BOOK V. PRESENT EXPERIENCE AND ABSOLUTE REALITY

CHAPTER XXXII THE INTRODUCTION OF THE EMPIRICAL

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| 294. | In this volume we shall apply the general results of Vol. I to certain empirical questions | 3 |
| 295. | In Bk V we shall consider, with regard to certain character- | |
| | istics which seem to apply to the existent, (a) whether they can, and (b) whether they do in fact, apply | 3 |
| 296. | In Bk VI we shall consider how appearance can diverge from | |
| 297. | reality, and how the two are related when they do diverge. In Bk VII we shall apply our results to questions of practical | 3 |
| | interest | 4 |
| 298. | In Vol. I the conclusions, if true, are certain. In Vol. II the positive conclusions are only highly probable | 4 |
| 299. | All empirical knowledge is, or is based on, perception | 6 |
| | Which is acquaintance with substances, giving knowledge about | |
| 301 | their characteristics | 6 |
| 001. | not be confused with the judgment that so-and-so has a | 7 |
| 302, | We shall find that a substance can be perceived as having | |
| | characteristics which it does not in fact have | 7 |
| | CHAPTER XXXIII. TIME | |
| | | |
| 303. | We shall try to prove that nothing is in time. This is a highly paradoxical conclusion | 9 |
| 304. | Yet it has been held by many philosophers and religious | 9 |
| 305 | mystics. Our reasons are different from theirs Temporal positions are distinguished as (a) Past, Present and | ð |
| 500. | Future, (b) Earlier and Later. The former are transitory, | |
| | the latter permanent | 9 |
| 3U6. | The two series are called respectively the A and the B series. The A series is as essential to time as the B series, and | |
| | more fundamental | 10 |

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| 307. | All observed events appear to form an A series as well as a B series | 11 |
| 308. | Could the \boldsymbol{A} series be merely subjective and the \boldsymbol{B} series | |
| | objective? | 11 |
| 309. | There could be no time unless something changed; and, if anything changes, then everything does so. Could there be | |
| | change without an A series? | 11 |
| 310 | No event could cease or begin to be an event, or merge into | |
| 010. | another event | 12 |
| 311. | The only characteristics of an event that can change are the | |
| 0241 | characteristics of the A series. So the A series is essential | |
| | for change and therefore for time | 13 |
| 312. | The B series involves time and therefore involves the A series | 13 |
| 3 13. | Russell's view of time and change | 13 |
| | It involves moments of time, and yet rejects the A series . | 14 |
| | Substances cannot change unless events do so. And events can | |
| | change only in respect of A characteristics | 14 |
| 316. | If we remove the A series we are left with a series which is not | |
| | temporal and allows of no change | 15 |
| 317. | Our theory involves that some propositions are sometimes true and sometimes false | 15 |
| 318 | Russell regards such propositions as ambiguous because ellip- | 10 |
| 020. | tical | 16 |
| 319. | There are trains of fictitious events which certainly form a B | 10 |
| | series, yet seem not to form an A series | 16 |
| 320. | But, since these events do not exist, they are not in time at | |
| | all | 16 |
| 321. | And, in so far as they are thought to exist, they are thought | |
| | to be in an A series | 17 |
| 322. | Would a plurality of time-series affect the argument? | 17 |
| | No. If there were many B series there would be as many A | |
| | series | 18 |
| 324. | Men have wanted to reject the Δ series and retain the B series | |
| | in the vain hope of saving the reality of time | 18 |
| | We have now to prove that an A series cannot exist | 18 |
| 326. | Past, present, and future are relational properties, not qualities | 19 |
| 327. | Since these properties change, the relations must be to some- | |
| | thing outside the time-series. And the relations are inde- | |
| | finable | 19 |
| 328. | It is difficult to conceive what this something could be. And | |
| | there is a more positive objection | 20 |
| 32 9. | For the three characteristics are incompatible and yet every | |
| | event has them all | 20 |

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| 330. | It might be replied that they are had successively, and are not | |
| | then incompatible | 21 |
| 331. | But this answer is found to lead to the same difficulty at the | |
| | next step | 21 |
| 332. | And involves a vicious infinite regress | 21 |
| 333. | So the A series must be rejected, and time with it | 22 |
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| | does not | 23 |
| 335. | This theory assumes that judgments about the future are | |
| | neither true nor false | 23 |
| 336. | And this is impossible | 24 |
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| | the future | 24 |
| 338. | And the past does sometimes intrinsically determine the | |
| | future | 24 |
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| 340. | And this would involve almost complete scepticism | 25 |
| | And the difficulty about past and present remains even if | |
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| 342. | Are we so certain of the reality of time that we can reject every | |
| | argument against it? | 27 |
| 343. | Even if time were objectively real, time as perceived would | |
| | have to be unreal or merely subjective | 27 |
| 344. | For specious presents are of various lengths; whilst the | |
| | objective present, if it had duration at all, would have one | |
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| 349. | Assertions about the temporal order of events will correspond | |
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| 351 | The C series has some analogy to Russell's time-series. But its | |
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| 354. | Secondary Qualities, even if they belong to matter, are no | |
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| 356. | The required sufficient descriptions of the primary parts of | |
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| 357. | And there could not be determining correspondence in respect | |
| | of spatial qualities unless it could be established in respect | |
| | of non-spatial qualities | 37 |
| 358 | For, if space be relative, bits of matter must be differentiated | ٠. |
| 000. | by non-spatial qualities | 37 |
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| 001 | For similar reasons matter could not be divided into temporal | 99 |
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| 377. | | |
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| 45 | myself either by acquaintance or by description | |
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| 400 | argument against Solipsism | 121 |
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BOOK VI. ERROR

CHAPTER XLIV. ERROR

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| | ment in terms of the specious present | |
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| 703. | No reason can be assigned for the greater importance attached | 0 |

to the future than to the past. But it is not contrary to reason

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| | between the value of a thing and the value in a thing . | 399 |
| | There is no value of a group of selves, though there is a value in it | 399 |
| | Hence the universe, on our view of it, has no value, though there is value in it | 399 |
| | This doctrine has been condemned as too atomistic. But it does not deny that the value of a self depends largely on its relations to other selves | 400 |
| 792. | Does a self have value, or is it only parts of selves which have value? This can be discussed separately of those parts which appear as simultaneous states and those which appear as successive stages in a single self. | 400 |
| 793. | When we say that a feeling of pleasure, e.g., is good we may | |
| | mean only that a self who has such a feeling is good | 400 |
| 794. | But the fact that selves are metaphysically fundamental raises a presumption that they are the only substances that have value. Not much weight can be attached to this | 401 |
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| 797. The arguments for holding that successive total states of a | |
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| 798. If good belongs to the self, it will be wrong to say, e.g., that the good determined by a past or future pleasure is itself past or future. But it will be right to say this if the good belongs to the state of pleasure and not to the self. And it does seem reasonable to say this | |
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| 803. There can be no unconscious states of selves, in the sense of states which lack the quality of consciousness | |
| 804. And, in our view, no self which was self-conscious could have any states which were unconscious in the sense that this self did not perceive them | |
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| 806. We have admitted that much which we perceive is perceived only as a vague background. And this is all that the psychology of the unconscious requires | 407 |
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| 810. On the latter alternative qualities would still be positively good or evil, in the only sense in which they could be so on any view | |

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| | of harmony when we take into account the number and | l |
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| | tion that it would just have resisted | 414 |
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| | determined by the actual nature of the universe | . 415 |
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| | can be a state of unmixed good or evil | 416 |
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| | state that we have experienced by more than the latter | 410 |
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| | will enable us to determine the proportion of good to evil in | . 417 |
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| 822. | There can be no analytical connection between existence and | 417 |
| | value, since neither good nor evil nor existence is definable. There is no direct synthetic connection, which we can see to | , 411 |
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| 025 | Attempts to establish by reasoning an indirect connection be | |
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| | argument, which does not use this premise, must be rejected | 419 |
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| | be good or useful | 421 |
| 829. | In the final stage, if virtue were the only good, there could be no good. But there might be good, even if virtue were the only good, at stages where there is an erroneous belief that there are other goods beside virtue | 422 |
| 8 3 0. | In the final stage there may be ignorance but there will be no error. And the ignorance will not involve the presence of unsolved problems. The final stage will therefore be one of unmixed good as regards knowledge | 423 |
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| 832. | No intrinsically evil emotions are possible in the final stage . | 424 |
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| | that there may also be pain | 427 |
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| 882. | the value of the final stage is determined in the same way. The final stage is in the inclusion series in the same sense in which the pre-final stages are. But it occupies an unique position, since it is the only term which includes and is not included | 458 459 |
| 883. | The value of the final term is infinite, in the sense that it is greater than any finite multiple of any finite value | 460 |
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| 885. | The final stage, then, has infinite value because it is unbounded | 461 |
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| | stages. \hat{A} fortiori, its value is not the sum of their values. | 462 |
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| 894. | The cause of my acquiescence in anything that I perceive is the fact that it is a part of some self for whom I feel either love, or affection, or self-reverence. Since these emotions are good, it is virtuous to acquiesce in the existence of their | |
| | necessary conditions. Now they could not exist unless the | |
| | selves which are their object existed, and these could not | |
| 895. | exist unless their parts existed | 466 |
| | necessary conditions of the existence of what is good. And, | |

since there can be no suppositions in the final stage, we do not at that stage contemplate the possibility that these states might have retained their utility without their undesirable

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qualities

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| 467 | otherwise very undesirable state merely because it was a necessary condition of some slight good. But love is the supreme good, and it is virtuous to acquiesce in states of sin and pain if they be necessary conditions for the existence | 89 |
| | all the evil that we shall perceive in the pre-final stages; we may be emotionally indifferent to it. But neither indifference | 89 |
| 468 | | 89 |
| 468 | will not. There will be sympathetic pain For we always feel sympathetic pain in contemplating the pain of those whom we regard with love or affection. Since pain, especially when undeserved, is an evil, the final stage is not | 89 |
| 469 | one of unmixed good | 90 |
| 470 | good and strike a balance | 90 |
| 470 | The hedonic value of the final stage consists of infinite and unmixed non-sympathetic pleasure and of sympathetic pleasure and pain. The sympathetic pain is wholly due to the contemplation of the pain in the pre-final stages; and this is finite. The sympathetic pleasure is due to the contemplation of both the finite pleasure of the pre-final stages and the infinite non-sympathetic pleasure of the final stage. Hence in the final stage sympathetic pleasure infinitely exceeds sympathetic pain | ฮบ |
| | This assumes that the amount of sympathetic pleasure or pain which we feel is proportional to the amount of non-sympathetic pleasure or pain which we perceive. In present experience we feel less sympathy for past pleasure and pain than for present pleasure and pain. If this difference does not depend on the real relations which appear as past and present, it will not affect our argument. And, if it does depend | 90 |
| 471 | on these relations, it will strengthen our argument. Our conclusions about the proportion of good and evil in the final stage, and in all the stages taken together, depend on | 90 |
| 472 | our conclusion that the final stage has infinite value | |

CHAPTER LXVIII. CONCLUSION

SECT.

| | | THOE |
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| 904. | Can we tell anything about the value of the stages which come between the present and the final stage? | 473 |
| 905 | We might think that we could count on a steady increase of | 710 |
| <i>5</i> 00. | - | 4170 |
| 000 | goodness, though its rate would be uncertain | 473 |
| <i>9</i> 00. | But this is not justifiable. For all the qualities which determine | |
| | goodness can oscillate, and the amount of goodness will oscil- | |
| | late with them | 473 |
| 907. | Since time is finite, the number of oscillations and the duration | |
| | of each must be finite. The existence of many short oscil- | |
| | lations would be better than that of a few long ones, for two | |
| | reasons | 475 |
| 908. | We know that a period of deterioration may last through the | |
| | whole of a man's life in one body. Whether it can last longer | |
| | we do not know | 475 |
| 909, | We cannot draw conclusions from observing long periods of | |
| | deterioration in the history of a nation or race or planet. | |
| | For we do not know that the successive generations are | |
| | composed of the same individuals | 476 |
| 910. | There is no reason why a process of deterioration which was | |
| | going on at death should not be continued in the next life | 477 |
| 911. | The smallness of our field of observation makes all inductive | |
| | conclusions about the future of the universe as a whole | |
| | almost worthless. The immense scale of the universe and | |
| | our own insignificance are somewhat depressing to consider | 477 |
| 912 | Hegel is an example of a great philosopher who could never | |
| V-2. | quite face these facts | 478 |
| 013 | We can set no limits to the evils that we may have to endure | 410 |
| 010. | • | |
| | before reaching the final stage. But we know that, however | |
| | great they may be, the goodness of the final stage will infinitely | 479 |
| | outweigh them | 418 |
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