

CONTENTS

Introduction	1
--------------------	---

Part One: FROM RATIONAL CHOICE TOWARDS INSTITUTIONAL VARIABILITY

Chapter 1: Economic Systems from the Co-Ordination Perspective

1. Different Versions of Systems	7
2. Attitudes towards Transactions	10
3. The Coase Systems Perspective	11
4. Attitudes towards Transaction Costs	13
5. The Role of the Rational Choice Model	15
6. Coase Systems and Rational Choice	21
7. Preliminary Orientation	21

Chapter 2: A Comprehensive Version of Institutional Choice

1. Partial and Comprehensive Versions of Institutional Choice ...	23
2. A More Comprehensive Model with Special Initial Conditions ...	25
3. A More Comprehensive Model with General Initial Conditions ...	27
4. Introducing Algorithms for Macro and Micro Choice	29
5. Summary and Conclusions	32

Chapter 3: A Rational and More Comprehensive Framework for Industrial Organization Studies

1. Introduction	35
2. Technological Change	36
3. Agency Relations in Large Enterprises	38
4. A More General Agency Concept	40
5. Multi-Unit Enterprises and the Behaviour of Operational Units on Markets	41
6. Principal-Agency Relations in Regulated Industries	43
7. The Explanation of Transaction Gaps in Inter-Industry Co-Ordination	44
8. Propositions	48

Part Two: THE CO-ORDINATION PERSPECTIVE ELABORATED

Chapter 4: The Scope of the Systems Approach

1. A General Perspective	51
2. A Systems Perspective	52
3. Co-Ordination Procedures as a Set of Basic Characteristics ...	55
4. Co-Ordination Procedures and Subsystems	56
5. Criteria for the Distinction of Co-Ordination Procedures	59
6. The Specification of Systems	61
7. Behaviour	62
8. Summary	63
9. Deriving Behavioural Expectations	64

**Chapter 5: Co-Ordination Procedures between Subsystems:
Economic Policy Regimes**

1. Introduction	66
2. The Government/Industry Interface	66
3. Co-Ordination Procedures at the Government/Industry Interface	68

**Chapter 6: Co-Ordination Procedures between Subsystems:
Governance Procedures**

1. The Government/Management Interface	74
2. Assignment of Rights between Governance and Management	75
3. Governance Procedures	78
4. General Observations on Governance Procedures	86
5. Conclusions	89

**Part Three: THE CO-ORDINATION PERSPECTIVE WITH SOME BASIC
BEHAVIOURAL AND COST RELATIONSHIPS**

**Chapter 7: Governance/Management Co-Ordination under Alternative
Economic Policy Regimes**

1. Introduction	91
2. The Principal/Agent Relationship	93
3. Governance Costs	95
4. Changing Regime Conditions	96
5. Conclusions	99

**Chapter 8: Incentive Failures and the Scale of Government
Participation in the Co-Ordination of Industries**

1. Institutional Choice and Optimal Allocation	100
2. Optimal Allocation as a One-Dimensional Criterion	101
3. Incentive-Failure of Co-Ordination Procedures	103
4. The Scale of Government Participation in Economic Co-Ordination	104
5. Different Systems of Sanctions (Incentives) to Governments in the Economic Perspective	106
6. Expediency versus Efficiency	108
7. Preliminary Conclusions	110
8. Dictatorships	111
9. Conclusions	112

Chapter 9: The Nature of Transaction Costs and Benefits

1. Regime and Governance Costs	114
2. A Concept of Regime and Governance Costs	115
3. Industry-Specific Governance Cost Differences upon Variation of Regimes in Railroad Organization	119
4. Regime and Governance Costs in Electricity Generation	122
5. Comparative Cost Differences and Regime (Governance) Choice ..	125
6. Conclusions	128

Contents

Chapter 10: Towards an Integration of Structural and Behavioural Characteristics of Different Economic Systems

1. Retrospect on Behavioural Relationships 131
2. From "Idealtypen" towards a Descriptive Notion of the Specific National Economic Systems 132
3. The Analytical Use of the "Systems-Interface" 133

Part Four: BEHAVIOURAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIFFERENT ECONOMIC SYSTEMS

Chapter 11: A System with Dominant Government Directory Regimes

1. A Perspective on Complex Systems 136
2. Structural Characteristics of the Soviet-Type System 140
3. Behavioural Characteristics 144
4. Allocational Characteristics 148
5. Competitive Atmosphere 149
6. Conclusion 150

Chapter 12: A System with Dominant Regulatory Regimes

1. Introductory Remarks 152
2. Structural Characteristics and Desiderata 153
3. Behavioural Characteristics of Regulators and Managers 155
4. Regulatory Behaviour in Different Political Systems 157
5. Behaviour of Managers and Technological Progress 160
6. Preliminary Conclusions 162
7. Allocational Characteristics 165

Chapter 13: A System with Dominant Commercial Regimes

1. A Perspective View	170
2. Structural Characteristics	170
3. Behavioural Characteristics	172
4. Conclusions	176

Chapter 14: Retrospect and Prospect

1. Propositions	179
2. Regularities between Types of Characteristics	180
3. Types of Systems	184

Literature	186
------------------	-----