

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments	v
Preface	xi
PART ONE: MORAL PROBLEMS, DISAGREEMENTS, AND REASONING	
I Examples of Moral Problems and Moral Disagreements	3
II The Nature of a Moral Problem and of a Moral Disagreement	13
III Moral Reasons and Moral Reasoning	25
Examples That Are and Are Not Moral Reasons	25
Stevenson's Analysis of Moral Reasons	28
Hare's Analysis of Moral Reasons	31
My Account of Moral Reasons	40
IV Moral Contrasted with Scientific Reasoning and Why There Are No Moral Experts	49
The Contrast between Moral and Scientific Reasoning	49
Why There Are No Moral Experts	52
Five Bad Arguments	52
My Argument	54
Objections and Replies	56

PART TWO: SOME MAJOR ETHICAL THEORIES

V	Approbative Theories	63
	Ethical Subjectivism and Conventionalism	63
	Individual or Specific Variants	66
	General or Universal Variants	67
	Relativistic Variants	68
	The Golden Rule	71
	Divine-Command Theory	74
VI	Objectivist Theories	81
	"Ethical" Egoism	82
	Personal (Individual or Specific) Ethical Egoism	82
	Impersonal (Universal or General) Ethical Egoism	83
	Evaluation of These Normative Doctrines	84
	Utilitarianism	88
	Act (or Extreme) Utilitarianism	89
	"Ideal" Form	89
	Hedonistic Version	89
	Eudaemonistic Version	90
	Objections to	91
	Rule (or Restricted) Utilitarianism	101
	The Appeal to Nature for Moral Guidance	102

Kant's Ethics	108
Based on the First Formulation of the Categorical Imperative	109
Based on the Second Formulation of the Categorical Imperative	114
Agapism	117
Criticisms of Agapism and the Second Version of Kant's Ethics	118
VII Conclusion	127
The Only Satisfactory Normative Position in Ethics is a Modified Form of What John Rawls Defines as Intuitionism	127
We Should Ourselves Acknowledge That We Are Objectivists	128
We Should Be Moderate Deontologists	129
The Intuitionism I Espouse Is Not To Be Confused with the Traditional Intuitionism of Either Prichard, Moore, or Ross	129
Why My View Does Not Fall Into Subjectivism or Conventionalism	131
The Question How We Determine That a Moral Judgment Is True	131
Why We Need Not Be Moral Skeptics	132
The Question Whether We Can Show That One Morality Is the Right One	134
Why My Account Does Not Make Moral Reasoning Arbitrary	136
Our Agreement in the Use of Moral Language	137

The Question Why We Should Be Moral If It Is Impossible To Justify Any Single Morality or Morality in General	138
The Question What the Source of Morality Is	138
 Why It Won't Do To Say Experience Is Its Source	140
The Question of What Does and Should Happen When Moral and Nonmoral Reasons Come into Conflict	140
Appendix: Multiple-Choice Review Questions	143
Bibliography	227
Glossary of Relevant Philosophical Terms	293
Index	311