## Contents

Preface	
Acknowledgements	xvii
1 'S knows that A'	I
1.1 Is Knowledge a Propositional Attitude?	3
1.2 Knowledge is a Relation Between a Mind and a Fact	7
1.3 Knowledge and Mental States	10
1.4 Epistemic Faculties	13
1.5 Defeaters	18
1.6 Reliability	22
1.7 Epistemic Priority	26
1.8 Conclusion	30
2 Facts	32
2.1 Resemblance	34
2.2 Combination	45
2.3 Vector Logic	47
2.4 The Problem of Sense and 'Nonsense'	55
2.5 Propositions and States of Affairs	59
2.6 Negation	62
2.7 Complex Facts	68
2.8 'Variables Explained Away'	73
2.9 The Adequacy Condition	78
Appendix: Adequacy of the Semantics	91
3 Concept and Content	100
3.1 Mental Acts	101
3.2 Apprehending a Fact	105
3.3 Content	107
3.4 Concepts	111
3.5 Reference	114

## VIII THE METAPHYSICS OF KNOWLEDGE

	3.6 Epistemology of Definitions	117
	3.7 Thought and Language	12
4	Necessity	12
	4.1 The A Priori	127
	4.2 The Strongest Modal Logic Consistent with Rationalism is S4	131
	4.3 Cartesian Counterexamples to the Rationalist Thesis	137
	4.4 Mathematical Counterexamples	138
	4.5 Identity Statement Counterexamples	141
	4.6 Descriptive Name Counterexamples	148
	4.7 Counterexamples with 'Actually'	150
	4.8 Possible Worlds Discourse with Only One World	16
5	Consciousness	169
	5.1 Self-knowledge by Consciousness	170
	5.2 What is Consciousness?	17:
	5.3 The Problem of Qualia	177
	5.4 The Necessity of Co-occurrence	180
	5.5 The Identity Thesis	181
	5.6 Advantages of the Identity Thesis	188
	5.7 Are Functionalism and the Identity Thesis Compatible?	19
6	Persons	194
	6.1 Unclarity of Personal Identity	196
	6.2 'I'—The 'Essential' Indexical	200
	6.3 How Do I Know I Exist?	202
	6.4 Beyond Solipsism of the Present Moment	20
	6.5 The Solipsist as Rational Agent	20
	6.6 A Functionalist Conception of Human Beings	20
	6.7 Other Minds Theory	20
	6.8 Is Personal Identity Indefinite?	21
	6.9 Conclusion	21
	Appendix: A Lichtenbergian Reconstruction of the Bafflement	
	Argument	21

## CONTENTS ix

7	Language	216
	7.1 Grammar	218
	7.2 Reading	224
	7.3 The Inferential Model of Testimony	232
	7.4 The Faculty Model of Testimony	241
	7.5 The Analogy Between Testimony and Perception	243
	7.6 Is Use a Regularity of Truthfulness and Trust?	248
	7.7 Use as a Regularity of Testifying—The Frequency Analysis	250
	7.8 Use as the Design End of an Artefact	253
8	The Constitutive Thesis and the Causal Thesis	258
	8.1 Functionalism and the Faculty Theory	260
	8.2 Type Identity Versions of the Constitutive Thesis	267
	8.3 The Argument for the Constitutive Thesis from Functionalism	275
	8.4 A Completeness Argument from Physics	279
	8.5 An Inductive Argument Against the Constitutive Thesis	291
Bi	bliography	298
In	dex	305