Contents

Pre	face	page ix
Lisi	t of Abbreviations	xv
	Introduction	I
	COMMENTARY ON DE ANIMA	
	Book 1	
I	The Nobility and Difficulty of Study of Soul; Its Connection	
	with Body	33
2	The Predecessors' Use of Soul to Account for Motion and	
	Perception	62
3	Criticism of Predecessors' Way of Accounting for Motion	83
4	Criticism of the Harmonia View as an Account of Motion	103
5	Criticism of Predecessors' Way of Accounting for Cognition	123
	Book 2	
I	Definition of Soul	145
2	What Is Life?	171
3	How Powers of Soul Are Distributed and United in the Soul	188
4	The Nutritive Faculty: Its Object and Subfaculties	200
5	Clarification of Being Affected, Living as Saving, and the First	
	Definition of Sense	223
6	The Three Sorts of Sensible Objects	250
7	Vision, Medium, and Object	263
8	Hearing, Sound, and Voice	285
9	Smell and Odor	302
10	Taste Is a Contact Sense; the Tasteable	313

Contents

IJ	Touch, the langibles, and Sense as a Mean	321	
12	Definition of Sense and Whether Sensibles Affect Nonperceiving Bodies	338	
Book 3			
1	In the World As It Is There Can Be but the Five Senses	361	
2	What Allows for Perceiving That We Perceive; Sense Joins in a Common Power so That the Five Senses Are Subfaculties of a		
	Central Sense Faculty	380	
3	Distinguishing Sense and Thought; What Is Phantasia?	403	
4	What Is Mind as That Capable of Thinking All Things	434	
5	What Enables Thinking to Occur	458	
6	The Sorts of Intelligible Objects	473	
7	Phantasia Has a Role in All Thinking	481	
8	That Mind Can Think All Things	494	
9	There Is a Capacity for Progressive Motion	501	
10	The Desiderative Capacity Is the Primary Cause		
	of Progressive Motion	514	
11	1		
	Calculative <i>Phantasia</i> Fits the Account of Progressive Motion	527	
12	The Necessary Order of the Faculties of Soul	534	
13	, I		
	of the Faculties of Soul	546	
Bibliography		555	
Index		563	