## **Contents**

Pref Ack		xi xiii
Part	I Inductivism and its Critics	1
1	Some Historical Background: Inductivism, Russell and the Cambridge School, the Vienna Circle and Popper 1.1 Inductivism 3 1.2 The Uniformity of Nature and the Principle of Induction 8 1.3 Russell and the Cambridge School 11 1.4 The Vienna Circle 17 1.5 The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Physics 20 1.6 Popper 21 1.7 The Dispersal of the Vienna Circle 23	3
2	Popper's Critique of Inductivism. His Theory of Conjectures and Refutations (or Falsificationism) 2.1 Popper's Critique of Inductivism 26 2.2 Popper's Theory of Conjectures and Refutations (or Falsificationism) 29 2.3 The Distinction between Discovery and Justification 30 2.4 Some General Observations on Popper's Theory of Scientific Method 32 2.5 Kepler's Discovery of the Elliptic Orbits of the Planets 36 2.6 Fleming's Discovery of Penicillin: Creative Induction 39 2.7 The Discovery of the Sulphonamide Drugs: Mechanical or Baconian Induction 48	26
3	Duhem's Critique of Inductivism 3.1 Inductivism as the Newtonian Method 54 3.2 Newton's Inference of the Law of Gravity from Kepler's Laws and Duhem's Objections 58 3.3 Criticisms of Inductivism and the Revolution in Physics 60 3.4 The Lives of Duhem and Poincaré 63 3.5 Artificial Intelligence and the Revival of Inductivism 69	54

viii Contents

Part	II Conventionalism and the Duhem-Quine Thesis	73
4	Poincaré's Conventionalism of 1902 4.1 Kant's Philosophy of Geometry 75 4.2 The Discovery of Non-Euclidean Geometry 77 4.3 Poincaré's Conventionalist Philosophy of Geometry 85 4.4 Poincaré's Conventionalism and Newtonian Mechanics 90 4.5 Poincaré on the Limits of Conventionalism 94	75
5	The Duhem Thesis and the Quine Thesis 5.1 Preliminary Exposition of the Thesis. The Impossibility of a Crucial Experiment 98 5.2 Duhem's Criticisms of Conventionalism. His Theory of Good Sense (le bon sens) 102 5.3 The Quine Thesis 108 5.4 The Duhem-Quine Thesis 112	98
Part	III The Nature of Observation	117
6	Protocol Sentences 6.1 Carnap's Views on Observation Statements in the Early 1930s 120 6.2 Neurath's Views on Observation Statements in the Early 1930s 122 6.3 Popper's Views on Basic Statements in 1934 124	119
7	Is Observation Theory-Laden? 7.1 Duhem's View that All Observation in Physics is Theory-Laden 132 7.2 A Reinforcement of the Holistic Thesis and Neurath's Principle 137 7.3 Some Psychological Findings 140 7.4 Some General Conclusions 146	132
Part	IV The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics	151
8	Is Metaphysics Meaningless? Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle, and Popper's Critique 8.1 Introduction: The Demarcation Problem and its Importance 153 8.2 Wittgenstein's Life 157 8.3 Wittgenstein's Tractatus 165 8.4 The Vienna Circle on Metaphysics 172 8.5 Popper's Critique of the Vienna Circle on Metaphysics 177 8.6 Wittgenstein's Later Theory of Meaning 181 8.7 The Influence of Wittgenstein's Life on his Philosophy 185	153
9	Metaphysics in Relation to Science: The Views of Popper, Duhem, and Quine 9.1 Popper on Metaphysics in Relation to Science 189 9.2 Duhem and Quine on the Status of Metaphysics 192	189

Contents ix

	9.3 Duhem and Popper on the Influence of Metaphysics on Science 195 9.4 Duhem's Defence of Religion 201	
10	Falsificationism in the Light of the Duhem-Quine Thesis 10.1 Falsificationism and the Falsifiability Criterion 205 10.2 Existential Statements 206 10.3 Probability Statements 207 10.4 Falsifiability and the Duhem-Quine Thesis 210 10.5 A Suggested Demarcation Criterion involving the Principle of Explanatory Surplus 214 10.6 How Much of Falsificationism can be Retained? 221 10.7 Some Concluding Philosophical Remarks 228	205
No	Notes	
References		238
Index		245