

# Contents

Acknowledgments ix

**Introduction xi**

## **1 The Measure of Madness 1**

1.1 Integrative versus Autonomous Theoretical Explanation 1

1.2 The Basis of Theoretical Autonomy 4

1.3 Jaspers and the Inscrutability of Delusion 5

1.4 Meaning Rationalism and Framework Propositions 7

1.5 Neurobiological Eliminativism 13

1.6 Cognitive Phenomenology 20

## **2 Models, Mechanisms, and Cognitive Theories 21**

2.1 Cognitive Autonomy: Models and Multiple Realizability 21

2.2 Causal Relevance and the Personal Level 23

2.3 Cognitive Neuropsychiatry and Neurocognitive Psychiatry 26

2.4 Autonomy Revisited 28

2.5 The Cognitive Economy 33

2.6 Theoretical Definition 35

## **3 The Processing Hierarchy and the Salience System 43**

3.1 The Processing Hierarchy 43

3.2 A Computational Framework 46

3.3 The Salience System and Reward Prediction 52

- 3.4 Salience and the Adaptive Critic 57
- 3.5 Dopamine and Delusion 61
- 3.6 Applications 65
- 4 The Default Mode Network 67
  - 4.1 Simulations as Narrative Elements 67
  - 4.2 Mental Time Travel and the Default Network 69
  - 4.3 Delusions as a “Mixed Mode” of the Default Network 72
  - 4.4 The First-Person Perspective and Decontextualization 75
  - 4.5 The Default Network and the “Essential Indexical” 78
  - 4.6 Subjectivity, Affective Processing, and the Hub of the Default Network 80
  - 4.7 Default and Decontextualized Processes 83
  - 4.8 A Mundane Example 86
- 5 Dreaming, Default Thinking, and Delusion 89
  - 5.1 Dreaming and the Default Mode Network 90
  - 5.2 The AIM Model 95
  - 5.3 Feature Binding and the Fregoli Delusion 99
  - 5.4 Context Binding in Dreams and Delusions 108
  - 5.5 Dorsolateral Deactivation in Dreams and Delusions 109
  - 5.6 Are Delusions Dreams? 110
- 6 The Second Factor: Default or Doxastic Incorporation 113
  - 6.1 Doxastic Theories and the Second Factor 115
  - 6.2 Performance Accounts: Endorsement, Explanation, and Incorporation 117
  - 6.3 Interactionism, Explanationism, and Attributional Style 122
  - 6.4 Attributional Style and the Cotard Delusion 124
  - 6.5 Bias and Default Thinking 128
  - 6.6 Competence Accounts: Deficits of Belief Fixation 130
- 7 Imagination Incorporated 135
  - 7.1 Incorporating Imagination 137
  - 7.2 Belief and Imagination; Congruence and Incongruence 139
  - 7.3 Joint Incorporation 143

7.4	The Metacognitive Account	145
7.5	Delusions and Default Processing	147
7.6	The Dual Nature of Default Thoughts	151
7.7	Imaginative Resistance and the Essential Indexical	154
7.8	Cognitive Therapy for Doxastic Theorists	156
7.9	Imagination and Psychological Structure	160
<b>8</b>	<b>The Sense of Agency, Lost and Found: Experience and Thought in Schizophrenic Delusion</b>	<b>163</b>
8.1	The Sense of Agency, Lost and Found	168
8.2	The Priority of Visual Experience	170
8.3	Predictive Mechanisms and Cognitive Architecture	173
8.4	Experimental Evidence	176
8.5	Awareness of Predictions in Schizophrenia	183
8.6	Passivity and Externality	189
8.7	Mirror Neurons and Other Bodies	192
8.8	Passivity of Thought	197
8.9	External Attribution of Thoughts	201
8.10	External Attribution and Psychological Coherence	204
8.11	Passivity of Experience, Externality of Thought	206
<b>9</b>	<b>Louis Sass and the Schizophrenic Lifeworld</b>	<b>209</b>
9.1	Schreber's Lifeworld	210
9.2	Cognitive Phenomenology	217
<b>10</b>	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>223</b>
	Notes	229
	References	231
	Index	265