

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE	XIII
TRANSLATOR'S NOTE	XV
INTRODUCTION	XVII
I. ORDERS OF CAUSALITY	1
II. CRITICAL COMMENTS ON THE PHYSICALIST THEORY OF SCIENCE	16
1. Verification and Elucidation	16
2. Elimination of Metaphysical Formulations by Means of the Physical Language	18
3. The 'Privileged Position' of Protocol Propositions and the Physicalist Criterion of Probation	22
4. Obtaining the Protocol Propositions	26
5. The 'True' Science	31
III. EMPIRICISM AND PHYSICALISM	36
IV. FORMS OF NEGATION OF EMPIRICAL PROPOSITIONS	47
1. Forms of Negation	47
2. 'Complete' and 'Incomplete' Contradictions	48
3. The Obtaining and Verifying of Propositions	49
4. Negation of Constatations	51
5. Incompatibility of 'Protocol Statements'	55
Postscript	58
V. PRINCIPLES OF LOGICAL EMPIRICISM	60
1. Reality Concepts, Metaphysical and Empirical	60
2. Invariant Systems of Statements	61

3. Non-Behaviouristic Verification	68
4. <i>K</i> -Statements and Invariant Systems of Statements	78
VI. THE METHOD OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL ANALYSIS	82
1. Analysis of Form and of Content	82
2. Formal Analysis of the Concept of Existence	84
3. Content Analysis of the Concept of Causality	87
VII. PROBABILITY INFERENCES AS SYNTACTIC INFERENCEAL FORMS	93
1. Relations of Consequence, Deductive and Probable	93
2. The System of Relations of Probable Consequence	96
3. 'Probable Consequence' and 'Logical Truth'	101
VIII. 'POSITIVE' AND 'NEGATIVE' USE OF STATEMENTS	105
1. Truth Value and Content	105
2. Conditions to be Satisfied by any Definition of Truth	106
3. 'Positive' and 'Negative' Use of Statements	109
4. Negation and Falsity	110
5. Confusion of Positive with Negative Use	113
6. The Recursive Definition of the Concept of Truth	114
IX. THE NEW FORM OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE	117
1. The 'Empirical Continuous' Form of Knowledge of Classical Physics	117
2. Uncertainty Domains as Prerequisite for the Empirical- Fictitious Form of Knowledge	119
3. Probability Description, a Special Case of the Empirical Fictitious Form of Knowledge	123
4. Probability Functions as Relations between Measured and Fictitious Values	126
5. The Empirical Fictitious Method Conditioned by Measuring Procedures	127
6. The Definition of Probability Functions by Repeated Application of the Empirical-Fictitious Method	129

X.	THE METHODOLOGICAL SYMMETRY OF VERIFICATION AND FALSIFICATION	134
	1. Like Names for Unlike Concepts	134
	2. Empirical Propositions about Finitely and Infinitely Many Cases	135
	3. Wittgenstein's Verification Thesis	137
	4. Propositions about Finitely and Infinitely Many Cases. The Methodologies of Wittgenstein, Carnap, and Popper	140
	5. 'Asymmetrical' Falsification Theories	146
	6. Criteria of Scientific Progress	149
	7. 'Complete' and 'Progressive Partial' Testability	154
XI.	THREE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE	164
	1. The Triadic Method	164
	2. Data of Consciousness—Logico-Mathematical Constructions—Methods of Empirical Content	164
	3. Three concepts of 'Truth' and 'Probability'	169
XII.	THE TRIADIC METHOD	176
	1. Elements of Linguistic Representation and the Triadic Method	176
	2. The Triadic Analysis of 'Truth'	180
	3. The Triadic Analysis of 'Probability'	184
	4. The Triadic Analysis of 'Number'	190
	5. The Triadic Analysis of 'Philosophic Expressions'	195
XIII.	THE METHOD OF FICTITIOUS PREDICATES	198
	Introduction	198
	1. Scientific and Speculative Philosophy	198
	2. 'Operative' and 'Fictitious' Existence	200
	Part I: Predicates as Descriptive Concept-Forms	205
	1. The Existence of Logico-Linguistic Forms	205
	2. Dispositional Concepts as Fictitious Predicates	207
	3. Characterization of Phenomena by Fictitious Quantities	210

Part II: Predicates as Quantities Characterizing States	213
4. Characterizing by Infinite Values of Quantities	213
5. Characterizing Phenomena in Uncertainly Ranges by Means of Fictitious Values ('Values of Measurement')	216
6. Logical Analysis of the Concepts 'Motion' and 'Rest'	221
7. Logical Analysis of the Relativity Principle	223
8. The Clock Paradox	227
9. Conditions, under which the Relativity Principle Does not Hold	231
10. Domains of Uncertainty as a Presupposition for Applying the New Method	242
Part III: Predicates as Probability Quantities	244
11. Analytic-Deductive Inferences. Inferences from Conjunctive Classes of Propositions	244
12. Inferences from Disjunctive Classes of Propositions. Probability Inferences	247
13. Systems of Probability Metric and Their Order	250
14. The Characterization of States by Conjunctive and Disjunctive Classes of Propositions	254
15. Presuppositions of Measurement in Classical and Relativistic Physics	258
16. Description by Ranges of Quantities	262
17. Definition of Probability Quantities by Means of Functions	266
18. Descriptions by Means of Probability and Metrical Quantities	268
19. Uncertainty Domains as Prerequisite for the Method of Fictitious Predicates	272
20. The Definition of Probability Functions by Means of Operators	277
21. Empirical and Fictitious Existence of Predicates	280
22. Theories of Measurement as a Presupposition of Exact-Continuous and of Probability Description	285

23. The Epistemological Conditions for Applying the Method of Fictitious Predicates	287
24. The Probability Field	293
25. Probability Description and Indeterminacy of Phenomena	298
26. The Logical Meaning of Quantisation. First and Second Quantisation	303
27. The Quantisation of Electromagnetic Fields	312
 Part IV. Empirical-Fictitious Knowledge	 317
28. Active and Fictitious Causality	317
29. Greatest Possible and Least Possible Physical Constants	321
30. The New Form of Knowledge	323
31. The Matrix Field and the Probability Wave Field	331
32. Probability Description in Biology	337
 BIBLIOGRAPHY	 344
 INDEX OF NAMES	 349