

Contents

PART I SEMANTICS FOR INTENTIONALITY

1 Intentional Operators	5
2 Identity	31
3 Objects of Thought	56
4 Characterization and Descriptions	82

PART II IN DEFENCE OF NON-BEING

5 On What There Isn't	105
6 Fiction	116
7 Mathematical Objects and Worlds	134
8 Multiple Denotation	156
<i>Bibliography</i>	179
<i>Index</i>	185

Detailed Table of Contents

PART I SEMANTICS FOR INTENTIONALITY

1 Intentional Operators	5
1.1 Introduction: Intentionality	5
1.2 Operators and Predicates	6
1.3 World Semantics	8
1.4 Noneism: A First Appearance	13
1.5 Worlds, Possible and Impossible	15
1.6 Negation	19
1.7 Open Worlds	20
1.8 Conclusion	25
1.9 Technical Appendix	25
2 Identity	31
2.1 Introduction: Identity and Intentionality	31
2.2 Adding Identity	31
2.3 Eubulides the Paradoxer	32
2.4 The Hooded Man Paradox	34
2.5 Descriptions and Rigid Designators	37
2.6 The Puzzle about Pierre	38
2.7 Frege and SI	40
2.8 SI and Open Worlds	42
2.9 Worlds and Identities	43
2.10 The <i>De Re</i> Argument	47
2.11 Conclusion	50
2.12 Technical Appendix	51
3 Objects of Thought	56
3.1 Introduction: Intentional Predicates	56
3.2 Non-Existence	56
3.3 A Formal Semantics	59
3.4 Substitutivity of Identicals	61
3.5 Indeterminacy	63

3.6 Conclusion	67
3.7 Appendix: Medieval Accounts of Intentionality	68
3.7.1 Non-Existence	68
3.7.2 Ockham on Indeterminacy	72
3.7.3 Ockham on Substitutivity	75
3.7.4 Buridan on Indeterminacy and Substitutivity	77
4 Characterization and Descriptions	82
4.1 Introduction: <i>Sein</i> and <i>Sosein</i>	82
4.2 The Characterization Principle	83
4.3 Further Comments	85
4.4 Identity	87
4.5 Indefinite Descriptions	91
4.6 Definite Descriptions and Speaker-Intention	93
4.7 Properties of Descriptions	95
4.8 Conclusion	96
4.9 Technical Appendix	97
PART II IN DEFENCE OF NON-BEING	
5 On What There Isn't	105
5.1 Introduction: Quine's Critique	105
5.2 Russell's Meinongianism	105
5.3 Russell's Critique of Meinong	106
5.4 On What There Is	108
5.5 The Possible Fat Man in the Doorway	110
5.6 Conclusion	115
6 Fiction	116
6.1 Introduction: Fictional Objects	116
6.2 Fictional Operators	116
6.3 Creating Objects	118
6.4 Some Objections	121
6.5 Conclusion	124
6.6 Appendix: <i>Sylvan's Box</i>	125
7 Mathematical Objects and Worlds	134
7.1 Introduction: Kinds of Non-Existent Object	134
7.2 Abstract Objects	135
7.3 Worlds	138
7.4 Five Objections	140

7.5 Referring	141
7.6 Knowing	144
7.7 The a Priori	147
7.8 Applying Mathematics	149
7.9 Platonism	152
7.10 Conclusion	155
8 Multiple Denotation	156
8.1 Introduction: A Paradox of Denotation	156
8.2 Semantic Paradoxes of Self-Reference	156
8.3 The Paradox of Hilbert and Bernays	157
8.4 Solutions	159
8.5 Multiple Denotation Semantics	160
8.6 Properties of the Semantics	163
8.7 The Paradox Revisited	164
8.8 Definite Descriptions	166
8.9 Conclusion	169
8.10 Technical Appendix	169
<i>Bibliography</i>	179
<i>Index</i>	185