

Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ix
INTRODUCTION	1
1 DISPOSITIONAL CONCEPTS	5
2 ACTUALISM	11
Section 1	
Radical Actualism or Megarianism	12
Section 2	
Non-radical Actualism	15
3 PHENOMENALISM	29
Section 1	
Ryle's Phenomenalism	30
Section 2	
Armstrong's Arguments Against Phenomenalism	33
Section 3	
The Determinist Argument	42
4 THE LOCATION OF THE DISPOSITIONAL BASIS	43
Section 1	
Various Positions Outlined	43
Section 2	
Armstrong	44
Section 3	
The Second Objection and an Alternative Account of the Location of the Basis	45
Section 4	
Biological Fitness	49
Section 5	
Mach	53
Section 6	
Two Variations on the Smith's Argument	54

5 THE NATURE OF THE DISPOSITIONAL BASIS	59
Section 1	
The Dispositional/Categorical Distinction	59
Section 2	
Dispositions Have Categorical Bases	62
6 DISPOSITIONS, BASES AND IDENTITIES	68
Section 1	
(a) The Type-Type Identification of Dispositions and Bases	68
(b) Token-Token Without Type-Type Identity	69
Section 2	
(a) Rejection of the Type-Type Identification of Dispositions and Bases	71
(b) Rejection of Token-Token Identification of Dispositions and Bases	75
7 FUNCTIONALISM ABOUT DISPOSITIONS	82
Section 1	
Functionalism about Dispositions	82
Section 2	
Possible Objections to a Functionalist Theory of Dispositions	89
8 SOME APPLICATIONS	96
Section 1	
Multi-Track Dispositions	96
Section 2	
Higher Order Dispositions	98
Section 3	
The Secondary Qualities	103
CONCLUSION	108
NOTES	109
BIBLIOGRAPHY	110