

# Contents

<i>Contributors</i>	page vii
<i>Preface</i>	viii
Introduction <i>Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen</i>	i
PART I NORMATIVE REASONS FOR BELIEF	ii
1 How to be a teleologist about epistemic reasons <i>Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen</i>	13
2 Is there reason to be theoretically rational? <i>Andrew Reisner</i>	34
3 Epistemic motivation: towards a metaethics of belief <i>Veli Mitova</i>	54
4 Error theory and reasons for belief <i>Jonas Olson</i>	75
5 Can reasons for belief be debunked? <i>Nishi Shah</i>	94
PART II REASONS AND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION	109
6 Reasons and belief's justification <i>Clayton Littlejohn</i>	111
7 Perception, generality, and reasons <i>Hannah Ginsborg</i>	131

8	Immediate warrant, epistemic responsibility, and Moorean dogmatism <i>Adam Leite</i>	158
9	Primitively rational belief-forming processes <i>Ralph Wedgwood</i>	180
10	What does it take to “have” a reason? <i>Mark Schroeder</i>	201
11	Knowledge and reasons for belief <i>Alan Millar</i>	223
12	What is the swamping problem? <i>Duncan Pritchard</i>	244
	<i>References</i>	260
	<i>Index</i>	271