

Contents

<i>List of Figures</i>	vii
<i>List of Tables</i>	ix
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xi
<i>Introduction</i>	xiii
Part I. Correlation and the Social Contract	1
1. Evolution and the Social Contract	3
Part II. Importance of Dynamics	27
2. Trust, Risk, and the Social Contract	31
3. Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious? <i>with Jason Alexander</i>	38
4. Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models	50
5. Dynamics of Conformist Bias	73
6. Chaos and the Explanatory Significance of Equilibrium: Strange Attractors in Evolutionary Game Dynamics	83
7. Evolutionary Dynamics of Collective Action in N -person Stag Hunt Dilemmas <i>with Jorge M. Pacheco, Francisco C. Santos, and Max O. Souza</i>	110
8. Learning to Take Turns: The Basics <i>with Peter Vanderschraaf</i>	128
9. Evolutionary Considerations in the Framing of Social Norms <i>with Kevin J. S. Zollman</i>	135
Part III. Dynamic Networks	147
10. Learning to Network <i>with Robin Pemantle</i>	149
11. A Dynamic Model of Social Network Formation <i>with Robin Pemantle</i>	163

12. Network Formation by Reinforcement Learning: The Long and the Medium Run <i>with Robin Pemantle</i>	187
13. Time to Absorption in Discounted Reinforcement Models <i>with Robin Pemantle</i>	205
Part IV. Dynamics of Signals	221
14. Learning to Signal: Analysis of a Micro-level Reinforcement Model <i>with Raffaele Argiento, Robin Pemantle, and Stanislav Volkov</i>	225
15. Inventing New Signals <i>with Jason McKenzie Alexander and Sandy L. Zabell</i>	250
16. Signals, Evolution, and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information	274
17. Co-Evolution of Pre-play Signaling and Cooperation <i>with Francesco Santos and Jorge Pacheco</i>	298
18. Evolution of Signaling Systems with Multiple Senders and Receivers	314
<i>Index</i>	337