

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1. Introducing Social Action and Cooperation	1
I    What is Cooperation?	1
II   Introducing the Basic Elements of Cooperation	4
III  Theses on Cooperation	11
IV   Survey of the Contents of the Book	17
Appendix 1: Previous Research on Cooperation	20
Appendix 2: Collective Social Action and Cooperation	23
CHAPTER 2. Collective and Joint Goals	26
I    A Classification of Collective Goals	26
II   The Components of Collective Goals	30
III  The Basic Analysis of Intended Collective Goals	33
IV   The Collectivity Condition for Goals	40
V    The We-attitude Analysis of Collective Goals	49
VI   Collective and Private Attitudes	53
VII  Joint Intentions and Joint Goals	57
VIII Summary	68
CHAPTER 3. Cooperative Joint Action	72
I    Acting Together	72
II   Cooperative Joint Action	79
III  Given and Final Preferences	88
IV   Cooperative Joint Action more Precisely Analyzed	93
V    Conclusion	102
Appendix: Bratman's Theory of Cooperation	103
CHAPTER 4. Cooperation and Collective Goals	108
I    Cooperation as Involving a Collective Goal	108
II   Detailed Analyses of Cooperative Situations	115
III  Cooperation, Common Goals, and Social Dependence	126
IV   Partial Cooperation	132
V    Cooperation in the Individual Mode	136
VI   Conclusion	137
Appendix: Coordination and Collective Goals	138

<b>CHAPTER 5. Cooperation, Practical Reasoning, and Communication</b>	<b>141</b>
I    Cooperation and Practical Reasoning	141
II   Collective Goals and Communicative Action	152
III  Communicative Intentions	156
IV   Summary	164
<b>CHAPTER 6. Cooperation in Institutional Context</b>	<b>165</b>
I    Collective Acceptance and Cooperation	165
II   Social Norms and Social Institutions	171
III  Institutional Cooperation	177
IV   Concluding Remarks	189
Appendix: Social Norms	190
<b>CHAPTER 7. Cooperation and Cooperative Game Theory</b>	<b>195</b>
I    Cooperative Game Theory	195
II   Collective Goal Theory and Cooperative Game Theory	202
III  Agreement and Commitment	205
IV   Summary	211
<b>CHAPTER 8. The Components of Social Control and Dependence</b>	<b>212</b>
I    Introduction	212
II   The Components of Social Control	213
III  Measurement of the Components of Social Control	219
IV   Correspondence and Concordance of Preferences	224
V    Control Related to Social Action	227
VI   Concluding Remarks	229
Appendix: Comments on the General Case	229
<b>CHAPTER 9. Cooperation and Preferences</b>	<b>232</b>
I    Introduction	232
II   The Degree of Correlation of Preferences	233
III  Examples of Interaction Structures	237
IV   Cooperation and Correlated Preferences: The Key Arguments	240
V    Summary of the Preference and Goal Correlation Account	249
<b>CHAPTER 10. Cooperation and the Dilemma of Collective Action</b>	<b>256</b>
I    Introduction	256
II   An Analysis of Free Riding	264
III  Examples of Collective Action Dilemma Structures	268
IV   Coordination and Conflict in Selection Situations	275
V    From Given to Final Utilities	279

VI	Conclusion	289
	Appendix	290
	A.	Three-Person Games with a Collective Action Problem 290
	B.	Case Studies of Collective Action Structures and the Components of Social Control 293
CHAPTER 11. Rational Cooperation and Collective Reasons		298
I	Rational Cooperative Action and Acting for a Collective Reason	298
II	The Desirability of Cooperation	305
III	The Rationality of Cooperation	306
IV	I-mode Utilities and We-mode Utilities	313
V	The Centipede, Trust, And Rationality	318
VI	Conclusion	333
	Appendix 1: Joint Equilibria	335
	Appendix 2: Rational Intentions and Strategic Interaction	338
CHAPTER 12. Long-Term Cooperation		341
I	Repeated Situations of Strategic Interaction	341
II	Different Kinds of Solutions to Collective Action Dilemmas	346
III	Experimental Results on Cooperation	351
IV	Evolutionary Game Theory, Similarity, and Cooperation	356
V	Concluding Remarks	366
CHAPTER 13. Conclusion		368
I	The Basic Ideas and Theses	368
II	The Main Results	374
III	Relevance to Moral and Political Philosophy	377
Notes		380
References		415
Index of Names		422
Subject Index		424