

THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION

Public Goods
and the
Theory of Groups

MANCUR OLSON

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CONTENTS

Introduction	1
I. A Theory of Groups and Organizations	5
A. The purpose of organization	5
B. Public goods and large groups	9
C. The traditional theory of groups	16
D. Small groups	22
E. "Exclusive" and "inclusive" groups	36
F. A taxonomy of groups	43
II. Group Size and Group Behavior	53
A. The coherence and effectiveness of small groups	53
B. Problems of the traditional theories	57
C. Social incentives and rational behavior	60
III. The Labor Union and Economic Freedom	66
A. Coercion in labor unions	66
B. Labor-union growth in theory and practice	76
C. The closed shop and economic freedom in the latent group	88
D. Government intervention and economic freedom in the latent group	91
IV. Orthodox Theories of State and Class	98
A. The economists' theory of the state	98
B. The Marxian theory of state and class	102
C. The logic of the Marxian theory	105

V. Orthodox Theories of Pressure Groups	111
A. The philosophical view of pressure groups	111
B. Institutional economics and the pressure group— John R. Commons	114
C. Modern theories of pressure groups—Bentley, Truman, Latham	117
D. The logic of group theory	125
VI. The “By-Product” and “Special Interest” Theories	132
A. The “by-product” theory of large pressure groups	132
B. Labor lobbies	135
C. Professional lobbies	137
D. The “special interest” theory and business lobbies	141
E. Government promotion of political pressure	148
F. Farm cooperatives and farm lobbies	153
G. Noneconomic lobbies	159
H. The “forgotten groups”—those who suffer in silence	165
Appendix	169
Index	179