# Contents

Preface

Acknowledgments

## Part I: Motivation and main ideas

## 1. Introduction

Generations of control theory. Control theory and rational expectations. Misspecification and rational expectations. Our extensions of robust control theory. Discounting. Representation of worst-case shock. Multiple agent settings. Explicitly stochastic interpretations. Calibrating fear of misspecification. Robust filtering and estimation. Robust control theory, shock serial correlations, and rational expectations. Entropy in specification analysis. Acknowledging misspecification. Why entropy? Why max-min? Is max-min too cautious? Aren't you just picking a plausible prior? Why not learn the correct specification? Is the set of perturbed models too limited? Is robust control theory positive or normative? Other lessons. Topics and organization.

#### 2. Basic ideas and methods

Introduction. Approximating models. Dynamic programming without model misspecification. Measuring model misspecification with entropy. Two robust control problems. Modified certainty equivalence principle. Robust linear regulator. More general misspecifications. A simple algorithm. Interpretation of the simple algorithm. Robustness and discounting in a permanent income model. The LQ permanent income model. Solution when  $\sigma = 0$ . Linear regulator for permanent income model. Effects on consumption of concern about misspecification. Observational equivalence of quantities but not continuation values. Distorted endowment process. A Stackelberg formulation for representing misspecification. Concluding remarks. Matlab programs. xv

## 3. A stochastic formulation

Introduction. Shock distributions. Martingale representations of distortions. A digression on entropy. A stochastic robust control problem. A recursive formulation. Verifying the solution. A value function bound. Large deviation interpretation of  $\mathcal{R}$ . Choosing the control law. Linear-quadratic model. Relative entropy and normal distributions. Value function adjustment for the LQ model.

## Part II: Standard control and filtering

## 4. Linear control theory

Introduction. Control problems. Deterministic regulator. Augmented regulator problem. Discounted stochastic regulator problem. Solving the deterministic linear regulator problem. Nonsingular  $A_{yy}$ . Singular  $A_{yy}$ . Continuous-time systems. Computational techniques for solving Riccati equations. Schur algorithm. Digression: solving DGE models with distortions. Doubling algorithm. Initialization from a positive definite matrix. Application to continuous time. Matrix sign algorithm. Solving the augmented regulator problem. Computational . techniques for solving Sylvester equations. The Hessenberg-Schur algorithm. Doubling algorithm. Doubling algorithm.

#### 5. The Kalman filter

Introduction. Review of Kalman filter and preview of main result. Muth's problem. The dual to Muth's filtering problem. The filtering problem. Sequence version of primal and dual problems. Sequence version of Kalman filtering problem. Sequence version of dual problem. Digression: reversing the direction of time. Recursive version of dual problem. Recursive version of Kalman filtering problem. Concluding remarks.

## Part III: Robust control

#### 6. Static multiplier and constraint games

Introduction. Phillips curve example. The government's problem. Robustness of robust decisions. Basic setup with a correct model. The constraint game with b = 0. Multiplier game with b = 0. The model with  $b \neq 0$ . Probabilistic formulation (b = 0). Gaussian perturbations. Letting the minimizing agent choose random perturbations

when b = 0. Constraint and multiplier preferences. Concluding remarks. Rational expectations equilibrium.

#### 7. Time domain games for attaining robustness

Alternative time domain formulations. The setting. Two Stackelberg games. Two Markov perfect equilibria. Markov perfect equilibrium: definition. Markov perfect equilibria: value functions. Useful recursions. Computing a Markov perfect equilibrium: the recursion. Step one: distorting the covariance matrix. Step two: distorting the mean. Another Markov perfect equilibrium and a Bellman-Isaacs condition. Taking inventory. Markov perfect equilibrium of infinite horizon game. Recursive representations of Stackelberg games. Markov perfect equilibria as candidate Stackelberg equilibria. Maximizing player chooses first. Minimizing player chooses first. Bayesian interpretation of robust decision rule. Relation between multiplier and constraint Stackelberg problems. Dynamic consistency. Miscellaneous details. Checking for the breakdown point. Policy improvement algorithm. Concluding remarks. Details of a proof of Theorem 7.7.1. Certainty equivalence. Useful formulas. A single Riccati equation. Robustness bound. A pure forecasting problem. Completing the square.

## 8. Frequency domain games and criteria for robustness 173

Robustness in the frequency domain. Stackelberg game in time domain. Fourier transforms. Stackelberg constraint game in frequency domain. Version 1:  $H_2$  criterion. Version 2: the  $H_{\infty}$  criterion. Stackelberg multiplier game in frequency domain. A multiplier problem. Robustness bound. Breakdown point reconsidered. Computing the worst-case misspecification. Three examples of frequency response smoothing. Example 1. Example 2. Example 3. Entropy is the indirect utility function of the multiplier game. Meaning of entropy. Risk aversion across frequencies. Concluding remarks. Infimization of  $H_{\infty}$ . A dual prediction problem. Proofs of three lemmas. Duality. Evaluating a given control law. When  $\theta = \theta_F$ . Failure of entropy condition. Proof of Theorem 8.8.2. Stochastic interpretation of  $H_2$ . Stochastic counterpart.

# 9. Calibrating misspecification fears with detection error probabilities

Introduction. Entropy and detection error probabilities. The contextspecific nature of  $\theta$ . Approximating and distorting models. Detection error probabilities. Details. Likelihood ratio under the approximating model. Likelihood ratio under the distorted model. The detection error probability. Breakdown point examples revisited. Ball's model. Concluding remarks. 139

#### 10. A permanent income model

Introduction. A robust permanent income theory. Solution when  $\sigma = 0$ . The  $\sigma = 0$  benchmark case. Observational equivalence for quantities of  $\sigma = 0$  and  $\sigma \neq 0$ . Observational equivalence: intuition. Observational equivalence: formal argument. Precautionary savings interpretation. Observational equivalence and distorted expectations. Distorted endowment process. Another view of precautionary savings. Frequency domain representation. Detection error probabilities. Robustness of decision rules. Concluding remarks. Parameter values. Another observational equivalence result.

## Part IV: Multi-agent problems

#### 11. Competitive equilibria without robustness

Introduction. Pricing risky claims. Types of competitive equilibria. Information, preferences, and technology. Information. Preferences. Technology. Planning problem. Imposing stability. Arrow-Debreu. The price system at time 0. The household. The firm. Competitive equilibrium with time-0 trading. Equilibrium computation. Shadow prices. Recursive representation of time 0 prices. Recursive representation of household's problem. Units of prices and reopening markets. Sequential markets with Arrow securities. Arrow securities. The household's problem in the sequential equilibrium. The firm. Recursive competitive equilibrium. Asset pricing in a nutshell. Partial equilibrium interpretation. Concluding remarks.

#### 12. Competitive equilibria with robustness

Introduction. A pure endowment economy. The planning problem. Household problem. A robust planning problem. Max-min representation of household problem. Sequence problem of maximizing player. Digression about computing  $\mu_0^w$ . Sequence problem of minimizing player. A decentralization with Arrow securities. A robust consumer trading Arrow securities. The inner problem. The outer problem. A Bayesian planning problem. Practical remarks. A model of occupational choice and pay. A one-occupation model. Equilibrium with no concern about robustness. Numerical example of Ryoo-Rosen model. Two asset pricing strategies. Pricing from the robust planning problem. Pricing from the ex post Bayesian planning problem. Concluding remarks. Decentralization of partial equilibrium. Solving Ryoo and Rosen's model by hand.

## 13. Asset pricing

Introduction. Approximating and distorted models. Asset pricing without robustness. Asset pricing with robustness. Adjustment of stochastic discount factor for fear of model misspecification. Reopening markets. Pricing single-period payoffs. Calibrated market prices of model uncertainty. Concluding remarks.

## 14. Risk sensitivity, model uncertainty, and asset pricing 307

Introduction. Organization. Equity premium and risk-free rate puzzles. Shocks and consumption plans. Recursive preferences. Stochastic discount factor for risk-sensitive preferences. Risk-sensitive preferences let Tallarini attain the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds. Reinterpretation of the utility recursion. Using martingales to represent probability distortions. Recursive representations of distortions. Ambiguity averse multiplier preferences. Observational equivalence? Yes and no. Worst-case random walk and trend stationary models. Market prices of risk and model uncertainty. Calibrating  $\gamma$  using detection error probabilities. Recasting Tallarini's graph. Concluding remarks. Value function and worst-case process. The value function. The distortion. An alternative computation. The trend stationary model.

## 15. Markov perfect equilibria with robustness

Introduction. Markov perfect equilibria with robustness. Explanation of  $x_{it+1}, x_t$  notation. Computational algorithm: iterating on stacked Bellman equations. Bayesian interpretation and belief heterogeneity. Heterogeneous worst-case beliefs. Concluding remarks.

## 16. Robustness in forward-looking models

Introduction. Related literature. The robust Stackelberg problem. Multiplier version of the robust Stackelberg problem. Solving the robust Stackelberg problem. Step 1: Solve a robust linear regulator. Step 2: Use the stabilizing properties of shadow price  $Py_t$ . Step 3: Convert implementation multipliers into state variables. Law of motion under robust Ramsey plan. A monopolist with a competitive fringe. The approximating and distorted models. The problem of a firm in the competitive fringe. Changes of measure. Euler equation for  $\lambda^q$  under the approximating model. Euler equation for  $\lambda^q$  under the monopolist's problem. Computing the volatility loading on  $\lambda_t^q$ . Timing subtlety. An iterative algorithm. Recursive representation of a competitive firm's problem. Multipliers. Cross-checking the solution for  $u_t, w_{t+1}$ . Numerical example. Concluding remarks. Invariant subspace method. The Riccati equation. 327

# Part V: Robust estimation and filtering

## 17. Robust filtering with commitment

Alternative formulations. A linear regulator. A static robust estimation problem. A digression on distorted conditional expectations. A dynamic robust estimation problem. Many-period filtering problem. Duality of robust filtering and control. Matlab programs. The worstcase model. Law of motion for the state reconstruction error. The worst-case model associated with a time-invariant K. A deterministic control problem for the worst-case mean. A Bayesian interpretation. Robustifying a problem of Muth. Reconstructing the ordinary Kalman filter. Illustrations. Another example. A forward-looking perspective. Relation to a formulation from control theory literature. The next chapter. Dual to evil agent's problem.

## 18. Robust filtering without commitment

Introduction. A recursive control and filtering problem. The decision maker's approximating model. Two sources of statistical perturbation. Two operators. The  $\mathbf{T}^1$  operator. The  $\mathbf{T}^2$  operator. Two sources of fragility. A recursive formulation for control and estimation. A certainty equivalent shortcut. Computing the  $\mathbf{T}^1$  operator. Worst-case distribution for  $z - \check{z}$  is  $\mathcal{N}(u, \Gamma(\Delta))$ . Worst-case signal distribution. Examples. Concluding remarks. Worst-case signal distribution.

## **Part VI: Extensions**

#### 19. Alternative approaches

Introduction. More structured model uncertainty. Model averaging. A shortcut. Probabilistic sophistication. Time inconsistency. Continuation entropy. Disarming the entropy constraint. Rectangularity can be taken too far.

Ref	eren	ces
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# Index

359

413

Contents

xiii

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