

# Contents

## List of contributors ix

### **Introduction: The evolutionary psychology of thinking** 1

*David E. Over*

### **1. The allocation system: Using signal detection processes to regulate representations in a multimodal mind** 11

*Gary L. Brase*

Implications of a multimodal mind	11
Primer on Signal Detection Theory	14
The allocation system	16
Misallocations and misrepresentations	18
The structure of the allocation system	24
Setting parameters in social situations	26
Other implications	28
References	29

### **2. Is there a faculty of deontic reasoning? A critical re-evaluation of abstract deontic versions of the Wason selection task** 33

*Laurence Fiddick*

Social Contract Theory	34
The deontic alternative	37
Abstract deontic rules are problematic for Social Contract Theory	39
Is a social contract a permission or is a permission a social contract?	41

Emotions as a cue to interpretation	44
What is the significance of these results for the study of deontic reasoning?	49
Conclusion	57
References	58

### 3. Evolutionary psychology's grain problem and the cognitive neuroscience of reasoning 61

*Anthony P. Atkinson and Michael Wheeler*

Introduction	61
The grain problem according to Sterelny and Griffiths	64
The two-dimensional grain problem	69
Levels of analysis	70
Inferring adaptive problems from their solutions: The case of reasoning	73
Inferring solutions from adaptive problems: The case of reasoning	78
The pay-off	84
A dispute dissolved?	86
Conclusion	90
References	91

### 4. Specialized behaviour without specialized modules 101

*Amit Almor*

Introduction	101
Domain specificity in evolutionary psychology	102
Evolutionary psychology and cheater detection	104
Cheater detection—the empirical evidence	109
A connectionist perspective	112
Conclusion	118
References	118

### 5. From massive modularity to metarepresentation: The evolution of higher cognition 121

*David E. Over*

Modularity arguments and deontic reasoning	123
Modularity arguments and probabilistic reasoning	128
Natural sampling	131
Metarepresentation	136
Conclusion	141
References	141

### 6. Probability judgement from the inside and out 145

*Steven A. Sloman and David E. Over*

Base-rate neglect	148
Conjunction fallacy	154
Summary of studies	157

Types of probability judgement	158
More on the natural frequency hypothesis	161
Frames for probability judgement	163
Conclusion	166
References	167

**7. Evolutionary versus instrumental goals: How evolutionary psychology misconceives human rationality**    171

*Keith E. Stanovich and Richard F. West*

Debates about the normative response in heuristics and biases tasks:	
Some examples	172
Dissociations between cognitive ability and the modal response in heuristics and biases tasks	178
Reconciling the two data patterns within a two-process view	181
Evolutionary rationality is not instrumental rationality	185
Where evolutionary psychology goes wrong	189
<i>How</i> evolutionary psychology goes wrong	197
The slippery notion of ecological rationality	206
The unacknowledged importance of the meme	209
Choosing the vehicle rather than the replicators: Evolutionary psychology without greedy reductionism	219
References	221

<b>Author index</b>	231
<b>Subject index</b>	240