

# CONTENTS

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction—laws and properties</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1	Laws of nature and natural properties	1
1.2	An outline of this book	5
<b>2</b>	<b>Dispositions</b>	<b>9</b>
2.1	Properties	9
2.1.1	Natural properties	9
2.1.2	Nominalism and realism	15
2.2	Dispositions	18
2.2.1	Multi-track dispositions	21
2.2.2	The conditional analysis of dispositions	24
2.2.3	Finkish dispositions	25
2.2.4	Lewis's reformed conditional analysis	26
2.2.5	Antidotes	27
2.2.6	The intrinsic dispositions thesis	29
2.2.7	Defending Lewis's Reformed Conditional Analysis?	31
2.2.8	Repairs to the Conditional Analysis?	36
2.2.9	The Conditional Analysis revisited	38
2.3	Conclusion	41
<b>3</b>	<b>Dispositional essentialism and the laws of nature</b>	<b>43</b>
3.1	How dispositional essentialism accounts for the laws of nature	43
3.1.1	Dispositional essentialism and potencies	43
3.1.2	Deriving the laws of nature from dispositional essentialism	46
3.1.3	The laws of nature are necessary	48
3.2	Strong necessitarianism	50
3.2.1	Strong necessitarianism and properties	51
3.2.2	The instantiation condition	51
3.2.3	Strong necessitarianism with instantiated properties	56
3.2.4	Evaluating strong necessitarianism	58
3.3	<i>Ceteris paribus</i> laws	59
3.3.1	Dispositional essentialism and <i>ceteris paribus</i> laws	59
3.3.2	Finks at the fundamental level?	60
3.3.3	Antidotes at the fundamental level?	62
3.4	Conclusion	64
<b>4</b>	<b>Categoricalism</b>	<b>66</b>
4.1	Categoricalism about properties and laws	66
4.2	What is wrong with categoricalism about properties	70
4.2.1	Quidditism	70
4.2.2	Against quidditism—(QA1)	73

4.2.3	Against quidditism—(QB1)	76
4.3	What is wrong with categoricism about laws—regularity	81
4.3.1	The regularity view of laws and Humean Supervenience	81
4.3.2	The regularity view of laws and explanation	86
4.4	What is wrong with categoricism about laws—nomic necessitation	91
4.4.1	Does necessitation entail regularity?	92
4.4.2	Does necessitation merely imply regularity?	93
4.4.3	Simple universals and Independence	94
4.4.4	Nomic necessitation contradicts categoricism	96
4.5	Conclusion	97
<b>5</b>	<b>Dispositional essentialism, modality, and intentionality</b>	<b>99</b>
5.1	Potency and its being	99
5.2	Too little actuality	100
5.3	Too much potentiality	104
5.3.1	No possibility in, no possibility out	105
5.3.2	The <i>tu quoque</i> TMP argument—unrealized possibilities in categoricism	106
5.3.3	The type-level response	106
5.4	Armstrong, modal realism, and actualism	108
5.5	There are unrealized possibilities	111
5.6	Dispositional essentialism and intentionality	114
5.6.1	Do potencies explain intentionality?	115
5.6.2	Compositional properties	116
5.6.3	Intentionality is non-compositional	117
5.7	Are potencies intentional?	118
5.7.1	The marks of intentionality	119
5.7.2	Does intentionality* have the marks of intentionality?	120
5.8	The manifest image	126
5.9	Conclusion	129
<b>6</b>	<b>The regress objection</b>	<b>132</b>
6.1	Two unsuccessful regress arguments	132
6.1.1	Incoherence	132
6.1.2	Swinburne's epistemological argument	133
6.2	Regress, circularity, and identity	135
6.2.1	The advantages of categorical monism and the mixed view	138
6.3	Responding to the regress objection	138
6.3.1	Reflexive potencies and the asymmetric manifestation relation— loops and digraphs	141
6.3.2	Further constraints	143
6.3.3	Essential stimuli	144
6.4	Conclusion	145

<b>7</b>	<b>Structural properties</b>	147
7.1	The Mellor–Prior debate	148
7.1.1	Testing for potency	149
7.1.2	Complications for the conditional test for potency	150
7.1.3	Rules of the debate	153
7.2	The case of triangularity	154
7.2.1	Locating dispositions	156
7.2.2	Properties and geometries	158
7.3	Background-free physical theories	161
7.3.1	Displacement as a multi-track disposition	161
7.3.2	Background structures and substantivalism versus relationism	162
7.3.3	Dispositional essences and background-free physical theories	164
7.4	Extrinsic structural properties?	166
7.5	Conclusion	167
<b>8</b>	<b>The illusion of nomic contingency</b>	169
8.1	The illusion of contingency of laws	172
8.1.1	Imagining necessary falsehoods	172
8.1.2	Epistemic possibility	175
8.2	The unreliability of our intuitions concerning the contingency of laws of nature	176
8.3	Kripke's strategy and the illusion of contingency	179
8.3.1	Kripke's strategy for identity generalized	179
8.3.2	The strategy applied to laws of nature	181
8.3.3	Modifying Kripke's strategy	182
8.4	Imagination and possibility	186
8.5	Conclusion	187
<b>9</b>	<b>Are there any laws, and if so what are they?</b>	189
9.1	There are no laws?	190
9.1.1	Mumford's lawlessness argument in summary	190
9.1.2	Must laws govern?	191
9.1.3	Could laws be or supervene on potencies?	195
9.1.4	Conclusion—are there laws?	197
9.2	Does science use laws?	198
9.3	What laws are	200
9.4	Conclusion	202
<b>10</b>	<b>Concluding remarks</b>	204
10.1	Review	204
10.2	Further work—natural kinds	208
10.3	Further work—problems from physics	211
10.3.1	The problem of fundamental constants	212

10.3.2	The problem of conservation and symmetry laws	213
10.3.3	The problem of least-action principles	214
10.3.4	The problem of mass	215
10.4	Final comments	215
<b>References</b>		<b>219</b>
<b>Index</b>		<b>226</b>