

# Contents

<i>Preface to the Second Edition</i>	vii
<i>Preface to the First Edition</i>	viii
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	x

## PART ONE: SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE

1 DESCRIPTION AND EXPLANATION	3
The logical conditions for giving a description; methods of generalizing; conditionals and rules of inference; explanation; the different ways that explanations can be given; systematization of discourse.	
2 INTERLUDE: THE AIMS AND METHODS OF SCIENCE	35
The aims of science; Bacon's views; the growth of positivism; the development of modern ideas.	
3 SCIENTIFIC DESCRIPTION	41
Systems; the analogy of algebra and system-history; the functional generalization; cumulative generalizations; non-cumulative generalizations; explication and reduction; systematization of descriptions; Aristotelian and Galilean systematization; facts and generalizations.	
4 SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION	69
Explanation by schematization; models, micromorphs and paramorphs; explanation by an informal model; explanation by a formally described model; explanation by a formal model; extension of theory; deployment and development; interscientific explanation; the functions of a generalization.	

## PART TWO: DISCOVERY AND CONFIRMATION

5	INDUCTIVE REASONING	95
	The traditional account; model arguments in deduction and induction; two attempts to solve the problem; senses of 'probably'; two technical definitions of 'probability'; an attempt to dissolve the problem; dissolution applicable only to general problem; intuitive inductions; science as rejection of incorrect expectations.	
6	'FITTING THE FACTS'	113
	The formation of a functional generalization; direct induction; confirmation as prediction-rule; mechanical induction; intuitive induction; small deviations; derivations of theory; testing of theories; exposing a hidden mechanism; model-proving; disconfirmation; ideal substances; statements of limitation; disconfirmation of a theory.	
7	NON-FACTUAL CRITERIA	137
	Conflict unresolvable by factual considerations; simplicity; simplicity of descriptions; economy and structural simplicity; simplicity and familiarity; simplicity as the basis of discovery-procedures; quasi-aesthetic judgements; elegance; fruitfulness and the conditions of a successful science.	
8	POSTSCRIPT TO SECOND EDITION	151
	In the discussion so far I have been developing a theory of scientific activity as if that activity were being carried on independently of any outside influences, excepting of course the results of experiments. This has sometimes been called an 'internalist' account of science. But like all human activities, scientific thought and the conduct of experiments, even the force of the results of those experiments as contributions to knowledge, is influenced by the social and historical conditions of the people involved. The study of the way those conditions affect what we take to be true knowledge, how we judge the power of experimental tests of theory and how we choose ideas from which to construct a theory has been called an 'externalist' account of science. In the last chapter I turn to examine the strengths and weaknesses of some recent externalist accounts of science.	
	<i>Further Reading</i>	175
	<i>Index of Names</i>	176
	<i>Index of Topics</i>	178