

CONTENTS

Foreword • ix

Part I Strategic interactions as games

Introduction to Part I • 1

- 1 Strategic form games • 3
- 2 Representing strategic interactions with games • 8

Part II Basic solution concepts for strategic form games

Introduction to Part II • 19

- 3 Dominant strategies • 23
- 4 Strongly dominated strategies • 42
- 5 Weakly dominated strategies • 51
- 6 Nash equilibrium • 65

Part III Prominent classes of strategic form games

Introduction to Part III • 85

- 7 Cooperation and conflict, strategic complements and substitutes • 89
- 8 Concentrated markets • 118
- 9 Coordination games and strategic uncertainty • 137

Part IV Uncertainty and mixed strategies

Introduction to Part IV • 157

- 10 Choice under uncertainty and risk dominance • 161
- 11 Mixed strategies • 171
- 12 Security strategies, strictly competitive games and the minimax theorem • 198
- 13 Mixed strategies in general games • 211

Part V Advanced topics in strategic form games

Introduction to Part V • 235

14 Rationalizable strategies • 239

15 Stability of equilibria • 246

16 Games and evolution • 259

17 Global games • 284

Part VI Dynamic games

Introduction to Part VI • 301

18 Extensive form games • 307

19 Non-credible threats, subgame perfect equilibrium and backward induction • 317

20 Commitment • 333

21 Backward induction: limitations and difficulties • 353

22 Moves of nature • 366

Part VII Repeated games

Introduction to Part VII • 383

23 The repeated Prisoner's Dilemma • 385

24 Games with an unbounded horizon: additional models and results • 413

Index • 441