

# Contents

Preface	<i>page ix</i>
Background and motivation	1
Chapter 1. Introduction and summary of the main results	8
1.1 Survey	8
1.2 Possible uses of the theory	18
Chapter 2. Preliminary concepts and basic results	20
2.1 Binary relations	20
2.2 Social welfare functions and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem	21
2.3 Social choice correspondences	23
2.4 Social choice functions	29
2.5 The Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem	32
2.6 Cores of simple games	34
Appendix	36
Chapter 3. Representations of committees	38
3.1 The simple games associated with an SCC	39
3.2 Representations of simple games by SCCs	46
3.3 Representations by SCFs	52
Chapter 4. Strong and dynamic representations	63
4.1 Consistent SCFs	64
4.2 Strong representations of weak games	72
4.3 Voting procedures and Arrow's conditions	75
4.4 Dynamic representations and the core	79

Chapter 5. Exactly and strongly consistent anonymous social choice functions	86
5.1 Partial implementation	87
5.2 The coefficients of a partially implementable and anonymous SCC	91
5.3 A characterization of the class of anonymous, exactly and strongly consistent, and independently blocking SCFs	96
5.4 Feasible elimination procedures	100
5.5 Further results on exactly and strongly consistent anonymous SCFs	104
5.6 Concluding remarks	106
Chapter 6. Effectivity functions and implementation	109
6.1 Effectivity functions	110
6.2 Families of effectivity functions	116
6.3 Stability of effectivity functions	129
6.4 A characterization of the class of partially implementable SCCs	140
6.5 Some remarks on implementation of SCCs	143
Appendix: Convex effectivity functions	147
Chapter 7. Concluding remarks	151
7.1 Restricted preferences and the core	151
7.2 Restricted preferences and nonmanipulability	152
7.3 Symmetry, neutrality, and lotteries on alternatives	153
7.4 Weak orders	154
7.5 Some remarks on the number of alternatives	161
References	163
Author index	167
Subject index	168