CONTENTS

I. AII	M AND METHOD	page
1.	The Subject Matter 1.1 'Rational Reconstruction', 1 1.2 'Formal Features', 5 1.3 'Social Interaction', 7 1.4 'Generation of Norms', 7 1.5 Norms, 12	1
2.	Methodological Individualism	14
II. PI) NORMS	
1.	The Prisoners' Dilemma 1.1 Presentation, 18 1.2 The Dilemma, 19	18
2.	The Main Proposition—PD Norms	21
3.	A Generalized PS-structured Situation 3.1 First Approximation, 23 3.2 Refinement, 25 3.3 The Condition of Individual Insignificance, 27	22
4.	The Solution as a Stabilizing Device	29
	The Mortarmen's Dilemma 5.1 Presentation, 30 5.2 Minelaying, 32 5.3 Discipline, 33 5.4 Honour, 36	30
	An Assessment of the Proposed Solutions to the Mortarmen's Dilemma and Their Relation to PD Norms	37
	PD and Morality 7.1 Are PD Norms Norms of Morality? 41 7.2 Norms for Keeping People in a PD Situation, 44	41
	Functionally Equivalent Solutions to PD Problems 8.1 Division of Labour in PD Situations, 48	45
9.	Public Goods	4 9
	The Generalization Argument and PD Norms 10.1 The Modified Generalization Argument, 59	53

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 11. Hobbes and the Prisoners' Dilemma 11.1 The Original Situation of Mankind as PD-structured, 63 11.2 Hobbes's Solution, 65 11.3 An Answer to Gauthier, 67 	62
III. CO-ORDINATION NORMS	
Introduction	74
1. Co-ordination Problems	77
 Co-ordination Problems and Norms An Established Solution Turned Norm, 83 2.2 Norms as Solutions to Novel Co-ordination Problems, 89 2.3 On Conformism, 93 	83
 The Distinguishing Features of Co-ordination Norms 3.1 General, 96 3.2 The Source of Effectiveness, 98 3.3 Whose Interests Are Served by the Conformity to Co- ordination Norms? 101 	96
 4. The Social Role of Co-ordination Norms 4.1 The So-called Integrative Function, 104 4.2 An Instrument for Social Choice, 106 4.3 The Problem of Rationality, 110 	10 4
 Co-ordination Norms and PD Norms Structural Differences, 114 Implications of Structural Differences—General, 115 Implications of Structural Differences—Norms, 117 An Intermediary Case—The Stag Hunt, 121 A.1. An Example, 124 The Oligopolists' Problem, 127 	114
6. Co-ordination and Co-operation IV. NORMS OF PARTIALITY	129
1. Status Quo of Inequality 1.1 Presentation, 134	134
1.2 Dahrendorf's Derivation of Social Inequality, 135	
2. The Disfavourably Placed Party	139
3. Improvement of Absolute Position	141
 4. Improvement of Relative Position 4.1 Presentation, 146 4.2 Relative Position Improvement in the Light of the Postulates of Game Theory and Pareto Optimality, 148 4.3 Envy and Rationality, 150 	146

xii

	CONTENTS	xiii
5.	Improvement of Relative Position at the Expense of Absolute Position	155
6.	Interpersonal Comparisons	157
7.	The Favourably Placed Party	159
8.	The Paradigmatic Situation 8.1 Characterization, 162 8.2 The Disfavourably Placed Party's Strategic Move, 164	162
9.	Fortifying Methods 9.1 The Possible Methods, 168 9.2 Force v. Norms, 170	168
10.	Norms of Partiality	173
11.	Functional Explanation	176
12.	Latent Functions and Latent Interests 12.1 Latent Functions and the Conspiracy Fallacy, 180 12.2 Latent Interests and Dahrendorf's Model, 182	180
13.	Norms of Partiality and Coercion 13.1 The Coercer and the Impersonality of Norms, 188 13.2 The Impartiality of Norms and Self-coercion, 189 13.3 Is Coercion a 'Zero-Sum' Concept? 193	187
BIBL	IOGRAPHY	198

INDEX

203