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Preface	ix
Introduction	xi

## Chapter 1

Meaning and Mentalism	1
<i>Fodor and Chomsky</i>	4
<i>Three Reasons Why Mentalism Can't Be Right</i>	8
<i>Connections between 1, 2, and 3</i>	15

## Chapter 2

Meaning, Other People, and the World	19
<i>The Division of Linguistic Labor</i>	22
<i>Elms, Beeches, and Searle</i>	26
<i>The Contribution of the Environment</i>	30
<i>An Indexical Component</i>	33
<i>Other Natural Kinds</i>	34
<i>Reference and Theory Change</i>	36
<i>Meaning and "Mental Representation"</i>	37

## Chapter 3

Fodor and Block on "Narrow Content"	43
<i>Narrow Content as a "Function of Observable Properties"</i>	43
<i>"Narrow Content" and "Conceptual Role"</i>	46
<i>Concluding Remarks</i>	54

## Chapter 4

Are There Such Things as Reference and Truth?	57
<i>Why "Folk Psychology" and Not "Folk Logic"?</i>	59
<i>Disquotation, Anyone?</i>	60
<i>The "Semantical Conception" of Truth</i>	61
<i>Disquotation as Disappearance</i>	66

Chapter 5	
Why Functionalism Didn't Work	73
Sociofunctionalism	74
What "In Principle" Means Here	76
The Single-Computational-State Version of Functionalism	80
Equivalence	84
Surveying Rationality	87
Chapter 6	
Other Forms of Functionalism	91
David Lewis and I	94
Lewis's Theory Further Examined	101
Conclusion	103
Chapter 7	
A Sketch of an Alternative Picture	107
Objectivity and Conceptual Relativity	109
Internal Realism as an Alternative Picture	113
My Present Diagnosis of the "Functionalism" Issue	116
Appendix	121
Notes	127
Author Index	135