Contents

A_{i}	cknov	 1.1 The aim of science 1.2 The constructive empiricist and his critics 1.2.1 A taxonomy of objections 1.2.2 Observation and detection 1.2.3 Extra terrestrials and extra-terrestrials 1.3 The new epistemology 1.3.1 The English and Prussian models of rationality 1.3.2 Relativism, scepticism and voluntarism 1.4 Summary 			
1	Arg	ument	ts Concerning Constructive Empiricism	1	
		The aim of science		1	
	1.2	The c	onstructive empiricist and his critics	6	
		1.2.1	A taxonomy of objections	6	
		1.2.2	Observation and detection	9	
		1.2.3	Extra terrestrials and extra-terrestrials	14	
	1.3	The new epistemology		20	
		1.3.1	The English and Prussian models of rationality	20	
		1.3.2	Relativism, scepticism and voluntarism	23	
	1.4	Sumn	nary	27	
2	Epistemic Voluntarism: Rationality, Inference and				
	- ·				
	2.1	1 Motivating voluntarism			
	2.2	Diach	ronic coherence and the principle of reflection	34	
		2.2.1	The diachronic Dutch-book	34	
		2.2.2	From Dutch-books to cognitive calibration	37	
		2.2.3	Greek sailors, drunk drivers and other epistemic		
			villains	41	
		2.2.4	Judgements about commitments	46	
	2.3	Tradit	ional epistemology: False hopes and bad lots	49	
		2.3.1	The justification of induction	49	
		2.3.2	Reliabilism and scepticism	53	
		2.3.3	The 'best of a bad lot'	58	
		2.3.4	Background theories and the ranking of		
			hypotheses	65	
		2.3.5	Probabilistic and non-probabilistic inferences	67	
	2.4	Taking	g a stance	72	
		2.4.1	The empiricist dilemma	72	
		2.4.2	Rationality and relativism	78	
	2.5	Summ	nary	84	
3	Aga	inst Ep	oistemic Voluntarism: Musgrave, Modality		
	and Mathematics				
	3.1	The p	roblem(s) of internal coherence	87	

	3.2	Musgrave's objection revisited		90			
			The unobservability of unobservables	90			
		3.2.2	On the syntax and semantics of observability	93			
		3.2.3	A question of scope	96			
	3.3	Ladyman's dilemma: Counterfactuals, contexts and					
		conventions					
		3.3.1	The problem of modality	98			
		3.3.2	From modal realism to structural realism	100			
		3.3.3	Deflationism and voluntarism about modality	105			
	3.4	Constructive empiricism and mathematical					
		nominalism					
		3.4.1	Abstract mathematical objects	112			
		3.4.2	Constructive empiricism and mathematical				
			fictionalism	117			
		3.4.3	Primitive consistency and expressive				
			completeness	124			
			The vices of voluntarism	131			
	3.5	Sumn		133			
	3.6	Appe	ndix – An expanded modal language	136			
4	On	the Nature and Norms of Acceptance and Belief					
	4.1	Anoth	ner perspective on scientific attitudes	144			
	4.2		ling to accept, deciding to believe	148			
		4.2.1	A lot of fuss about functionalism	148			
		4.2.2	The individuation of intentional states	157			
		4.2.3	Contradiction and science	167			
	4.3	Empiricism and agnosticism		179			
			The acceptance solution	179			
			Committed modal agnosticism	185			
		4.3.3	Acceptance and anti-realism in the philosophy				
			of modality	193			
			A short note on mathematical nominalism	208			
	4.4	Summary					
C	onclu	ision: V	What Is This Thing Called 'Constructive				
Er	Empiricism'?						
N	otes			216			
	Notes						
References							
In	dex			233			