

# Contents

List of Figures	xii
List of Tables	xvi

Preface	1
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<b>1. Social Insurance, Informality, and Labor Markets: How to Protect Workers While Creating Good Jobs</b>	9
<i>Carmen Pagés, Jamele Rigolini, David Robalino</i>	
1.1. Introduction	9
1.2. Conceptualizing the Links Between Social Insurance and the Labor Market	11
1.3. Assessing the Effects of Social Insurance on Labor Markets	13
1.4. Setting the Mandate of the Insurance Programs	18
1.5. Financing a Universal Social Insurance System	23
1.6. Concluding Remarks	26
Notes	29
References	29

## **Part I Assessing the Effects of Social Insurance on Labor Markets**

<b>2. The Evolution of Social Security Systems in Latin America</b>	33
<i>David S. Kaplan, Santiago Levy</i>	
2.1. Introduction	33
2.2. The Bismarckian Vision of Social Security	35
2.3. When Did Latin America Adopt the Bismarckian Model?	37

2.4.	A Comparison Between Social Security Policy and Education Policy	39
2.5.	The Beveridge Model of Social Security	41
2.6.	Why Did Latin America Adopt the Bismarckian Model?	42
2.7.	The Expected Expansion of Coverage Never Materialized	45
2.8.	Why Has Informality Been So Persistent?	47
2.9.	The Movement Towards Parallel Non-Contributory Programs	51
2.10.	The Result of a Long Historical Process is a Poorly Designed Patchwork System of Social Security	52
2.11.	An Alternative Social Security Model Can Be Implemented	53
2.12.	Conclusions	55
	Notes	56
	References	56

### **3. Labor Informality and the Incentive Effects of Social Protection Systems: Evidence from a Health Reform in Uruguay** 58

*Marcelo Bérgho, Guillermo Cruces*

3.1.	Introduction	58
3.2.	The Social Protection System in Uruguay	60
3.3.	The Health Reform and its Labor Market Incentive Effects	61
3.4.	Data and Identification Strategy	64
3.5.	Empirical Results: Incentive Effects and the Health Reform in Uruguay	65
3.6.	Conclusions and Policy Discussion	70
	Notes	77
	References	78

### **4. Effects of Non-Contributory Systems on Informality: Taking Stock of Eight Years of Implementation of Mexico's Seguro Popular** 80

*Mariano Bosch, M. Belén Cobacho, Carmen Pagés*

4.1.	Introduction	80
4.2.	The Reform	83
4.3.	Implementation of, and Affiliation to, Seguro Popular	85

4.4.	Direct Effect of <i>Seguro Popular</i> on Health Services Provision and Health Outcomes	87
4.5.	Unintended Effects of <i>Seguro Popular</i> on the Labor Market	94
4.6.	Discussion and Conclusions	104
	Notes	109
	References	109
<b>5.</b>	<b>Unemployment Insurance, Job Search, and Informal Employment</b>	<b>112</b>
	<i>David N. Margolis, Lucas Navarro, David Robalino</i>	
5.1.	Introduction	112
5.2.	Overview of Current Malaysian Labor Markets	114
5.3.	The Model Framework	119
5.4.	The Data	122
5.5.	Estimation	124
5.6.	Microsimulations of Policy Experiments	130
5.7.	Conclusion	135
	Appendix A-C	137
	Notes	144
	References	146
<b>6.</b>	<b>Does Formal Work Pay? The Role of Labor Taxation and Social Benefit Design in the New Member States</b>	<b>147</b>
	<i>Johannes Koettl, Michael Weber</i>	
6.1.	Introduction	147
6.2.	Measurements of Informality and Disincentives for Formal Work	151
6.3.	Do Disincentives for Formal Work Matter?	168
6.4.	Conclusions and Policy Implications	184
	Notes	186
	References	187

## **Part II Setting the Mandate of the Insurance Programs and Designing Redistributive Arrangements**

<b>7. Participation in Mandated and Voluntary Social Risk Management Arrangements: The Role and Limits of Financial Education and Other Interventions</b>	191
<i>Robert Holzmann</i>	
7.1. Introduction: Background, Motivation, and Structure	191
7.2. The Role and Limits of Information/Capability to Foster Individual Self-Provision and Reduce the Need for Compulsion	194
7.3. The Role and Limits of Financial Literacy/Capability	205
7.4. The Role and Limits of Financial Education and Other Interventions	212
7.5. Conclusions	221
Notes	224
References	225
<b>8. Labor Income and the Design of Default Portfolios in Mandatory Pension Systems: An Application to Chile</b>	227
<i>Alfonso R. Sánchez Martín, Sergi Jiménez Martín, David Robalino, Federico A. Todeschini</i>	
8.1. Introduction	227
8.2. A Model of Life-Cycle Behavior	230
8.3. Calibration of the Illustrative Examples	233
8.4. Results	237
8.5. Conclusions	248
Appendix A-B	250
Notes	260
References	262

<b>9. Assessing Redistribution within Social Insurance Systems: The Cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay</b>	264
<i>Alvaro Forteza</i>	
9.1. Introduction	264
9.2. The Old-Age Pension and Unemployment Insurance Programs	265
9.3. Conceptual Framework	266
9.4. Data	271
9.5. Methods	273
9.6. Results	277
9.7. Concluding Remarks	286
Notes	288
References	288
<b>10. The Design of a Multi-Tier Contributory Pension System: The Distributional Impact of the 2008 Chilean Pension Reform</b>	291
<i>Orazio Attanasio, Costas Meghir, Andres Otero</i>	
10.1. Introduction	291
10.2. The Chilean Pension System and Its Reform	295
10.3. Data	301
10.4. Methodology	302
10.5. Results	310
10.6. Conclusions	326
Appendix A-D	327
Notes	344
References	346
<b>11. Should Cash Transfers Be Confined to the Poor? Implications for Poverty and Inequality in Latin America</b>	347
<i>Pablo Acosta, Phillippe Leite, Jamele Rigolini</i>	
11.1. Introduction	347
11.2. The Cash and Targeting Revolutions	353
11.3. Data and Methodology	356
11.4. Results	357
11.5. Conclusions	369
Appendix	370
Notes	371
References	371

## **Part III Financing Social Insurance Programs**

<b>12. Labor Market Institutions and Informality in Transition and Latin American Countries</b>	375
<i>Hartmut Lehmann, Alexander Muravyev</i>	
12.1. Introduction	375
12.2. Using a Broad Definition of Informality	379
12.3. The Impact of Policies to Lower Labor Costs and to Reduce Regulation	379
12.4. Taxation and Informality within the Formal Sector	392
12.5. Empirical Analysis with Macro Data	394
12.6. Conclusions	405
Appendix	406
Notes	408
References	409
<b>13. Financing Social Expenditures in Developing Countries: Payroll or Value-Added Taxes?</b>	411
<i>Richard Bird, Michael Smart</i>	
13.1. Introduction	411
13.2. Financing SI in Latin America	415
13.3. The Choice of Tax Base	421
13.4. A Formal Model	426
13.5. Concluding Remarks	437
Notes	438
References	439
<b>14. Financing Universal Social Security in Mexico</b>	442
<i>Arturo Antón, Fausto Hernández</i>	
14.1. Introduction	442
14.2. Current Social Insurance and Tax Policy vs. USI	444
14.3. The Model	448
14.4. Taking the Model to the Data	452
14.5. Is the New Scheme Financially Sound?	456
14.6. Conclusions	461
Notes	463
References	463

<b>15. Alternative Ways of Pricing and Financing Social Insurance</b>	465
<i>Robert Gillingham, Alain Jousten</i>	
15.1. Introduction	465
15.2. Current Social Insurance and Tax Structures	467
15.3. Problems with Payroll Financing of Social Insurance	473
15.4. How Can Pricing Issues Be Addressed?	477
15.5. Implications for Informality	482
15.6. Implications for Financing Social Insurance	485
Appendix A-C	486
Notes	495
References	495
Notes on Editors and Authors	497
Index	508