

Contents



<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xiii
Introduction	1
Part 1. Epistemic Angst	9
Chapter 1. Radical Skepticism and Closure	11
1. The Contemporary Radical Skeptical Paradox	11
2. Undercutting versus Overriding Anti-skeptical Strategies	16
3. An Overriding Anti-skeptical Strategy (I): Nonclosure	17
4. An Overriding Anti-skeptical Strategy (II): Epistemic Externalism	19
5. Radical Skepticism about Rationally Grounded Knowledge	22
6. An Overriding Anti-skeptical Strategy (III): Abductivism	25
7. Concluding Remarks	28
Chapter 2. Radical Skepticism and Underdetermination	29
0. Introductory Remarks	29
1. Radical Skepticism and the Underdetermination Principle	29
2. An Overriding Anti-skeptical Strategy: Epistemic Externalism	32
3. Attributer Contextualism as an Overriding Anti-skeptical Strategy	36
4. Attributer Contextualism as an Undercutting Anti-skeptical Strategy	40
5. Comparing the Two Forms of Radical Skepticism	46
6. The Source of Underdetermination-Based Radical Skepticism	49
7. Two Sources of Radical Skepticism	54
8. Anti-skeptical Desiderata	58

Part 2. Wittgenstein and the Groundlessness of Our Believing	61
Chapter 3. Wittgenstein on the Structure of Rational Evaluation	63
0. Introductory Remarks	63
1. Wittgenstein on the Structure of Rational Evaluation	63
2. Wittgenstein contra the Skeptical “Paradox”	66
3. A Core Problem for the Wittgensteinian Account of the Structure of Rational Evaluation	70
4. Epistemic Ways of Developing the Wittgensteinian Account of the Structure of Rational Evaluation (I): The Externalist Reading	73
5. Epistemic Ways of Developing the Wittgensteinian Account of the Structure of Rational Evaluation (II): The Entitlement Reading	77
6. A Nonepistemic Way of Developing the Wittgensteinian Account of the Structure of Rational Evaluation: The Nonpropositional Reading	84
7. Concluding Remarks	87
Chapter 4. Hinge Commitments	89
0. Introductory Remarks	89
1. The Nonbelief Reading	90
2. Hinge Commitments	94
3. Anti-skeptical Contrasts (I): Inferential Contextualism	103
4. Anti-skeptical Contrasts (II): Strawsonian Naturalism	110
5. Anti-skeptical Contrasts (III): Davidsonian Content Externalism	112
6. Wittgensteinian Anti-skepticism and Underdetermination-Based Radical Skepticism	113
7. Epistemic Priority and Underdetermination-Based Radical Skepticism	116
8. Concluding Remarks	118
Part 3. Epistemological Disjunctivism	121
Chapter 5. Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Factivity of Reasons	123
0. Introductory Remarks	123
1. Epistemological Disjunctivism in Outline	123

2. Three Core Problems for Epistemological Disjunctivism	127
3. Epistemological Disjunctivism qua Anti-skeptical Strategy	132
4. Radical Skepticism and Favoring/Discriminating Epistemic Support	136
5. Concluding Remarks	142
Chapter 6. Epistemological Disjunctivism and Closure-Based Radical Skepticism	144
0. Introductory Remarks	144
1. Anti-skeptical Contrasts (I): Rational Support Contextualism	144
2. Anti-skeptical Contrasts (II): Contrastivism	153
3. Anti-skeptical Contrasts (III): Dogmatism	157
4. A Weakness in Epistemological Disjunctivism	160
5. Epistemological Disjunctivism and Its Competitors	163
6. Concluding Remarks	166
Part 4. Farewell to Epistemic Angst	167
Chapter 7. Farewell to Epistemic Angst	169
0. Introductory Remarks	169
1. Recap: The Problem of Radical Skepticism	169
2. The Biscopic Proposal: Epistemic Angst Avoided	173
3. Some Anti-skeptical Contrasts	179
4. Concluding Postscript: Epistemic Vertigo	184
<i>Notes</i>	189
<i>Bibliography</i>	217
<i>Index</i>	237