

## CONTENTS

---

<i>Permissions</i>	vii
H. W. KUHN <i>Foreword</i>	ix
DAVID KREPS AND ARIEL RUBINSTEIN <i>An Appreciation</i>	xi
1. JOHN F. NASH, JR. Equilibrium Points in $n$ -Person Games. <i>PNAS</i> 36 (1950) 48–49.	3
2. JOHN F. NASH, JR. The Bargaining Problem. <i>Econometrica</i> 18 (1950) 155–162.	5
3. JOHN NASH Non-Cooperative Games. <i>Annals of Mathematics</i> 54 (1951) 286–295.	14
4. JULIA ROBINSON An Iterative Method of Solving a Game. <i>Annals of Mathematics</i> 54 (1951) 296–301.	27
5. F. B. THOMPSON Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form. RAND Memo RM-759 (1952).	36
6. H. W. KUHN Extensive Games and the Problem of Information. <i>Contributions to the Theory of Games</i> II (1953) 193–216.	46
7. L. S. SHAPLEY A Value for $n$ -Person Games. <i>Contributions to the Theory of Games</i> II (1953) 307–317.	69
8. L. S. SHAPLEY Stochastic Games. <i>PNAS</i> 39 (1953) 1095–1100.	80

9. H. EVERETT Recursive Games. <i>Contributions to the Theory of Games III</i> (1957) 47–78.	87
10. R. J. AUMANN AND B. PELEG Von Neumann–Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments. <i>Bulletin AMS</i> 66 (1960) 173–179.	119
11. GERARD DEBREU AND HERBERT SCARF A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy. <i>International Economic Review</i> 4 (1963) 235–246.	127
12. ROBERT J. AUMANN AND MICHAEL MASCHLER The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games. <i>Advances in Game Theory</i> (1964) 443–477.	140
13. ROBERT J. AUMANN Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders. <i>Econometrica</i> 34 (1966) 1–17.	170
14. HERBERT E. SCARF The Core of an $n$ -Person Game. <i>Econometrica</i> 35 (1967) 50–69.	192
15. JOHN C. HARSANYI Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players. Part I: The Basic Model. <i>Man. Sci.</i> 14 (1967) 159–182 Part II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points. <i>Man. Sci.</i> 14 (1968) 320–334 Part III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game. <i>Man. Sci.</i> 14 (1968) 486–502.	216 247 268
16. DAVID BLACKWELL AND T. S. FERGUSON The Big Match. <i>Ann. Math. Stat.</i> 39 (1968) 159–163.	289
17. LLOYD S. SHAPLEY AND MARTIN SHUBIK On Market Games. <i>J.E.T.</i> 1 (1969) 9–25.	296
18. R. SELTEN Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. <i>Int. J. Game Th.</i> 4 (1975) 25–55.	317
<i>List of Contributors</i>	355
<i>Index</i>	357