

Contents

Acknowledgments	ix
1 Desiderata on a Theory of Concepts	1
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 Desiderata	3
1.3 Do We Need Language Desiderata?	16
1.4 Preview	22
2 Traditional Philosophical Accounts	25
2.1 Imagism	25
2.2 Definitionism	32
2.3 Conclusions	48
3 Similarity-Based Accounts	51
3.1 Prototype Theory	51
3.2 Exemplar Theory	63
3.3 Conclusions	72
4 Maximal and Minimal Accounts	75
4.1 The Theory Theory	75
4.2 Informational Atomism	89
4.3 Conclusions	100
5 Empiricism Reconsidered	103
5.1 Introduction	103
5.2 What Is Concept Empiricism?	106
5.3 Why Empiricism?	122
5.4 Conclusion	137

6	Proxytype Theory	139
6.1	From Percepts to Proxytypes	139
6.2	Publicity	152
6.3	Categorization	161
6.4	Conclusion	164
7	The Perceptual Basis	165
7.1	The Scope Trial	165
7.2	Countering Counterexamples	169
7.3	Conclusion	187
8	Overcoming Concept Nativism	189
8.1	Stances on Nativism	190
8.2	Arguments for Innateness	198
8.3	Conclusion	235
9	Intentional Content	237
9.1	Philosophical Theories of Intentionality	237
9.2	Informational Semantics	241
9.3	A Hybrid Theory	249
9.4	Conclusion	260
10	Cognitive Content	263
10.1	Narrow Approaches to Cognitive Content	263
10.2	Proxytypes and Cognitive Content	270
10.3	Nominal Content and Real Content	276
10.4	Conclusion	282
11	Combining Concepts	283
11.1	Confounded Combinations	283
11.2	Compositionality: How Much Is Enough?	286
11.3	A Three-Stage Model of Concept Combination	301
11.4	Conclusion	312
	Conclusion: Back to Our Senses	313
	Notes	317
	References	327
	Index	347