

Contents

PREFACE *ix*

- I. THE HYPOTHESIS OF PHILOSOPHICAL RELATIVITY 3
 1. Problems without Solutions 3
 2. Philosophical Relativity and Semantic Relativity 5
 3. Contextualism and Invariantism 6
 4. Alternative Psychologies 11
 5. Events in Real Time and in Real Brains: Alternative Interpretations 13
 6. Two Levels for Relativity: Words and Objects 14
 7. Indeterminacy of Translation and Holistic Explanation 15
- II. ASPECTS OF SEMANTIC RELATIVITY 21
 1. Contrasting Groups of Expressions 21
 2. Statements, Beliefs, and Truth-values 25
 3. Logic and Meaning 27
 4. Sortalism 30
 5. Extreme Semantic Approaches 33
 6. The Relativity and the Rationality of Contextualism 35
 7. The Appeal of Invariantism 37
 8. General Sentences, Conversational Interests, and
Contexts of Utterance 40
 9. The Compatible Vagueness of Semantic and Pragmatic Terms 43

III. A RELATIVISTIC APPROACH TO SOME PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS	46
1. A Problem of Knowledge	46
2. A Problem of Power and of Freedom	54
3. A Problem of Causation	58
4. A Problem of Explanation	60
5. Categorical Problems and Conditional Problems	62
IV. ON THE STATUS OF OSTENSIBLE INTUITIONS	65
1. The Objection from Semantic Intuitions	66
2. Semantic Intuitions Concerning Problematic Words	67
3. The Objection Reformulated	69
4. Two Invariantist Replies	70
5. A Direct Relativist Reply	74
6. How Commonsense Beliefs Account for Appearances of Intuitions: An Explanatory Sketch	75
V. TWO APPROACHES TO OSTENSIBLE INTUITIONS	79
1. The Prevalent Approach to Responses and the Causal Theory of Reference	80
2. Some Problems for the Causal Theory and for the Prevalent Approach	83
3. Some Advantages of a Psychological Approach to Examples	90
4. Perceived Threats to Our System of Beliefs	95
5. Egocentric Attitudes as Determinants of Response	97
6. Ostensible Intuitions, Commonsense Beliefs, and Semantic Relativity	102
VI. THE STATUS OF PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS	105
1. An Objection from Particular Expressions	106
2. An Objection from a Particular Language	110
3. An Objection from Overgeneralization	112
4. An Objection from Unnaturalness	113
5. Prospects for Philosophy	115
NOTES	121
INDEX	131