

# CONTENTS

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<i>Preface</i>	xiii
<i>To the general reader</i>	xiii
<i>To students and course instructors</i>	xiv
<i>Synopsis</i>	xv
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xix
<b>CHAPTER ONE · English and Vickrey Auctions</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 <i>Auctions</i>	1
1.2 <i>A Brief History</i>	5
1.3 <i>English Auctions</i>	8
1.4 <i>Variations on the English Theme</i>	10
1.5 <i>Truthful Bidding is Dominant in (Japanese Button)         English Auctions</i>	12
1.6 <i>Sealed-bid Second-Price (Vickrey) Auctions</i>	14
1.7 <i>Mail-bid Auctions</i>	16
1.8 <i>Weak Strategic Equivalence of (Japanese button)         English and Vickrey Auctions</i>	17
1.9 <i>The Four Standard Auctions and Why They Are         Two Pairs</i>	18
1.10 <i>Disincentives to truthful bidding</i>	21
1.11 <i>Questions</i>	22
<b>CHAPTER TWO · From Vickrey to eBay</b>	<b>25</b>
2.1 <i>eBay as an Evolutionary Product of Vickrey: The         California Auction</i>	25
2.2 <i>Other Online Auction Rules</i>	28
2.3 <i>eBay <math>\neq</math> Vickrey</i>	30
2.4 <i>Summary</i>	32
2.5 <i>Questions</i>	32
<b>CHAPTER THREE · eBay Strategies Observed</b>	<b>34</b>
3.1 <i>Some Bidding Histories</i>	34

3.1.1	<i>Start and End Clustering, Snipers</i>	34
3.1.2	<i>A Bidding War</i>	36
3.1.3	<i>An Early Bidder and Her Fate</i>	38
3.2	<i>“Enter Your Maximum, Then Sit Back and Watch!”</i>	39
3.3	<i>Good Reasons to Snipe</i>	40
3.4	<i>Other (Generally Good) Reasons to Snipe</i>	43
3.4.1	<i>Bidding Wars, Response to Incremental Bidding</i>	43
3.4.2	<i>Implicit Collusion</i>	44
3.4.3	<i>Nonstrategic Reasons to Bid Late</i>	45
3.5	<i>Some (Questionable) Reasons to Bid Early</i>	46
3.5.1	<i>Uncertain Values and the Cost of Discovery</i>	46
3.5.2	<i>Scaring Away Competition</i>	47
3.5.3	<i>Nonstrategic Reasons to Bid Early</i>	50
3.6	<i>On Balance, Snipe</i>	51
3.7	<i>Seller Choices</i>	51
3.7.1	<i>Opening Bid</i>	52
3.7.2	<i>Use of a Secret Reserve</i>	54
3.7.3	<i>Use of the Buy-It-Now Option</i>	56
3.7.4	<i>Other Seller Choices</i>	57
3.8	<i>The Next Three Chapters</i>	60
3.9	<i>Questions</i>	61
 <b>CHAPTER FOUR · What If eBay Were First-Price?</b>		<b>65</b>
4.1	<i>First-Price Is the More Natural Assumption</i>	65
4.2	<i>The Sealed-Bid First-Price Auction</i>	66
4.3	<i>The Simplest of All Worlds</i>	67
4.3.1	<i>The Independent Private Values (IPV) model</i>	67
4.4	<i>How to Shade</i>	71
4.5	<i>Revenue: The Bottom Line</i>	73
4.6	<i>A First-Price eBay Would Discourage Early Bidding</i>	74
4.7	<i>First-Price Is More Work for the Bidder</i>	75
4.8	<i>Further Theory Disappoints</i>	76
4.9	<i>Conclusion</i>	77
4.10	<i>Questions</i>	78

CHAPTER FIVE · The Signals that Sellers Send	79
5.1 Reserves	79
5.2 Price Estimates and Related Revelations	81
5.3 Virtue Rewarded, in Theory	83
5.4 Art, Silver, and Jewelry Auctions: Empirical Observations of Seller Price Estimates	86
5.5 The Complexity of the Seller's Signaling	88
5.6 What Theory Has To Say About Reserves	90
5.6.1 The Tradeoff in Second-Price Auctions	91
5.6.2 The Tradeoff in First-Price Auctions	91
5.6.3 The Optimal Reserve	92
5.6.4 The New Equilibrium	92
5.6.5 Practical Implications	94
5.7 Field Experiments	95
5.8 A Field Comparison of Public vs. Secret Reserves on eBay	99
5.9 Lucking-Reiley's Magic Window in Time	100
5.9.1 Field Confirmation of Some First-Price Theory	101
5.10 Flatness of Revenue vs. Reserve Curves	102
5.11 The Importance of the Extra Bidder	104
5.12 Extracting Some Advice for the eBay Seller	105
5.13 Questions	107
 CHAPTER SIX · Prices!	 108
6.1 Appraising the Scaffolding	108
6.1.1 Valuations	109
6.1.2 Equilibrium	111
6.1.3 Homo economicus	111
6.2 Overbidding: Some Classroom Experiments	112
6.2.1 Experiment 1: First-price with Uniformly Distributed Valuations	113
6.2.2 Experiment 2: First-Price with Less Competition	114
6.3 Feedback and Learning	116
6.3.1 Feedback in First-Price Auctions	117
6.3.2 Feedback in Second-Price and English Auctions	117

6.4	<i>Overbidding: Jars of Nickels</i>	118
6.5	<i>Results from the Field: Tests of Revenue Equivalence</i>	120
6.5.1	<i>Magic on the Internet: A Surprise</i>	121
6.5.2	<i>Music CDs and Xboxes on eBay</i>	123
6.6	<i>Reconciliations</i>	125
6.7	<i>Equilibrium Regained</i>	125
6.7.1	<i>Risk Aversion</i>	126
6.7.2	<i>Spite: An Alternative Theory</i>	130
6.8	<i>The Theoretically Informed (and Human) eBay Bidder</i>	134
6.8.1	<i>Simply a Mistake: Bidding Untruthfully in Vickrey's Setting</i>	135
6.8.2	<i>The Winner's Curse</i>	135
6.8.3	<i>Lessons from the Failures of Revenue Equivalence</i>	137
6.8.4	<i>Spiteful Behavior</i>	138
6.8.5	<i>Wars, Frenzies, and Bubbles</i>	140
6.9	<i>Questions</i>	147
CHAPTER SEVEN · Transgressions		150
7.1	<i>Shills</i>	150
7.1.1	<i>Shill Bidding and Theory</i>	155
7.1.2	<i>Mock Auctions: The More Important Diamond</i>	157
7.2	<i>Bidder Rings: 84 Charing Cross Road</i>	158
7.3	<i>Ethics</i>	162
7.3.1	<i>The Twinge of Guilt: The Buyer Withholds Information</i>	162
7.3.2	<i>Conversely: The Seller Withholds Information</i>	163
7.3.3	<i>Sniping</i>	164
7.3.4	<i>Shadowing Bidders</i>	164
7.3.5	<i>The Ethics of Feedback</i>	165
7.3.6	<i>Exporting and Importing Ancient Artifacts</i>	166
7.4	<i>A Note on Downright Fraud</i>	168
7.5	<i>Fakes</i>	169
7.6	<i>Questions</i>	173

CHAPTER EIGHT · Epilogue	174
8.1 <i>Looking Back</i>	174
8.2 <i>Looking Ahead</i>	176
APPENDIX A <i>Vickrey's Genesis</i>	179
A.1 <i>Introduction</i>	179
A.2 <i>A Preview of Revenue Equivalence</i>	180
A.3* <i>Quick Review of Some Probability Theory</i>	183
A.4* <i>Order Statistics</i>	185
A.5 <i>Revenue of Second-Price Auctions</i>	188
A.6 <i>First-Price Auctions and Nash Equilibria</i>	189
A.7 <i>Revenue Equivalence of First- and Second-Price Auctions with Uniformly Distributed Values</i>	190
A.8 <i>A Nash Equilibrium for First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions</i>	192
A.9 <i>Revenue of First-Price Auctions</i>	197
A.10* <i>Conditional Expectation</i>	198
A.11 <i>An Interpretation of First-Price Equilibrium Bidding Strategy</i>	200
A.12 <i>Stronger Revenue Equivalence</i>	200
A.13 <i>Dutch Auctions and Strategic Equivalence</i>	202
A.14 <i>Another Kind of Auction—the All-Pay Auction</i>	203
A.15 <i>Questions</i>	205
APPENDIX B <i>Riley and Samuelson's Optimal Auctions</i>	207
B.1 <i>Definition of Riley and Samuelson's Class</i>	207
B.2 <i>Revenue</i>	208
B.3 <i>Optimal Reserve Price</i>	211
B.3.1 <i>Example: First-Price Auction with Reserve</i>	213
B.3.2 <i>Example: Second-Price Auction with Reserve</i>	215
B.4 <i>Sad Losers and Santa Claus</i>	216
B.4.1 <i>The Sad-Loser Auction</i>	217
B.4.2 <i>The Santa Claus Auction</i>	219
B.5 <i>The All-Pay Auction Revisited</i>	222
B.6 <i>Risk Aversion</i>	224

\* Note: Sections providing mathematical background are indicated with an asterisk. Skim these sections if you don't need the review.

## CONTENTS

B.7	<i>Point of Departure</i>	227
B.8	<i>Questions</i>	227
APPENDIX C	<i>Myerson's Optimal Mechanisms</i>	230
C.1	<i>Directions</i>	230
C.2	<i>Interdependent Values</i>	231
C.3	<i>Asymmetric Bidders</i>	235
C.4	<i>Efficiency</i>	236
C.5	<i>Myerson's Optimal Mechanism in the Asymmetric-Bidder Case</i>	239
C.5.1	<i>Interlude: Revenue Equivalence Revisited in the Asymmetric-Bidder Case</i>	242
C.5.2	<i>The Optimal Allocation Rule</i>	244
C.5.3	<i>The Payment Rule</i>	247
C.5.4	<i>A Wrinkle</i>	248
C.5.5	<i>Is This Practical?</i>	248
C.6	<i>Optimal Riley and Samuelson Auctions Are Optimal Mechanisms</i>	249
C.7	<i>Auctions vs. Negotiations</i>	249
C.8	<i>Summary</i>	252
C.9	<i>Questions</i>	253
APPENDIX D	<i>Laboratory Evidence: A Summary</i>	254
D.1	<i>Introduction</i>	254
D.2	<i>Laboratory Experiments</i>	255
D.3	<i>Experimental Results for the IPV Model</i>	256
D.4	<i>Experimental Results for the Common-Value Model</i>	259
	<i>References</i>	263
	<i>Index</i>	271