

Contents

PREFACE	ix
INTRODUCTION	xi
PART ONE: CONCEPTS	
I. MEANING AND ASSERTABILITY	3
1. Truth-Conditions vs. Use-Conditions	3
2. The "Logic" of Use-Conditions	5
3. The Rationale of Differentiation: The Epistemic Gap	9
4. Legitimation through the Teleology of Communication	14
5. Paralogisms	18
6. Problems of Interpretation	23
II. CONCEPTUAL SCHEMES	27
1. Introduction	28
2. The Translation Argument	30
3. Is Translatability Necessary?	32
4. The Functional Equivalency Construction of Alternative Conceptual Schemes	35
5. Alternative Conceptual Schemes Involve Variant Factual Commitments	38
6. Scheme-Differentiation and the Truth-Status of Theses	40
7. The Myth of a Ubiquitous, Scheme-Neutral Input	43
8. The Myth of Form-Content Separability	49
9. The Alternativeness of Conceptual Schemes	52
10. The Appraisal of Conceptual Schemes	55
11. The Question of the Inherent Superiority of Our Own Conceptual Schemes	57
III. CATEGORIES	61
1. Two Types of Categories	61
2. Philosophical Categories	66

3. Categorical Metaphysics	69
4. Scientific Categories	70
5. The Non-Rationalizability of Protocategories	72
6. The Scientific Categories vs. The Traditional Categories	75
7. The Mutability of Categories	77

PART TWO: KNOWLEDGE

IV. COGNITIVE DYNAMICS	83
1. The Idea of a Body of Knowledge	83
2. The Status of Theses within a Body of Knowledge	88
3. Cognitive Dynamics	90
4. Cognitive Eschatology	92
5. Cognitive Copernicanism	95
6. Cognitive Relativism	97
V. COMMUNICATION, THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE, AND THE NATURE OF "THINGS"	101
1. Hidden Depths	102
2. The Cognitive Inexhaustibility of Things	104
3. Emergence in the Cognitive Sphere	108
4. Implications of Cognitive Inexhaustibility	110
5. The Corrigibility of Conceptions	113
6. Communicative Parallax	115
7. The Intentionality of Interpersonal Communication	117
8. The Communicative Irrelevance of Conceptions ..	122

PART THREE: QUESTIONS AND INQUIRY

VI. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF FACTUAL QUESTIONS AND INQUIRY	131
1. Introduction	131
2. Issues Regarding the Legitimacy of Questions	136
3. The Knowledge-Relativity of Questions	139
4. Question Dissolution	142
5. The Dynamics of Erotetic Change	144
6. Unavailable Questions	146
7. Kant's Principle of Question Propagation	147

VII.	QUESTION EXFOLIATION AND EROTETIC DIALECTICS . . .	151
	1. Question Exfoliation	151
	2. Question Dialectics	156
	3. The "Importance" of Questions	158
	4. Difficulties in Predicting Future Science	159
	5. Issues Regarding the Economics of Inquiry	162
VIII.	COGNITIVE COMPLETENESS AND COGNITIVE LIMITS	166
	1. Problems of Completeness	166
	2. Cognitive Completeness: Question-Answering (or "Erotetic") Completeness	167
	3. Some Questions of Eschatology	172
	4. Improper vs. Intractable Questions: Two Very Different Sorts of Cognitive Limits	174
	5. Cognitive Limits and Their Ramifications	175
	6. The Reymond-Haeckel Controversy	178
	7. The Incompleteness of "Our Knowledge" in the Factual Domain	180

PART FOUR: TRUTH AND REALITY

IX.	THE PERSPECTIVE OF SCIENCE AND THAT OF EVERY-LIFE COMMON SENSE	185
	1. The Perspective of Science and that of Everyday-Life	185
	2. The Difference in Cognitive Orientation between Science and Daily Life	189
	3. The Indispensability of the Everyday-Life Scheme	194
	4. The Comparability of Theory-Constitutions	198
X.	TRUTH AND IDEALIZATION	204
	1. Fallibilism and the Crucial Distinction between Our (Putative) Truth and the Real Truth	205
	2. Bridging the Appearance/Reality Gap	208
	3. The Peircean Strategem: Against Convergencism, Approximation, and the View that Later Science is Lesser Science	210
	4. Issues of Descriptive Particularity	215
	5. Truth Estimation	217

	6. Is a Sceptical Abandonment of Truth Possible? ...	220
	7. Ideal Science	224
XI.	SCIENTIFIC TRUTH AND THE ARBITRAMENT OF PRAXIS .	228
	1. Science as Truth-Estimator	228
	2. The Arbitrament of Praxis	234
	3. Why This Link between Pragmatic Efficacy and Truthfulness?	236
	4. A Copernican Inversion	239
	5. Perfection Not Attainable: Technological Escalation	241
	6. How Far?	243
XII.	SCIENTIFIC REALISM	246
	1. The Thesis of Scientific Realism and the Fact of Scientific Fallibilism	246
	2. Realism and the Aim of Science	249
	3. Scientific Realism at the Level of Ideal Science ...	252
	4. Instrumentalism and the Descriptive Purport of Science	253
XIII.	REALITY AND REALISM	257
	1. Reality	257
	2. Realism	261
	3. The Regulative Aspect	263
	4. Realism and Idealism	266
	NOTES	269
	NAME INDEX	287
	SUBJECT INDEX	289