Contents

1	Indi	viduals and Cross-World Identity	Ţ
	1.1	Introduction: The Notion of 'Same Object'	1
	1.2	Intricacies of Cross-World Identity	5
	1.3	The Proposal	9
	1.4	The Semantic Role of Cross-World Links	17
	1.5	Transcendental Interpretation of World Lines	20
	1.6	Epistemic Interpretation of World Lines	23
2	The	Nature of Modal Individuals	25
	2.1	Introduction	25
	2.2	Transcendental Preconditions	25
	2.3	World Line Semantics	30
	2.4	Types of Predicates	36
	2.5	Contents	39
	2.6	Systems of Modal Unities	41
	2.7	Relation to Other Views	44
		2.7.1 Kripke's Stipulative Account	44
		2.7.2 Lewis on Counterparts and Humean Supervenience	47
		2.7.3 Fine's Notion of Variable Embodiment	52
		2.7.4 What World Lines Are Not.	55
3	Two	Modes of Individuation	59
	3.1	Introduction	59
	3.2	Intentional and Physical Mode of Individuation	61
	3.3	Availability and Realization	65
	3.4	World Line Semantics Generalized	68
	3.5	Examples	71
	3.6	Hintikka on Two Modes of Identification	75
	3.7	Necessitism and World Lines	78
	3.8	Meinongianism and World Lines	82

xiv Contents

4	Intentional Objects as World Lines				
	4.1	Introduction: Features of Intentional Objects	85		
	4.2	Two Modes of Predication	86		
	4.3	Description-Sensitivity	90		
	4.4	Factiveness and Material Objects of Intentional States	94		
	4.5	Indeterminacy	96		
	4.6	Non-Existent Objects and States with Material Objects	99		
	4.7	Intentional States and Their Contents	102		
	4.8	Representations of Physical Objects	107		
5	Log	ical Repercussions of World Line Semantics	113		
	5.1	Introduction	113		
	5.2	Quantifiers and the Substitutivity of Identicals	114		
	5.3	The Logical Behavior of Constant Symbols	118		
	5.4	The Barcan Formula and Its Converse	123		
	5.5	Validity and Its Preservation Under Substitution	127		
	5.6	Schemata, Logical Forms, and Schematic Formulas	132		
	5.7	Relation to First-Order Logic	135		
	5.8	Negative Properties Put into Perspective	139		
6	Gen	eral Consequences	143		
	6.1	Introduction	143		
	6.2	Objects of Thought: A Uniform Analysis	144		
	6.3	Singular Contents and Singular Propositions	146		
	6.4	Comparison with Crane's Account	150		
	6.5	Talking About Objects of Thought	154		
	6.6	Robust Intensional Verbs	160		
	6.7	Intensional Verbs and World Line Semantics	166		
Co	Concluding Remarks				
Αŗ	Appendix A: Proofs				
Αŗ	Appendix B: Overview of Definitions				
Re	References				
Index					