

Contents

Part I: *Belief*

1	<i>The Nature of Belief</i>	3
2	<i>Beliefs as States</i>	7
I	Three Ways of Conceiving of Beliefs	7
II	Dispositions are States	11
III	Differences between Beliefs and Dispositions	16
IV	Belief and Consciousness	21
3	<i>Belief and Language</i>	24
I	Manifestations and Expressions	24
II	Belief without Language	25
III	Sophisticated Belief and Language	31
IV	Thought and Language	36
4	<i>Propositions</i>	38
I	The Notion of a Proposition	38
II	Propositions and Language	42
III	Two Unsatisfactory Accounts of Propositions	43
IV	An Account of Propositions Sketched	46
5	<i>Concepts and Ideas</i>	50
I	The Distinction between Concepts and Ideas	50
II	Simple and Complex Concepts and Ideas	54
III	The Self-directedness of Simple Concepts and Ideas	60
IV	Hume's Problem	70
6	<i>General Beliefs</i>	77
I	Having a Reason for Believing Something	77
II	Efficient and Sustaining Causes	79
III	Difficulties for the 'Sustaining Cause' Analysis	82
IV	Principles of Inference	85

v	General Beliefs	89
vi	Inferring	94
vii	Reasons and Rationalization	95
viii	Good Reasons	96
7	<i>Existential Beliefs</i>	99
8	<i>Further Considerations about Belief</i>	104
i	Contradictory Beliefs	104
ii	Conjunctive Beliefs	106
iii	Degrees of Belief	108

Part II : Truth

9	<i>Truth</i>	113
i	Correspondence	113
ii	Nominalism	114
iii	Semi-Nominalism	118
iv	Realisms	119
v	Predicates and Properties	123
vi	The Correspondence Relation	130

Part III : Knowledge

10	<i>Knowledge Entails True Belief</i>	137
i	The Classical Account of Knowledge	137
ii	The Truth-condition	137
iii	Different Views concerning the Belief-condition	138
iv	Rejection of the Strong Denial of the Belief-condition	139
v	Rejection of the Strong Assertion of the Belief-condition	141
vi	Rejection of the Weak Denial of the Belief-condition	143
11	<i>The Infinite Regress of Reasons</i>	150
i	The Evidence-condition	150
ii	The Infinite Regress of Reasons	152
iii	Different Reactions to the Regress	154

I 2	<i>Non-Inferential Knowledge (1)</i>	I 62
I	What are the paradigms of non-inferential knowledge? 162	
II	The 'Thermometer' view of non-inferential knowledge 166	
III	Deutscher's objection 171	
IV	A parallel account of manifestations of skill 175	
V	Further objections 178	
VI	Self-fulfilling beliefs 180	
I 3	<i>Non-Inferential Knowledge (2)</i>	I 84
I	In support of our account of non-inferential knowledge 184	
II	An epistemological objection to our account of non- inferential knowledge 190	
III	Restrictions on the scope of our account of non-inferential knowledge 192	
IV	Enlargements of the scope of our account of non-inferential knowledge 194	
I 4	<i>Inferential and General Knowledge</i>	I 98
I	Difficulties about inferential knowledge 198	
II	Non-inferential knowledge of general propositions 201	
III	Inferential Knowledge 205	
IV	O'Hair's objection 208	
V	Between inferential and non-inferential 210	
I 5	<i>Further Considerations about Knowledge</i>	2 I 2
I	Knowledge of Knowledge 212	
II	Knowledge of Probabilities 214	
III	Certainty 216	
IV	Metaphysical implications of our account of Knowledge 216	
V	Scepticism 217	
	<i>Conclusion</i>	2 2 0
	<i>Works referred to</i>	2 2 2
	<i>Index</i>	2 2 5