

SUMMARY CONTENTS

<i>Contents</i>	ix
<i>Abbreviations</i>	xxii
30. Suarez: Law and Obligation	1
31. Suarez: Naturalism	28
32. Natural Law and 'Modern' Moral Philosophy	70
33. Grotius	88
34. Hobbes: Motives and Reasons	100
35. Hobbes: From Human Nature to Morality	125
36. Hobbes: Morality	157
37. Spinoza	179
38. The 'British Moralists'	204
39. Cumberland and Maxwell	219
40. Cudworth	239
41. Locke and Natural Law	264
42. Pufendorf	284
43. Leibniz: Naturalism and Eudaemonism	312
44. Pufendorf and Natural Law	332
45. Shaftesbury	353
46. Clarke	372
47. Hutcheson: For and Against Moral Realism	399
48. Hutcheson: For and Against Utilitarianism	421
49. Balguy: A Defence of Rationalism	439
50. Balguy and Clarke: Morality and Natural Theology	465
51. Butler: Nature	476
52. Butler: Superior Principles	489
53. Butler: Naturalism and Morality	507
54. Butler: Implications of Naturalism	539
55. Hume: Nature	558

56. Hume: Passion and Reason	579
57. Hume: Errors of Objectivism	598
58. Hume: The Moral Sense	620
59. Hume: The Virtues	641
60. Smith	678
61. Price	714
62. Reid: Action and Will	754
63. Reid: Knowledge and Morality	782
64. Voluntarism, Egoism, and Utilitarianism	812
65. Rousseau	852
<i>Bibliography</i>	883
<i>Index</i>	899

CONTENTS

Abbreviations

xxii

30. Suarez: Law and Obligation	1
423. The Questions about Natural Law	1
424. Some Issues and Clarifications	2
425. Suarez's 'Intermediate' Position	3
426. Naturalism	4
427. Two Versions of Naturalism	8
428. Suarez's Objection to Naturalism	10
429. True Law	13
430. Obligation and the Natural Law	14
431. Conceptions of Obligation	16
432. Why Obligation Requires Laws and Commands	18
433. Obligations v. Duties	21
434. Obligation, Law, and Natural Law	22
435. Voluntarism	25
31. Suarez: Naturalism	28
436. The Natural Basis of Natural Law	28
437. The Foundation of Obligation	29
438. Moral Goodness	31
439. The Objectivity of Moral Goodness: An Argument for Naturalism	33
440. Metaphysics and Meta-ethics	35
441. Intrinsic Rightness	38
442. Theoretical and Practical Reason	41
443. Natural Rightness and Divine Freewill	45
444. Subordinate Principles of Natural Law	48
445. Our Knowledge of Natural Law	49
446. Application of the Precepts	52
447. Divine Dispensations from the Natural Law?	54
448. The Natural Law and the Law of Nations	57
449. Natural Law and the Basis of Political Society	61
450. The Law of War as Part of the Law of Nations	62
451. Sedition and Rebellion	64
452. The Separation of Morality from Natural Law	67

32. Natural Law and ‘Modern’ Moral Philosophy	70
453. The Modern Theory of Natural Law	70
454. Barbeyrac’s View of Grotius	72
455. The Fundamental Status of Natural Law	73
456. Sidgwick: A Jural Conception of Ethics	75
457. What is Distinctive of a Jural Conception?	77
458. Sidgwick and Barbeyrac	78
459. The Abandonment of Jural Morality?	79
460. Who Holds a Jural Conception?	82
461. Alleged Contrasts between Aquinas and Suarez	83
462. Grotius as a Secular Moralist	85
33. Grotius	88
463. Grotius and his Predecessors	88
464. Naturalism	89
465. The Will of God	91
466. Natural Sociality	93
467. Natural Law and Political Principles	96
468. Is Grotius a Pioneer?	98
34. Hobbes: Motives and Reasons	100
469. Hobbes’s Aims	100
470. Passion v. Will	103
471. Hobbes and Greek Scepticism	105
472. Objections to Hobbes’s Account of Will	106
473. Deliberation and Practical Reason	107
474. Conflicting Views on Incontinence	109
475. Will, Passion, and Freewill	110
476. A Hedonist Account of Desire and Emotion	112
477. Pleasure and Good	114
478. Practical Reason and Prudence	115
479. Pleasure, Reason, and the Human Good: Rejection of Eudaemonism	118
480. The Instability of Desire	120
481. Aristotelian Teleology	122
35. Hobbes: From Human Nature to Morality	125
482. Moral Philosophy, Old and New	125
483. Human Nature and Natural Law	126
484. Freedom and Rights	128
485. Obligation as Renunciation of Rights	130
486. Obligation as Motivation	132
487. Natural Law and Divine Commands	134

488.	Why Moral Principles are Laws of Nature	138
489.	The Reduction of Morality	140
490.	The State of Nature	142
491.	Competition and Conflict	144
492.	Why a State of War?	146
493.	Arguments for a Commonwealth	149
494.	Objections to the Prudential Argument	151
495.	Prudence and Motivation in the State of Nature	154
496.	Reason and the Laws of Nature	155
36.	Hobbes: Morality	157
497.	Hobbes's Attitude to Morality	157
498.	Hobbes's Defence of Morality	158
499.	Indirect Arguments for Morality	159
500.	Morality and the Preservation of Peace	161
501.	Revolutionary Objections	164
502.	Libertarian Objections	166
503.	Non-conformist Objections	167
504.	Indirect Prudence	168
505.	Psychology and Morality: The Presumption of Equality	172
506.	Psychology and Morality: Risk and Reciprocity	175
507.	Moral Theory in Hobbes's System	176
37.	Spinoza	179
508.	Spinoza's Attitude to Ethics	179
509.	Mind and the Limits of Agency	180
510.	Errors about Freedom	185
511.	Intellect and Will	188
512.	Emotion and Freedom from Emotion	190
513.	Desires and Tendencies	193
514.	Desire and Goodness	194
515.	Passions as the Sources of Conflict	195
516.	The Good of Rational Beings	198
517.	Intellectual Love of God	199
518.	Reason and the Good of Others	201
38.	The 'British Moralists'	204
519.	Rationalists and Sentimentalists	204
520.	Whewell: Dependent v. Independent Morality	206
521.	Whewell and Utilitarianism	207
522.	Whewell on Voluntarism	209
523.	Objections to Whewell: Utilitarianism	210
524.	Appropriate Questions	211

525.	The Significance of Voluntarism	211
526.	Tendencies to Voluntarism	212
527.	Anti-Scholasticism	214
528.	Rationalism v. Orthodoxy	216
529.	Voluntarism and Egoism	217
39.	Cumberland and Maxwell	219
530.	Cumberland's Aims	219
531.	Natural Law as Divine Legislation	220
532.	Cumberland's Voluntarism: Natural Law and Morality	222
533.	Individual Happiness and the Common Good	224
534.	Non-instrumental Goods v. Moral Goods	226
535.	Utilitarianism?	227
536.	Maxwell's Criticism of Cumberland's Account of Morality	229
537.	Morality and its Sanction	230
538.	Divine Goodness and the Stability of Morality	232
539.	The Authority of Divine Legislation	233
540.	Morality and Practical Reason	236
40.	Cudworth	239
541.	Cudworth's Place in the History of Moral Philosophy	239
542.	Reason and Will	241
543.	The Hegemonicon	243
544.	Does Cudworth Improve on the Scholastic View?	246
545.	What is Cudworth's Objection to Determinism?	247
546.	The Nature of the Will and the Basis of Ethics	249
547.	The Question about Immutability	252
548.	Legislation and Morality	254
549.	Cudworth and Plato	256
550.	Cudworth and Hobbes	257
551.	Obligation, Reason, and Motive	260
41.	Locke and Natural Law	264
552.	Disputes about Scholastic Naturalism	264
553.	Locke, Hobbes, and Cudworth	265
554.	Reason and Will	265
555.	Freedom	267
556.	Disputes on Natural Law	269
557.	Sanderson	270
558.	Culverwell and Suarez	272
559.	Culverwell and the Character of Morality	273
560.	Parker	275
561.	Locke's Voluntarist Account of Natural Law	278

562. Morality and Pleasure	279
563. A Return to Naturalism?	280
42. Pufendorf	284
564. Pufendorf on Morality and Law	284
565. Pufendorf's Voluntarism	285
566. Nature, Creation, and Divine Freedom	286
567. Nature and Imposition	287
568. Natural v. Moral Goodness	289
569. Morality, Obligation, Law, and Command	290
570. The Errors of Naturalism	291
571. Self-Interest v. Morality	292
572. Natural Goodness v. Natural Morality	294
573. Divine Law as a Source for Morality	296
574. The Form of Moral Requirements	296
575. The Authority of Divine Legislation	297
576. Pufendorf v. Hobbes on Legitimate Rulers	298
577. A Non-moral Basis for Morality?	298
578. Divine Commands as a Substitute for Morality	300
579. Grotius on Nature and Contradiction	301
580. Divine Freedom and Natural Goodness	303
581. What Sort of Voluntarist is Pufendorf?	304
582. Divine Freedom, Creation, and Legislation	305
583. Sociality and Society	307
584. The Limits of Sociality	308
585. Influence of Pufendorf	310
43. Leibniz: Naturalism and Eudaemonism	312
586. Scholasticism	312
587. The Reformation	313
588. Egoism and Eudaemonism	314
589. The Right and the Just	317
590. Naturalism v. Voluntarism	321
591. The Errors of Pufendorf's Voluntarism	322
592. Pufendorf's Legislative Account of Morality	323
593. Barbeyrac's Defence of Pufendorf on the Content of Morality	325
594. God's Right to Rule	326
595. Barbeyrac's Objections to Eudaemonism	327
596. Barbeyrac's Argument from Obligation	329
597. Leibniz v. Traditional Eudaemonism	330
44. Pufendorf and Natural Law	332
598. Barbeyrac's Attempt to Assimilate Grotius to Pufendorf	332
599. Barbeyrac's Attempt to Assimilate Pufendorf to Grotius	333

600.	Barbeyrac's Modern Theory of Natural Law	335
601.	Burlamaqui on Pufendorf	336
602.	A Defence of Voluntarism: Fundamental v. Formal Morality	338
603.	What is Fundamental Morality?	340
604.	Defence of Naturalism	343
605.	The Persistence of Voluntarism	346
606.	Mackie's Defence of Pufendorf	347
607.	Adams's Defence of Pufendorf	350
45.	Shaftesbury	353
608.	Platonist, or Sentimentalist, or Both?	353
609.	The Sense of Right and Wrong	354
610.	Moral Motivation, Virtue, and Happiness	357
611.	Platonism, Realism, and Voluntarism	361
612.	Realism and the Irreducibility of Morality to Self-Interest	365
613.	The Moral Sense as Support for Realism	368
614.	The Moral Sense and Mutability	369
615.	Shaftesbury as a Source of Sentimentalism and Realism	370
46.	Clarke	372
616.	Cudworth and Clarke	372
617.	Natural Law and Obligation	373
618.	Eternal Fitnesses	375
619.	Clarke v. Naturalism	377
620.	The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Eternal Fitnesses	379
621.	The Content of Moral Judgments	380
622.	Benevolence	382
623.	Moral Principles and Motivation	387
624.	Against Hobbes: Morality and the Right of Nature	388
625.	Morality and Self-Preservation	390
626.	Moral Obligations in the State of Nature	390
627.	The Role of Self-Preservation in Morality	392
628.	Prudential Obligation	392
629.	Prudential Obligation and Hobbesian Motivation	393
630.	The Significance of Clarke's Criticism of Hobbes	395
631.	Rationalism v. Naturalism in Clarke	396
47.	Hutcheson: For and Against Moral Realism	399
632.	Hutcheson's Aims	399
633.	Psychological Hedonism	401
634.	Prudential Hedonism	403
635.	Arguments for a Moral Sense: Against Egoism	404

636.	Voluntarism and Divine Commands	407
637.	Reason, Desire, and Action	408
638.	The Rejection of Rationalism	410
639.	Exciting Reasons and Justifying Reasons	411
640.	Freewill	413
641.	Anti-rationalism and the Moral Sense	415
642.	A Subjectivist Account of the Moral Sense	416
643.	The Rejection of Realism	419
48.	Hutcheson: For and Against Utilitarianism	421
644.	Benevolence and Utilitarianism	421
645.	Utilitarianism and Natural Law	425
646.	Objections to Hutcheson's Utilitarian Arguments	426
647.	Indirect Utilitarianism	427
648.	Indirect Utilitarianism and Indirect Egoism	429
649.	How does the Moral Sense Support Utilitarianism?	430
650.	A Conflict between Hutcheson's Normative Ethics and his Meta-ethics	433
651.	The Significance of Hutcheson's Position	434
652.	Fielding, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson	435
49.	Balguy: A Defence of Rationalism	439
653.	Hutcheson and Rationalism	439
654.	Free Will and Reason	440
655.	The Moral Sense and Motivation: Hutcheson and Burnet	441
656.	Balguy on Reasons and Motives	443
657.	Moral Judgment v. Moral Sense	446
658.	Morality as an End	448
659.	How is the Moral Sense Corrigible?	449
660.	Balguy, Hutcheson, and Euthyphro	452
661.	Hutcheson and Open Questions	454
662.	Divine Goodness: Bayes and Grove	455
663.	How Sentimentalism Agrees with Voluntarism	457
664.	Rationalism and Utilitarianism	459
665.	What is Fitness?	460
666.	Adams on Utilitarianism	462
667.	A Plausible Defence of Rationalism?	463
50.	Balguy and Clarke: Morality and Natural Theology	465
668.	Balguy on Morality and God	465
669.	Morality, Motivation, and Self-Interest	466
670.	Obligation and Revelation	468
671.	Maxwell on Reason and Revelation	469

672. Christian Virtues	471
673. Reason and Revelation in Moral Understanding	472
51. Butler: Nature	476
674. Butler's Aims	476
675. Hobbes on Nature and Morality	477
676. Sentimentalism and Naturalism	478
677. The Error of Sentimentalism	479
678. Naturalism and Rationalism	481
679. Butler's Version of Naturalism	482
680. Is Human Nature a System?	484
681. The Law of Our Nature	486
682. The Difference between Naturalism and Rationalism	487
52. Butler: Superior Principles	489
683. What is Superiority?	489
684. Superior Principles as Sources of External Reasons	490
685. Why Do We Need Superior Principles?	492
686. Self-Love as a Superior Principle	493
687. Self-Love and Nature	495
688. Psychological Hedonism	498
689. Different Conceptions of Self-Love: Hedonism v. Holism	500
690. Self-Love, Pleasure, and Happiness	501
691. Psychological Egoism	503
692. Self-Love and the Passion of Benevolence	504
53. Butler: Naturalism and Morality	507
693. Benevolence as a Passion and as a Rational Principle	507
694. Self-Love and the Principle of Benevolence	509
695. Conscience as the Generic Principle of Reflexion	510
696. Conscience as a Specific Superior Principle	512
697. Does Conscience Support Morality?	513
698. Benevolence and Morality	515
699. Indirect Benevolence and Morality: Berkeley's Argument	516
700. Objections to Indirect Utilitarianism	519
701. Divine Goodness and Divine Benevolence	521
702. Fairness, Responsibility, and Non-utilitarian Morality	522
703. Self-Love, Benevolence, and Conscience	523
704. Non-utilitarian Morality as a Source of Natural Action	525
705. Why is Conscience Supreme?	527
706. The Obligation to Follow Conscience	528
707. Why Does it Matter Whether Conscience is Natural?	530
708. The Harmony of Self-Love and Conscience	531
709. The Legitimate Claims of Self-Love	533

710. Different Conceptions of Self-Love	534
711. Questions about Butler and Aristotelian Eudaemonism	536
54. Butler: Implications of Naturalism	539
712. Different Views of Butler	539
713. Butler and Hobbes on Nature	541
714. Butler and Sentimentalism	542
715. Hutcheson v. Butler on Conscience	543
716. Normative Naturalism v. Rationalism	545
717. Voluntarism	547
718. Naturalism, Constructivism, and Realism	550
719. Conscience, Reasons, and Motives	552
720. Constructivism and Realism	554
55. Hume: Nature	558
721. The Experimental Method	558
722. The Experimental Method as a Source of Scepticism and a Reaction to Scepticism	559
723. The Experimental Method and Scepticism in Moral Philosophy	563
724. Errors of the Ancient Moralists	565
725. Achievements of the Ancient Moralists	567
726. The Ancients v. the 'Divines' on Voluntary and Non-voluntary Virtues	568
727. Predecessors in the Science of Human Nature	571
728. Hume v. Hutcheson and Butler on Nature	572
729. Legitimate Appeals to Nature	574
730. Nature and Rational Authority	575
731. Objectivism and Naturalism	577
56. Hume: Passion and Reason	579
732. Aquinas, Hobbes, and Hume on the Passions	579
733. The Object and the Cause of a Passion	580
734. Passion and Evaluation	582
735. Reason and Passion: Hume and Hutcheson	583
736. The Functions of Reason	584
737. Objections to Hume on Justifying Reasons	587
738. Prudence and Calm Passion	588
739. Can Desires be Unreasonable?	592
740. Objections to Hume on Exciting Reasons	593
741. Passion, Will, and Freedom	594
742. Responsibility	595
57. Hume: Errors of Objectivism	598
743. The Two Arguments against Rationalism	598
744. Moral Judgments and Motivation: What Does Common Experience Show?	599

745. Questions about Internalism	601
746. Moral Judgments and Moral Error	603
747. The Character of Moral Facts	604
748. 'The Object in Itself'	607
749. Conceivability and Possibility	609
750. 'The Object Itself' and Motivation	610
751. Anti-realism: Hume and Hutcheson	612
752. Is and Ought: Different Interpretations	614
753. Is and Ought: Hume's View	616
754. Do Hume's Arguments Support Non-cognitivism?	617
58. Hume: The Moral Sense	620
755. Anti-realism and Sentimentalism	620
756. The Meaning of Moral Judgments	622
757. An 'Error Theory' of Moral Judgments?	624
758. A Correction of Hutcheson	625
759. Hume, Hutcheson, and Voluntarism	627
760. Objectivist Criticisms of Hume's Sentimentalism	628
761. Hume's Account of the Moral Sentiment	630
762. A Common Point of View	632
763. The Point of View of Humanity	634
764. Can We Isolate Moral Sentiment?	636
765. Moral Judgment Without Sentiment?	637
766. The Possibility of Humean Objectivism	639
59. Hume: The Virtues	641
767. Natural and Artificial Virtues	641
768. The Difficulties about Justice	642
769. The Origin of Justice	644
770. Hume v. Hobbes on Justice	645
771. Justice and the Moral Sentiment	647
772. Natural Virtues	649
773. Is Justice an Artificial Virtue?	651
774. Justice, Self-Interest, and Moral Sentiment	653
775. Personal Merit	655
776. Hume and the 'Divines' on the Criteria for Virtue	657
777. Objections to Hume's Account	660
778. Kames and Sentimentalism	661
779. The Supremacy of Morality	662
780. Self-Approval	664
781. The Philosopher as Anatomist: Hume and Hutcheson	666
782. The Sensible Knave	668
783. How to Evaluate Moral Theories: Effects on Moral Practice	671

784. Hume's Contribution to the Defence of Morality	673
785. Hume's Reaction to Hutcheson and Hobbes	674

60. Smith **678**

786. The Practical Unimportance of the Epistemology and Metaphysics of Morality	678
787. Arguments for Sentimentalism	680
788. A Descriptive and Causal Theory	682
789. Moral Sentiments v. Moral Sense	682
790. Sympathy and Fellow-Feeling	684
791. A Reductive Account of Approval	687
792. Approval and Propriety	689
793. Sharing of Passions v. Approval of Passions	691
794. Desert	694
795. Justice and the Impartial Spectator	696
796. Being Praised and Being Praiseworthy	699
797. A Non-normative Account of the Impartial Spectator	700
798. The Sense of Duty	703
799. Utilitarianism	706
800. Stoicism	708
801. The Importance of Irrational Sentiments	710

61. Price **714**

802. Price's Aims	714
803. Psychology and Epistemology	715
804. Hedonism and Value	716
805. Pleasure, Happiness, and Self-Interest	717
806. Passions v. Affections	719
807. Reasonable Self-Love	720
808. Reason and Will	721
809. Freewill	722
810. The Objectivity of Moral Properties	723
811. Voluntarism and Moral Properties	727
812. Open Questions	730
813. Naturalism, Rationalism, and Moral Properties	732
814. Price's Criteria for Definitions	734
815. Meanings and Properties	735
816. Objections to Sentimentalism	738
817. The Evaluation of Character	740
818. Obligation	741
819. Obligation and Motivation	743
820. Obligation and Reason	744
821. Virtue and Vice	746

822. Objections to Utilitarianism	747
823. Normative Ethics and Intuition	751
62. Reid: Action and Will	754
824. Reid's Main Contributions	754
825. Will as the Source of Active Power	755
826. Will and Judgment	756
827. What is a Non-rational Will?	757
828. The Rational Aspect of Will	759
829. Reason v. Passion	761
830. Animal v. Rational Principles	762
831. Superior Principles	762
832. Will and Freedom	764
833. Why is Freedom Necessary for Accountability?	766
834. Objections to Reid's Indeterminist Account of Agency	768
835. The Free Will and the Rational Will	769
836. Self-Love and Happiness	772
837. Superior Principles and Ends	774
838. Against Hume on Reason and Passion	775
839. Prudence and Reason	776
840. Theoretical and Practical Rationality	778
841. Prudence, Justification, and Motivation	779
63. Reid: Knowledge and Morality	782
842. Reid's Defence of the Moral Sense	782
843. The Errors of Sentimentalism	784
844. The Errors of Empiricism and Rationalism	785
845. Moral Knowledge	786
846. Against Hume on Moral Judgment	789
847. Against Hume on 'Is' and 'Ought'	790
848. Rightness 'in the Object'	791
849. Approval of Virtue	792
850. Actions and Agents	794
851. Justice v. Utility	796
852. Utilitarianism and Intuitionism	798
853. Duty and Interest: In Defence of Self-Love	799
854. Duty and Interest: Objections to Self-Love	801
855. Eudaemonism and the Moral Motive	803
856. The Supremacy of Conscience	804
857. The Authority of Conscience	806
858. Rationalism v. Naturalism	807
859. Intuitionism v. Naturalism	808
860. Reasons for Rejecting Naturalism	809

861. Difficulties for Non-naturalist Rationalism	810
862. Rationalism, Naturalism, and Kant	810
64. Voluntarism, Egoism, and Utilitarianism	812
863. Voluntarists as Critics	812
864. Enthusiasm	813
865. Obligation and Imperatives	815
866. Objections to Sentimentalism and Rationalism	816
867. Fitness and Utilitarianism	818
868. Utilitarianism and Egoism	820
869. Waterland on Moral and Positive Duties	822
870. Voluntarism as the Consensus	825
871. Association and the Moral Sense	827
872. Waterland v. Butler on Self-Love and Benevolence	828
873. Happiness	830
874. Voluntarism and Eudaemonism	831
875. Warburton's Compromise	832
876. Cockburn's Defence of Clarke	835
877. Objections to Voluntarism: Doddridge and Grove	838
878. Grove on Egoism	840
879. Tucker and Paley	842
880. Whately's Criticisms of Paley	845
881. Thomas Brown's Criticism of Paley	847
882. Wainewright's Defence of Paley	849
65. Rousseau	852
883. Hobbes's Errors	852
884. The Errors of Traditional Naturalism	854
885. The Growth of Rational and Social Characteristics	858
886. The Relation of the <i>Social Contract</i> to the <i>Discourse</i>	863
887. Why is a Social Contract Needed?	865
888. The Nature of the Contract	868
889. What is the Civil State?	870
890. What Difference does the Civil State Make?	872
891. How does the Civil State Realize Freedom?	873
892. How do we Discover the General Will?	876
893. The Common Good and the General Will	879
<i>Bibliography</i>	883
<i>Index</i>	899