	449
428. Argument from the identity of indiscernibles	451
429. Points are not active	452
430. Argument from the necessary truths of geometry	454
431. Points do not imply one another	454

CHAPTER LII.

KANT'S THEORY OF SPACE.

432. The present work is diametrically opposed to Kant	456
433. Summary of Kant's theory	456
434. Mathematical reasoning requires no extra-logical element	457
435. Kant's mathematical antinomies	458
436. Summary of Part VI	461

PART VII.

MATTER AND MOTION.

CHAPTER LIII.

MATTER.

	PAGE
437. Dynamics is here considered as a branch of pure mathematics	465
438. Matter is not implied by space	465
439. Matter as substance	466
440. Relations of matter to space and time	467
441. Definition of matter in terms of logical constants	468

CHAPTER LIV.

MOTION.

442. Definition of change	469
443. There is no such thing as a state of change	471
444. Change involves existence	471
445. Occupation of a place at a time	472
446. Definition of motion	472
447. There is no state of motion	473

CHAPTER LV.

CAUSALITY.

448. The descriptive theory of dynamics	474
449. Causation of particulars by particulars	475
450. Cause and effect are not temporally contiguous	476
451. Is there any causation of particulars by particulars?	477
452. Generalized form of causality	478

CHAPTER LVI.

DEFINITION OF A DYNAMICAL WORLD.

453. Kinematical motions	480
454. Kinetic motions	480

CHAPTER LVII.

NEWTON'S LAWS OF MOTION.

	PAGE
455. Force and acceleration are fictitious	482
456. The law of inertia	482
457. The second law of motion	483
458. The third law	483
459. Summary of Newtonian principles	485
460. Causality in dynamics	486
461. Accelerations as caused by particulars	487
462. No part of the laws of motion is an <i>à priori</i> truth	488

CHAPTER LVIII.

ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE MOTION.

463. Newton and his critics	489
464. Grounds for absolute motion	490
465. Neumann's theory	490
466. Streintz's theory	491
467. Mr Macaulay's theory	491
468. Absolute rotation is still a change of relation	492
469. Mach's reply to Newton	492

CHAPTER LIX.

HERTZ'S DYNAMICS.

470. Summary of Hertz's system	494
471. Hertz's innovations are not fundamental from the point of view of pure mathematics	495
472. Principles common to Hertz and Newton	496
473. Principle of the equality of cause and effect	496
474. Summary of the work	497

APPENDIX A.

THE LOGICAL AND ARITHMETICAL DOCTRINES OF FREGE.

475. Principal points in Frege's doctrines	501
476. Meaning and indication	502
477. Truth-values and judgment	502
478. Criticism	503
479. Are assumptions proper names for the true or the false?	504
480. Functions	505
481. Begriff and Gegenstand	507

	PAGE
482. Recapitulation of theory of propositional functions	508
483. Can concepts be made logical subjects?	510
484. Ranges	510
485. Definition of ϵ and of <i>relation</i>	512
486. Reasons for an extensional view of classes	513
487. A class which has only one member is distinct from its only member .	514
488. Possible theories to account for this fact	515
489. Recapitulation of theories already discussed	516
490. The subject of a proposition may be plural	517
491. Classes having only one member	518
492. Theory of types	518
493. Implication and symbolic logic	519
494. Definition of cardinal numbers	520
495. Frege's theory of series	520
496. Kerry's criticisms of Frege	520

APPENDIX B.

THE DOCTRINE OF TYPES.

497. Statement of the doctrine	523
498. Numbers and propositions as types	525
499. Are propositional concepts individuals?	526
500. Contradiction arising from the question whether there are more classes of propositions than propositions	527
INDEX	529