

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## BOOK I. INTRODUCTORY

### CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY

SECT.	PAGE
1. The object of this work. The Existent and the Real . . . . .	3
2. Reality is indefinable . . . . .	3
3. Reality is not an ambiguous term . . . . .	4
4. Reality does not admit of degrees . . . . .	4
5. Existence is indefinable . . . . .	5
6. Even if there should be anything real which was not existent, it would be of no <i>practical</i> interest to us . . . . .	7

### CHAPTER II. REALITY AND EXISTENCE

7. Various classes of things have been asserted to be real without existing . . . . .	9
8. (a) Propositions. Is their reality involved in the existence of true and false beliefs? . . . . .	9
9. What makes a belief true? . . . . .	10
10. The truth of a belief is a relation of correspondence in which the belief stands to a fact . . . . .	11
11. Truth is a relation and not a quality . . . . .	11
12. Our theory is not the same as the "copy theory" of truth . . . . .	12
13. The copy theory of truth, continued . . . . .	13
14. The truth of a belief does not involve the reality of propositions . . . . .	14
15. The objection that many things are true which are never thought of . . . . .	15
16. The invalidity of this objection . . . . .	16
17. The objection that whatever is true is timelessly true . . . . .	17
18. The invalidity of this objection . . . . .	18
19. The falsity of a belief is a relation of non-correspondence in which the belief stands to all facts . . . . .	19
20. The objection that every belief must refer to some object . . . . .	20
21. What is meant by two false beliefs being beliefs in the same thing . . . . .	21
22. The falsity of a belief does not involve the reality of propo- sitions . . . . .	22
23. Nor has any reason ever been given for the reality of propo- sitions except the truth or falsehood of beliefs . . . . .	22

SECT.	PAGE
24. But do beliefs involve the reality of non-existent facts? Beliefs which profess to refer to existent facts, whether true or false, do not involve this . . . . .	22
25. But how about beliefs which do not profess to refer to existent facts? . . . . .	23
26. All such beliefs assert that the presence of one characteristic implies the presence of another . . . . .	24
27. The same continued . . . . .	25
28. Such beliefs do not imply the reality of non-existent facts if the characteristics in question are existent . . . . .	26
29. Characteristics which are not existent are often determined by certain relations to the existent . . . . .	26
30. But these relations will not give us what we want . . . . .	28
31. But a characteristic which is not existent as a characteristic is always existent as an element in a negative characteristic . . . . .	28
32. Thus beliefs which do not profess to refer to existent facts do not involve the reality of non-existent facts, when such beliefs are true . . . . .	30
33. Nor when they are false . . . . .	30
34. (b) Characteristics. It follows from what has been said above that all characteristics are existent, independently or as elements in others . . . . .	32
35. (c) Possibilities. These also are not real without existing . . . . .	32
36. We have seen then that there are no non-existent characteristics and possibilities . . . . .	33
37. As to non-existent propositions. We have no reason to assert their reality. And our theory of reality would be simpler if they were rejected. But this would not prove that they are not real . . . . .	34
38. But there does seem reason for rejecting them . . . . .	35
39. And, even if any were real, in studying the existent we should study all reality . . . . .	36
40. It follows from what has been said that the existent is not limited by possibilities of existence which are independent of it . . . . .	36

### CHAPTER III. METHOD

41. Our two enquiries in this work will have rather different methods . . . . .	38
42. With regard to the earlier enquiry. Its method cannot be inductive, because it would involve a vicious circle . . . . .	38
43. And because the field of observation would be infinitely smaller than the field of inference . . . . .	38
44. But in two cases our conclusions will rest on perception. What is meant by awareness and perception . . . . .	40

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ix

SECT.	PAGE
45. The first case is the initial enquiry whether anything does exist. The second is the enquiry as to whether substance is differentiated . . . . .	41
46. The nature of empirical beliefs of this kind . . . . .	42
47. Our method will resemble Hegel's in being a chain of determinations . . . . .	43
48. But it will differ from it (a) in the absence of triadic divisions, (b) in the absence of the aspect of partial falsity which is found in the Hegelian categories . . . . .	44
49. (c) In the explicit admission of premises for each conclusion other than the preceding conclusions . . . . .	46
50. (d) In the fact that the order of the determinations does not profess to be in all respects necessary, (e) in the absence of uncertainty as to whether the dialectic deals with existence or reality . . . . .	47
51. Certain preliminary justifications which are required by Hegel's method are not required by ours . . . . .	47
52. Our method is ontological, not epistemological . . . . .	49
53. The divisions in the later enquiry . . . . .	50
54. The differences of method in the later enquiry . . . . .	52

## BOOK II. SUBSTANCE

### CHAPTER IV. EXISTENCE

55. Does anything exist? . . . . .	57
56. If this is doubted or denied, it can be proved from the existence of the denial or the doubt . . . . .	57
57. The same continued . . . . .	58
58. The denial that something exists is not self-contradictory, nor its affirmation self-evident, but its truth is beyond doubt . . . . .	59

### CHAPTER V. QUALITY

59. That which exists must have some nature besides its existence	60
60. And so we reach the conception of quality, which is indefinable	61
61. Negative qualities . . . . .	62
62. Whatever exists will possess as many qualities as there are positive qualities. Of these some will be positive and some negative . . . . .	63
63. Qualities can be divided into simple, compound and complex qualities . . . . .	63
64. Every compound and complex quality can be analysed into simple characteristics . . . . .	64

## CHAPTER VI. SUBSTANCE

SECT.	PAGE
65. The existence of qualities involves the existence of substance .	66
66. Objections to this view. But it is impossible to dispense with the conception of substance . . . . .	66
67. The same continued . . . . .	68
68. The further objection that a substance is nothing apart from its qualities . . . . .	69
69. The objection that the being of anything cannot consist entirely in its relations to something else . . . . .	70
70. The contention that the conception of substance should be replaced in all cases by the conception of subject . . . . .	71
71. Why we did not reach the conception of substance earlier . . . . .	72
72. By our definition many things will be classed as substances which are not generally called so . . . . .	73

## CHAPTER VII. DIFFERENTIATION

73. Is substance differentiated? This is best decided by an appeal to perception. . . . .	74
74. It is clearly differentiated unless solipsism is true . . . . .	75
75. And even if solipsism were true, differentiation is proved by the differentiation of my field of perception, or by my perception of a single perception-datum . . . . .	75
76. Is it proved by a single thought? At any rate it is proved by the perception of a single thought . . . . .	76
77. Thus the differentiation of substance is certain. But this does not prevent us from holding that all that exists is also a single substance . . . . .	77

## CHAPTER VIII. RELATIONS

78. Relations exist between the various substances. The conception of relation is indefinable . . . . .	79
79. A relation can have more than two terms, and it can have only one term . . . . .	79
80. The conception of relation is indispensable. Attempts to show it to be invalid . . . . .	80
81. These attempts are unsuccessful . . . . .	81
82. And it is ultimate and indefinable. The causes which have led to this fact being sometimes ignored . . . . .	82
83. On the other hand, we cannot replace qualities by relations . . . . .	83
84. Every relation is either simple, compound, or complex. Relations can also be classed in respect of reflexiveness, symmetry and transitivity . . . . .	84

## CHAPTER IX. DERIVATIVE CHARACTERISTICS

SECT.	PAGE
85. Relations and relationships. Every relationship generates a derivative quality in each of its terms . . . . .	86
86. Thus the nature of a thing changes if any of its relationships change. Some consequences of this . . . . .	87
87. And derivative relationships are generated by all qualities and by all relationships . . . . .	88
88. Thus every characteristic of a substance generates an infinite series of its characteristics. But these infinite series are not vicious . . . . .	88
89. The distinction between primary and repeating qualities—which is not the same as that between original and derivative qualities . . . . .	89
90. A characteristic has also infinite series of characteristics. The characteristics of a characteristic must be distinguished from its parts . . . . .	90
91. Every substance has an infinite number of repeating qualities, and of derivative primary qualities. We have no means of knowing whether any substance has an infinite number of original primary qualities . . . . .	91
92. Why is there a tendency to regard the conception of quality as more fundamental than those of relation and substance? . . . . .	92

## CHAPTER X. DISSIMILARITY OF SUBSTANCES

93. Can two substances have the same nature? . . . . .	95
94. It seems to me ultimately certain that they cannot . . . . .	96
95. An objection to this based on the conception of the thing-in-itself. This objection is invalid . . . . .	97
96. It is sometimes supposed that this theory involves that substances must be dissimilar in original qualities. But this is a mistake. A dissimilarity, <i>e.g.</i> in spatial or temporal relations, might be sufficient . . . . .	99
97. Or its position in any other series . . . . .	99
98. But the dissimilarity could not be <i>only</i> in their relation to qualities which did not belong to them . . . . .	100
99. Our result is what has been called the Identity of Indiscernibles, but would be better called the Dissimilarity of the Diverse. . . . .	101

## CHAPTER XI. SUFFICIENT DESCRIPTION

100. Substances cannot be defined, but they can be described . . . . .	102
101. Exclusive descriptions . . . . .	102
102. Sufficient descriptions . . . . .	104

SECT.	PAGE
103. Has every substance a sufficient description? There are few cases in which we can know what it is . . . . .	104
104. But it must have one, since every substance has an exclusive description . . . . .	106
105. And if it had no sufficient description, the exclusive description would involve a vicious infinite . . . . .	108

## CHAPTER XII. DETERMINATION

106. Implication . . . . .	110
107. Inference . . . . .	110
108. Corresponding to implication between propositions, there is between characteristics a relation of intrinsic determination	111
109. Besides this there is another relation of determination between the characteristics of any substance which may be called extrinsic determination. All the characteristics of any substance determine one another extrinsically . . . . .	112
110. Three objections to this view . . . . .	114
111. A fourth objection, based on the conception of the thing-in-itself . . . . .	116
112. It is invalid . . . . .	117
113. We are entitled to accept extrinsic determination as valid. How far this is important . . . . .	119

## CHAPTER XIII. MANIFESTATION

114. Unities of composition may be also regarded as unities of manifestation . . . . .	120
115. But the second is not more accurate than the first . . . . .	121
116. Nor does a unity of manifestation serve as any explanation of the qualities in which it is manifested . . . . .	122

## BOOK III. GROUPS

### CHAPTER XIV. SIMILARITY OF SUBSTANCES

117. Some substances are similar to some other substances . . . . .	127
118. The plurality of the substances connected with a quality is not, however, completely analogous to the plurality of qualities connected with a substance . . . . .	127
119. Every substance is similar to every other substance . . . . .	128

## CHAPTER XV. GROUPS

SECT.		PAGE
120.	Definition of a Group. The difference between Groups and Classes . . . . .	130
121.	This difference further considered . . . . .	131
122.	<i>Any</i> combination of substances or groups is a group . . . . .	132
123.	Distinction between the members and the parts of a group . . . . .	133
124.	The conception of a set of parts . . . . .	134
125.	The conception of content . . . . .	135
126.	Repeating groups . . . . .	136

## CHAPTER XVI. COMPOUND SUBSTANCES

127.	Every group is a substance. Definition of Compound Substances . . . . .	138
128.	One substance can be many groups . . . . .	138
129.	Objections to the view that any two substances of different content form a compound substance . . . . .	140
130.	Further objections. None of these objections are valid . . . . .	141

CHAPTER XVII. EXCLUSIVE COMMON QUALITIES  
IN GROUPS

131.	Definition of Common Qualities, and Exclusive Common Qualities. Is there an exclusive common quality in every group? . . . . .	143
132.	There is, but of a type which could never be known by our powers of knowledge . . . . .	143
133.	In some groups there are exclusive common qualities which can be known by our powers of knowledge, but we do not know that in every group there are qualities of this type . . . . .	145
134.	It is only those of the second type which have any importance for us . . . . .	145

## CHAPTER XVIII. THE UNIVERSE

135.	There is no group which contains all other groups, but there is a substance which contains all other substances. This is the Universe . . . . .	147
136.	Any fact about any other substance is an element in a fact about the universe . . . . .	148

## CHAPTER XIX. UNIVERSAL DETERMINATION

137.	Every fact about any other substance extrinsically determines every fact about the universe, and <i>vice versa</i> . . . . .	150
138.	And every fact about any substance extrinsically determines every fact about every other substance . . . . .	151

SECT.	PAGE
139. We can now return to the objection to determination postponed from Section 110, and see that it is invalid . . . . .	151
140. The conclusion in Section 138 could have been reached in a more direct way . . . . .	152
141. We have no right to make any supposition about what would happen if anything were different from what it is. This result does not impair the validity of general laws . . . . .	153
142. The conclusion which we have reached does not prove that anything is causally determined . . . . .	154
143. The objections of some thinkers to the conception of a "block" universe . . . . .	155

## CHAPTER XX. ORGANIC UNITY

144. From the relation of manifestation between the nature of a substance and the qualities of the substance, there follows a relation between the substance itself and its parts . . . . .	156
145. And this involves a fresh relation of the parts to one another . . . . .	157
146. These relations are sometimes expressed by saying that the whole is in every part. The phrase is unfortunate . . . . .	158
147. And so is the phrase that the nature of the whole is expressed in each part . . . . .	159
148. This manifestation of the whole in its parts occurs in the case of every substance . . . . .	159
149. Such a whole may be called an Organic Unity. The reasons in favour of such a name . . . . .	160
150. But it is misleading in various ways . . . . .	162
151. The same continued . . . . .	163
152. Objections to the use of the name Inner Teleology . . . . .	164
153. The same continued . . . . .	165
154. It seems better to keep the name of organic unity, but to discard the name of inner teleology . . . . .	166

## CHAPTER XXI. SUMMARY OF RESULTS

155. Causal Order, Serial Order, and Order of Classification. We have no reason so far to suppose that the first two occur in the universe . . . . .	167
156. Nor Order of Classification . . . . .	168
157. The same continued . . . . .	168
158. Our empirical knowledge suggests to us that some wholes are better expressed as unities of composition, while some are as well expressed as unities of manifestation . . . . .	170
159. But we cannot be certain that this is so in any particular case . . . . .	171
160. We can, so far, find no fixed point in all this complexity of existence, except the universe itself . . . . .	172



## CHAPTER XXII. INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF SUBSTANCE

SECT.	PAGE
161. Is every substance divisible, or are there simple substances? . . . . .	174
162. If there are simple substances, they must be indivisible in every dimension. Definition of Dimension . . . . .	174
163. We perceive nothing that is simple. For, at any rate, all that we perceive is divisible in time . . . . .	175
164. Further consideration of this point . . . . .	177
165. This result is not affected if a self can perceive itself . . . . .	177
166. But the fact that we can perceive nothing simple does not prove that nothing simple exists . . . . .	178
167. Coming back to the main issue—it is submitted that there can be no simple substance. The importance of this result, which is synthetic, and also self-evident and ultimate . . . . .	178
168. Reasons for hesitation about this result—(a) It is new . . . . .	179
169. (b) There is a danger of confusing the impossibility of imagining a simple substance with the impossibility of a simple substance existing . . . . .	180
170. (c) I may have been prejudiced by the desirable consequences which I conceive to follow from it . . . . .	180
171. But, after weighing these points, the result still seems to me clear. Re-statement of the result . . . . .	180
172. It must be remembered that a simple substance would have no history or duration in time . . . . .	181
173. And that inseparability of parts is not simplicity . . . . .	182
174. But is there any reason to suppose that our results would involve a contradiction? This will be considered in the next chapter . . . . .	182
175. No presumption is raised against our view by the fact that there are simple characteristics, since the relation of simple substances, if there were any, to compound substances would be so different from the relation between simple and compound characteristics . . . . .	183
176. Does science demand the existence of simple substances? Geometrical points need not be simple substances . . . . .	185
177. Nor does science demand that any geometrical point should exist . . . . .	186
178. Nor does science offer us a clear conception of a simple substance . . . . .	187
179. That our result has not been discovered before need not excite any suspicion. Modern philosophy and the conception of simple substance . . . . .	188
180. Infinite divisibility of the type here asserted does not exclude the possibility of next terms . . . . .	190
181. Definition of Precedent and Sequent Sets of Parts . . . . .	190

## CHAPTER XXIII. THE CONTRADICTION OF INFINITE DIVISIBILITY

SECT.	PAGE
182. The infinite divisibility of substance would produce a contradiction, except under one condition . . . . .	192
183. Definition of Presupposition . . . . .	193
184. Some characteristics of Presupposition . . . . .	194
185. The Fixing of Presuppositions . . . . .	194
186. Definition of Total Ultimate Presupposition . . . . .	196
187. Sufficient descriptions of the members of a set of parts always give a sufficient description of the whole. But this is not always reciprocal . . . . .	196
188. And, if it does not happen with $A$ , then the nature of $A$ will presuppose sufficient descriptions of all its parts . . . . .	197
189. If these sufficient descriptions can only be fixed by means of sufficient descriptions of the members of a set of parts of each part, there will be a contradiction . . . . .	198
190. It may be said that they can be Independently Fixed. But the possibility of this seems doubtful . . . . .	199
191. And, if it were possible, a contradiction would still arise when we considered the total ultimate presupposition . . . . .	200
192. To avoid this the nature of $A$ must supply the sufficient descriptions of all its parts . . . . .	202
193. It cannot supply them all by including them, unless it also supplies them by implying them . . . . .	202
194. The same continued. It must therefore imply sufficient descriptions of all its parts which are sequent to some given set of parts . . . . .	203

## BOOK IV. DETERMINING CORRESPONDENCE

### CHAPTER XXIV. DETERMINING CORRESPONDENCE

195. The problem recapitulated . . . . .	207
196. Some solutions are impracticable . . . . .	208
197. The only practicable solution—Determining Correspondence . . . . .	209
198. This removes the difficulty explained in the last chapter . . . . .	210
199. The same continued . . . . .	211
200. In this way we shall gain sufficient descriptions of <i>all</i> parts of $A$ . We shall also gain a sufficient description of $A$ . . . . .	212
201. The conditions which will give a solution can be rather wider, in several respects, than those given in Section 197 . . . . .	212
202. Definitions of the terms used so far in this chapter . . . . .	214
203. It is not necessary that every primary part should be determined, directly or indirectly, by every other primary part in its primary whole . . . . .	216

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

xvii

SECT.	PAGE
204. <i>All</i> sufficient descriptions of the members of a sequent set give sufficient descriptions of the members of a precedent set, but, in the reverse direction, we only know that <i>some</i> sufficient description of the members of a precedent set will give a sufficient description of the members of a sequent set . . . . .	216
205. Superprimary Wholes . . . . .	217
206. Recapitulation . . . . .	218

## CHAPTER XXV. DETERMINING CORRESPONDENCE AS CAUSAL

207. Is Determining Correspondence a relation of Causality? . . . . .	219
208. Causality is admittedly a relation ( <i>a</i> ) of intrinsic determination, ( <i>b</i> ) between existents, ( <i>c</i> ) between qualities . . . . .	219
209. It is also held that the terms of the relation can be distinguished as cause and effect, the cause being the earlier of the two, if they are successive . . . . .	221
210. It is also held that the cause determines the effect in some way in which the effect does not determine the cause. But this is erroneous . . . . .	222
211. It is also erroneous to hold that the cause explains the effect in some way in which the effect does not explain the cause . . . . .	223
212. Or to hold that the cause exerts an activity on the effect . . . . .	224
213. Why did these erroneous beliefs arise? . . . . .	225
214. The view that a causal series must have a first cause while it need not have a last effect . . . . .	226
215. How far does the view at which we have arrived differ from the ordinary view of causality? . . . . .	227
216. It follows from what has been said that determining correspondence is a relation of causality . . . . .	228
217. But it does not follow that all existent qualities are terms in causal relations. What is meant by the universal validity of causation . . . . .	228
218. The universal validity of causation would not imply the universal validity of reciprocal causation . . . . .	230
219. What is meant by reciprocal causation . . . . .	231
220. It may be universal, but there is no reason to think it is so . . . . .	233
221. It has sometimes been supposed that complete causal determination would make it possible to infer the nature of any substance from that of any other. But this is a mistake . . . . .	233
222. Why this has been believed . . . . .	235
223. Whether the absence of complete causal determination would yield results satisfactory to ethical indeterminism, would depend upon what ethical indeterminism would regard as satisfactory . . . . .	236

## CHAPTER XXVI. DETERMINING CORRESPONDENCE

*(continued)*

SECT.	PAGE
224. Does it follow from our results that every quality in a determinate part is determined by determining correspondence?	238
225. This does not follow . . . . .	238
226. We cannot, at this stage in our argument, determine exactly what relation of determining correspondence does occur in the universe . . . . .	239
227. Nor can we lay down any further conditions with which it must comply. In particular, we cannot, at present, be certain that the same species of determining correspondence occurs throughout the universe . . . . .	240
228. Nor that more than one species does not extend over the whole universe, or over part of it . . . . .	241
229. An enumeration of the characteristics which we have found to belong to determining correspondence . . . . .	241
230-232. Three sorts of relations which could not be relations of determining correspondence . . . . .	242-3
233. A sort of relation which might be a relation of determining correspondence . . . . .	244
234-235. Certain relations between knower and known could not be relations of determining correspondence . . . . .	245-7
236. But perception might, under certain conditions, be a relation of determining correspondence . . . . .	248

## CHAPTER XXVII. EXCLUSIVE COMMON QUALITIES

*(continued)*

237. Recapitulation of the results of Chapter xvii . . . . .	250
238. We can now show that every substance belongs to at least one group in which there is an exclusive common quality which is not a re-statement of the denotation of the group. The first type of these groups for substances within the Fundamental System . . . . .	251
239. The second type . . . . .	252
240. The third type . . . . .	253
241. The fourth type . . . . .	253
242. The first type of groups for substances not within the Fundamental System . . . . .	254
243. The second type . . . . .	254
244. All these exclusive common qualities are relational qualities . . . . .	255
245. But this is all that is essential . . . . .	256
246. It does not follow that, because we know a substance, we shall know to which groups of these types it belongs . . . . .	258

## CHAPTER XXVIII. ORDER IN THE UNIVERSE

SECT.	PAGE
247. Recapitulation of results in Chapter XXI as to Order. We can now see that the universe possesses causal order and order of classification . . . . .	259
248. Definition of a Fundamental System . . . . .	260
249. Why such systems should be regarded as specially fundamental	261
250. Principle of classification of these arrangements of the universe which depart from the fundamental system . . . . .	262
251. But this principle is not applicable in practice, owing to our limited knowledge . . . . .	264
252. Recapitulation of results in Chapter XXI as to unities of composition and unities of manifestation . . . . .	265
253. We can now see that all primary and secondary parts are more appropriately called unities of manifestation . . . . .	266
254. Of substances not members of the fundamental system, either both expressions are equally appropriate, or unity of composition is more appropriate . . . . .	266
255. Primary wholes and the universe are more appropriately called unities of composition . . . . .	268
256. Thus primary parts occupy a position of unique importance in the fundamental system, and the universe is more fundamentally a plurality than a unity . . . . .	270
257. As to the <i>natures</i> of substances, there seems no ground for supposing that either unity of composition or unity of manifestation is the more appropriate expression . . . . .	272

## CHAPTER XXIX. LAWS IN THE UNIVERSE

258. The validity of the fabric of knowledge which we accept in ordinary life involves the validity of what we may call Exclusive Laws in the Universe . . . . .	273
259. There are some such laws which we know <i>à priori</i> must be valid if there is a universe at all . . . . .	274
260. But to justify our <i>primâ facie</i> system of knowledge it will be necessary that some laws should be valid which we do not know <i>à priori</i> . . . . .	275
261. And the system of determining correspondence enables us to assert <i>à priori</i> that some laws are valid which we do not know <i>à priori</i> . . . . .	275
262. The same continued . . . . .	276
263. The range of these laws is very considerable. How far does our knowledge that they exist justify our belief that we know by induction some of the Exclusive Laws in the Universe? . . . . .	277
264. The nature of inductive arguments . . . . .	278

SECT.	PAGE
265. They involve an assertion that one quality intrinsically determines another. And this assertion cannot be justified on the basis of induction alone . . . . .	280
266. The same continued . . . . .	281
267. Nor can it be justified by the fact that some qualities can be seen <i>à priori</i> to intrinsically determine others . . . . .	282
268. The objection in Sections 265-266 is removed by the establishment of determining correspondence . . . . .	283
269. But there is another which cannot so far be removed by determining correspondence, though subsequent developments of that theory might affect it . . . . .	284
270. And a third which could not be removed by determining correspondence, nor by complete causal determination . . . . .	286
271. A philosophical justification of induction has not yet been found . . . . .	286

### CHAPTER XXX. THE DIFFERENTIATION OF PRIMARY PARTS

272. It is necessary that every primary part should be differentiated from all other primary parts . . . . .	288
273. This may take place by a difference in their differentiating groups—though this could not be the sole method with all primary parts . . . . .	288
274. Or by a difference in their relations to other substances . . . . .	290
275. Or by a difference in their original qualities . . . . .	290
276. Or by a difference in their derivative qualities . . . . .	291
277. We have no reason to assert that every primary part has any quality which is common and exclusive . . . . .	291

### CHAPTER XXXI. THE UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE

278. We can, at this point, determine definitely nothing further as to the unity of the universe. But it is useful to consider some possible results . . . . .	294
279. The first supposition to be considered . . . . .	295
280. It would produce a unity in many respects very close . . . . .	295
281. And between the parts of any primary part, there would exist a system of relations homologous to a system of relations existing between the primary parts of the universe . . . . .	296
282. The same continued . . . . .	298
283. And this would lead to a correspondence between the universe and each primary part . . . . .	298

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

xxi

SECT.	PAGE
284. So that the universe would be what we may call a Self-Reflecting Unity . . . . .	299
285. If the universe is such a unity, then no other substance in the same fundamental system can be such a unity. Nor can any substance which is not in a fundamental system be reflected, as the universe is, in the members of each of an endless series of sets of parts . . . . .	300
286. The expressions that the whole is in every part, and that each part expresses the nature of the whole, though incorrect even of a self-reflecting unity, are less inappropriate with such a unity than elsewhere . . . . .	301
287. But, even on the first supposition, the differentiations of the universe are more fundamental than its unity . . . . .	302
288. The second supposition . . . . .	303
289. It does not give as much unity as the first . . . . .	303
290. The third supposition. This, again, gives less unity . . . . .	305
291. The fourth supposition. Here the unity is again less . . . . .	306
292. And the same is the case with the fifth supposition . . . . .	307
293. And the sixth supposition . . . . .	308
INDEX . . . . .	310