

# Contents

Preface	xi
Introduction: What is Analytic Philosophy?	1
<i>Leading Analytic Philosophers</i>	6
1 Russell and Moore	8
<i>Empiricism, Mathematics, and Symbolic Logic</i>	8
<i>Logicism</i>	12
<i>Russell on Definite Descriptions</i>	20
<i>G. E. Moore's Philosophy of Common Sense</i>	27
<i>Moore and Russell on Sense Data</i>	30
<i>Moore's and Russell's Anti-Hegelianism</i>	33
<i>Summary</i>	38
2 Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle, and Logical Positivism	46
<i>Introduction</i>	46
<i>Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</i>	48
<i>Historical Note: The Vienna Circle and their Allies</i>	58
<i>The Elimination of Metaphysics and the Logical Positivist Program</i>	59
<i>The Demise of the Vienna Circle</i>	68
<i>The Influence of the Logical Positivists</i>	69
3 Responses to Logical Positivism: Quine, Kuhn, and American Pragmatism	76
<i>Introduction</i>	76
<i>The Demise of the Verifiability Criterion of Meaningfulness</i>	78
<i>Quine's Rejection of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction</i>	82
<i>Quinean Empiricism without the Dogmas</i>	86
<i>American Pragmatists after Quine: Nelson Goodman, Richard Rorty, and Hilary Putnam</i>	101

## Contents

4	Oxford Ordinary Language Philosophy and Later Wittgenstein	119
	<i>Introduction</i>	119
	<i>The Attack on Formalism – Strawson and Ryle</i>	124
	<i>Philosophy of Language – Austin and Wittgenstein</i>	128
	<i>Philosophy of Mind – Ryle, Strawson, and Wittgenstein</i>	138
	<i>The Rejection of Sense Data Theory</i>	147
	<i>The Legacy of Ordinary Language Philosophy</i>	153
5	Responses to Ordinary Language Philosophy: Logic, Language, and Mind	160
	<b><i>Part 1: Formal Logic and Philosophy of Language</i></b>	161
	<i>Gödel and Tarski</i>	161
	<i>Davidson</i>	166
	<i>Grice</i>	174
	<i>Carnap – Meaning and Necessity</i>	178
	<i>Chomsky</i>	180
	<b><i>Part 2: Philosophy of Mind</i></b>	183
	<i>Functionalism</i>	183
	<i>Objections to Functionalism – Bats and the Chinese Room</i>	188
	<i>Anomalous Monism</i>	192
	<i>The Problem of Mental Causation</i>	194
6	The Rebirth of Metaphysics	204
	<i>Modal Logic</i>	204
	<i>Possible Worlds</i>	212
	<i>Problems with the Canonical Conception of Possible Worlds</i>	216
	<i>Transworld Identity and Identification</i>	223
	<i>The Modal Version of the Ontological Argument</i>	229
7	Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds: Kripke, Putnam, and Donnellan	239
	<i>Introduction</i>	239
	<i>The Traditional Theory of Meaning and Reference</i>	240
	<i>Kripke's and Donnellan's Criticism of the Traditional Theory: Names and Descriptions</i>	243
	<i>Natural Kind Terms</i>	247
	<i>Problems for the New Theory of Reference</i>	253
	<i>Applications of the New Theory of Reference to the Philosophy of Mind</i>	257
	<i>The Social, Cultural, and Institutional Basis of Meaning and Reference</i>	260
8	Ethics and Metaethics in the Analytic Tradition	264
	<i>Introduction</i>	264
	<i>G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica</i>	266

<i>The Non-Cognitivism of C. L. Stevenson</i>	269
<i>The Universal Prescriptivism of R. M. Hare</i>	272
<i>The Return to Substantive Ethics</i>	275
<i>Questioning the Fact/Value Divide</i>	278
<i>Peter Singer and Animal Liberation</i>	281
<i>John Rawls' Theory of Justice</i>	285
9 <b>Epilogue: Analytic Philosophy Today and Tomorrow</b>	299
<i>Analytic Philosophy since 1980</i>	299
<i>What is the Future of Analytic Philosophy?</i>	321
<b>References</b>	327
<b>Index</b>	337