

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	<i>page ix</i>
<i>Chapter 1</i> The Liar paradox	1
1.1 Some versions of the Liar	2
1.2 Proposals	7
1.3 Universality and semantic universality	13
1.4 Diagonalization	16
<i>Chapter 2</i> The diagonal argument	20
2.1 Cantor's use of the diagonal argument	20
2.2 General analysis of the diagonal argument	22
2.3 Good and bad diagonal arguments	27
Appendix Extensions of the diagonal theorem	37
<i>Chapter 3</i> The diagonal argument and the Liar, I	45
3.1 A problem for truth gap theories	46
3.2 Kripke's theory of truth	47
3.3 Fuzzy logic	55
3.4 A thesis of expressive incompleteness	58
<i>Chapter 4</i> The diagonal argument and the Liar, II	62
4.1 Herzberger and Gupta and stable truth	62
4.2 Feferman: A type-free theory of partial predicates	70
4.3 McGee and definite truth	72
4.4 Inconsistency views	78
<i>Chapter 5</i> A medieval solution to the Liar	83
5.1 An outline of the Ockham–Burley–Pseudo-Sherwood solution	84
5.2 An interpretation of the Ockham–Burley–Pseudo-Sherwood solution	86

Contents

5.3	Comparisons and contrasts with some modern approaches	94
<i>Chapter 6</i>	A singularity solution to the Liar	99
6.1	An informal presentation of the singularity solution	100
6.2	A glimpse of the formal account	112
6.3	A suggestion of Gödel's	116
<i>Chapter 7</i>	A formal account of singularities	118
7.1	Pragmatic and semantic aspects	118
7.2	The reflective hierarchy and singularities	121
7.3	English and the reflective hierarchy	139
<i>Chapter 8</i>	Applications and further singularities	142
8.1	Applications of the formal account	142
8.2	Further singularities	153
<i>Chapter 9</i>	Semantic universality	159
9.1	Groundedness (and "singularity" in one sense)	159
9.2	Truth in a context (and "singularity" in a second sense)	163
9.3	The object language and the language of the theory	174
9.4	Universality	181
<i>Notes</i>		183
<i>Bibliography</i>		217
<i>Index</i>		225