

# Contents

## *I* Introduction, 3

1. The Problem of the Reality of Free Will, 3
2. Definitions of Terms, 10
3. Overview of the Text, 19

## **Part I Hierarchical Compatibilism Defended**

### *2* A Compatibilist Account of Free Will, 27

1. Two Hierarchical Accounts, 27
2. Problems for the Accounts of Frankfurt and Watson, 31
3. The First Line of Reply: Let's Distinguish  
    between Intrusive and Non-Intrusive Controllers, 35
4. The Second Line of Reply:  
    The Autonomy Variable Strategy, 37
5. Five Autonomy Variables, 38
6. The Autonomy Variable Account, 48
7. How the Autonomy Account Handles the Local  
    and Global Challenges, 49
8. The Third Line of Reply: "Free Will" as an  
    Internalistic Concept, 55
9. Conclusion, 61

### *3* Does Freedom Require Morality?, 62

1. Three Arguments for the Affirmative Answer, 62
2. The Case for the Negative Answer, 67

3. Replies to the Three Arguments, 63
  4. Conclusion, 74
- 4 **Compatibilism and Moral Responsibility, 75**
1. Introduction, 75
  2. The Content and Ascribability Issues, 76
  3. Reduced Content and Consequentialist Ascribability, 79
  4. Problems with Consequentialist Ascribability, 81
  5. Formalist Moral Responsibility, 84
  6. Conclusion, 94
- Part II Free Will Unravelling**
- 5 ***Free Will* as an Exemplar Concept, 97**
1. The Normative Problem, 98
  2. Four Cases to Illustrate the Normative Problem, 100
  3. The Bribe Problem, 109
  4. Do Causes That Incline without Compelling Reduce Free Will?, 111
  5. Does Being Free Entail Feeling Free?, 112
  6. Three Exemplars of Freedom, 114
  7. Some Empirical Support for the Free Will Exemplars, 119
  8. The Three Exemplars and the Unsettled Free Will Questions, 124
  9. Conclusion, 130
- 6 **Meta-Compatibilism, 133**
1. The Argument for Meta-Compatibilism, 134
  2. Objections and Replies, 144
  3. Conclusion, 150
- 7 **An Argument for Moral Non-Realism, 151**
1. Introduction, 151
  2. Three Theories of Moral Properties, 158
  3. The Argument against Objective Moral Realism, 162
  4. Why Non-Naturalist Theories Cannot Satisfy Both the Conformity and Simplicity Conditions, 168

5. Difficulties for the Naturalist Alternatives, 173
6. The Universal Subjective vs. Anarchistic Subjective Theories, 180
7. Conclusion, 187
  
- 8 Troubles with Libertarianism, 190
  1. Three Libertarian Conditions, 190
  2. Nonvalerian Theories, 192
  3. Dennett's Valerian Theory, 199
  4. Kane's Theory, 202
  5. Delay Libertarianism, 211
  6. Libertarianism's Problems with Rationality, 214
  7. Conclusion, 216
  
- 9 Conclusion, 217
  1. Six Conditions for an Account of Free Will, 218
  2. Rating the Free Will Theories, 221
  3. What Is Left, 223

NOTES, 231

REFERENCES, 235

INDEX, 243