

Modality and Explanatory Reasoning

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Contents

1. Synopsis	1
1.1 The Nature of Modality	2
1.2 Modality and Explanation	5
1.2.1 Explanation	5
1.2.2 The Direction of Analysis	6
1.2.3 Closeness to Actuality	8
1.3 The Function of Modal Thought	10
1.4 Modality in Metaphysics	14
1.5 The Question of Reduction	15
1.6 A Guide for Selective Readers	18
2. The Nature of Modality	20
2.1 Necessity as Invariability	21
2.1.1 The Problem of the Narrow Circle	21
2.1.2 Truth in a Situation	22
2.1.3 Ramseyfying out of the Circle	26
2.2 Necessity as Unconditional Truth	27
2.3 Necessity as Secure Truth	28
2.4 The Necessity Scale	30
2.5 Modal Holism	34
2.6 Comparisons	37
2.6.1 Modality and the Space of Worlds	37
2.6.2 Modal Monism and Modal Dualism	38
2.7 An Agenda for the Analysis of Modality	43
Appendix A	46
Appendix B	51
3. Absolute Necessity and Iterated Modality	54
3.1 Context Dependence and the Absolute Nature of Necessity	54
3.1.1 Absolute Terms	54
3.1.2 Context Invariance and the Quest for Precision	59
3.1.3 Other Domain Restrictions	60
3.2 Worlds and Possibility	61
3.3 Modal Operators and Iterated Modality	63
3.3.1 Modal Operators	63
3.3.2 The Tetradic Relation of Comparative Closeness	65
3.3.3 The Modal Status of Modal Truths	67

4. On the Contingency of Worlds	71
4.1 Worlds as Stories	72
4.2 Propositions	74
4.3 Logic	77
4.4 Three Principles about Worlds	83
4.5 The Individuation of Worlds	85
4.5.1 Actualization Conditions and Existential Dependence	85
4.5.2 The Identity of Worlds across Possible Worlds	88
4.5.3 The Existence Conditions of Worlds	93
4.6 An Account of Worlds	99
4.6.1 Defining Worlds and Truth at a World	99
4.6.2 Truth in a World and Truth at a World	102
4.7 On the Fragility of All Worldly Matters	104
4.8 Contingently Existing Worlds and Iterated Modality	108
Appendix	110
5. A Theory of Worlds	113
5.1 Extensions of the Lagadonian Language	114
5.1.1 Introduction: Sets and Proper Classes	114
5.1.2 Compounds of Proper-Class-Many Propositions	115
5.1.3 Singular Propositions about Proper Classes	119
5.2 Redefining Worlds and Truth at a World	121
5.2.1 The Maximality of Worlds	121
5.2.2 The Plenitude of the Space of Worlds	126
5.2.3 The Identity and Existence Conditions of Worlds	128
5.2.4 A New Definition of Worlds and of Truth at a World	131
5.3 Implications for the Theory of Modality	133
Appendix A	134
Appendix B	137
Appendix C	140
6. Essence, Laws, and Explanation	146
6.1 Essential Truths	147
6.1.1 Identity Conditions and Instantiation Conditions	147
6.1.2 A Selective Survey of Essentialist Idioms	152
6.1.3 Definition, Reduction, and Fundamentality	158
6.2 Essence and Explanation	159
6.2.1 Data	159
6.2.2 Essence, Laws, and Metaphysical Explanation	161
6.2.3 The Covering-Law Conception of Grounding	167
6.3 Essence and Fundamentality	173
6.3.1 Essentiality is Indefinable	173
6.3.2 Fundamental Essence Facts	175

6.4 Explanatory Asymmetries	180
7. Metaphysical and Nomic Necessity	183
7.1 Defining Metaphysical and Nomic Necessity	183
7.2 Explaining the Modal Facts	189
7.3 An Alleged Example of Contingent Essence	192
7.4 A Simpler Account?	197
8. The Standards of Closeness	199
8.1 Preliminary Survey of Data	199
8.2 David Lewis's Account	202
8.3 The Causal Criterion of Relevance	205
8.4 The Explanatory Criterion of Relevance	209
8.5 The Laws of Nature and Pre-antecedent Match	213
8.6 Facts about the Natural Laws	217
8.7 The Standards of Similarity	218
8.8 The Account in Action	221
9. Clarifications, Additions, and Objections	224
9.1 Spelling Out the Explanatory Criterion of Relevance	224
9.1.1 Fact Talk	224
9.1.2 Producers, Omissions, and Preventers	225
9.1.3 Omissions	227
9.1.4 Explanation and Context Dependence	228
9.1.5 Relevant Similarities and Holding Fixed	229
9.2 Closeness-Relevant Dissimilarities	231
9.2.1 Completing the Account of Closeness	231
9.2.2 Defining Departures	236
9.3 Objections	239
9.3.1 Counterfactual Chance Raising	239
9.3.2 Antecedents that Contradict my Account	241
9.3.3 A Problem Case	241
10. Causation, Nomic Determination, and the Counterfactual Test	243
10.1 Causal and Counterfactual Thought	244
10.2 Causal Discourse without Causal Relata	245
10.3 Causation and Counterfactual Dependence	247
10.3.1 The Deterministic Problem Cases	247
10.3.2 Additional Problems under Indeterminism	249
10.4 The Determination Idea	250
10.4.1 The Determination Idea Spelled Out	251
10.4.2 An Objection to the Determination Idea	256
10.5 The Method of Difference	258

10.6	The Counterfactual Test	262
10.6.1	The Workings of the Counterfactual Test	262
10.6.2	The Epistemic Requirements of the Counterfactual Test	264
10.6.3	The Function of Counterfactual Reasoning	266
10.7	The Utility of the Method of Difference and the Counterfactual Test	270
11.	On the Genealogy of Modality	272
11.1	The Closeness Ordering	273
11.1.1	Reducing the Epistemic Preconditions of the Counterfactual Test	273
11.1.2	Preliminaries	275
11.1.3	Comparative Closeness to Actuality	276
11.1.4	Generalizing the Counterfactual Test	282
11.2	The Explanatory Criterion of Relevance	288
11.2.1	An Informal Exposition	288
11.2.2	A Formal Treatment	291
11.3	Weighing Relevant Similarities	294
11.3.1	Counterfactual Reasoning about Matters of Particular Fact	295
11.3.2	Counterfactual Reasoning about the Natural Laws	300
11.3.3	A System of Spheres	302
11.3.4	Metaphysical Laws Revisited	304
11.3.5	How to Weight Similarities	306
11.4	The Notion of Counterfactual Dependence	307
11.5	The Epistemic Preconditions of the Counterfactual Test (Revisited)	309
11.6	The Notions of Possibility and Necessity	312
	Appendix: The Rationale for the Explanatory Criterion of Relevance	314
12.	Extensions and Limitations of the Counterfactual Test	318
12.1	The Limits of the Counterfactual Test	318
12.2	The Versatility of the Counterfactual Test	322
12.3	The Counterfactual Test under Indeterminism	326
12.3.1	Testing Claims about the Causes of Chances	326
12.3.2	Avoiding Departures	329
12.4	The Counterfactual Test without the Transitivity Assumption	334
	<i>References</i>	337
	<i>Index</i>	349