Contents

1	**Exposing Methods: The 2014 European Parliament Elections**		1
	1.1	The 28 Member States of the 2014 Union	1
	1.2	Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria; Electoral Keys	3
	1.3	Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany; Table Design	7
	1.4	Denmark, Estonia, Greece; Alliances and Indeps	11
	1.5	Spain, Finland, France, Croatia; Vote Patterns and Vote Categories	13
	1.6	Hungary, Ireland, Italy; Quotas	19
	1.7	Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia; Residual Fits	24
	1.8	Malta, the Netherlands, Poland; Nested Stages	27
	1.9	Portugal, Romania, Sweden; Method Overview	28
	1.10	Slovenia, Slovakia, United Kingdom; Local Representation	33
	1.11	Diversity Versus Uniformity	37
2	**Imposing Constitutionality: The 2009 Bundestag Election**		41
	2.1	The German Federal Election Law	41
	2.2	Countrywide Super-Apportionment 2009	44
	2.3	Per-Party Sub-Apportionments 2009	46
	2.4	Negative Voting Weights	48
	2.5	Direct and Universal Suffrage	49
	2.6	Free, Equal, and Secret Ballots	51
	2.7	Equality of the Voters' Success Values	52
	2.8	Equality of Representative Weights	54
	2.9	Satisfaction of the Parties' Ideal Shares of Seats	55
	2.10	Continuous Fits Versus Discrete Apportionments	56
3	**From Reals to Integers: Rounding Functions and Rounding Rules**		59
	3.1	Rounding Functions	59
	3.2	Floor Function	60
	3.3	Ties and the Need for Rules of Rounding	60
	3.4	Rule of Downward Rounding	61

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3.5 Ceiling Function and Rule of Upward Rounding 62
3.6 Commercial Rounding Function 63
3.7 Rule of Standard Rounding 63
3.8 Signpost Sequences 65
3.9 Rounding Rules 66
3.10 Stationary Signposts 68
3.11 Power-Mean Signposts 68
3.12 Simple Rounding Does Not Suffice! 69

4 Divisor Methods of Apportionment: Divide and Round 71
4.1 House Size, Vote Weights, and Seat Numbers 71
4.2 Apportionment Rules 73
4.3 The Five Organizing Principles 75
4.4 Apportionment Methods 77
4.5 Divisor Methods 77
4.6 Max-Min Inequality 80
4.7 Jump-and-Step Procedure and the Select Divisor 82
4.8 Uniqueness, Multiplicities, and Ties 83
4.9 Tie Resolution Provisions 85
4.10 Primal Algorithms and Dual Algorithms 86
4.11 Adjusted Initialization for Stationary Divisor Methods 87
4.12 Universal Initialization 88
4.13 Bad Initialization 89
4.14 Highest Comparative Scores 91
4.15 Authorities 92

5 Quota Methods of Apportionment: Divide and Rank 95
5.1 Quota Methods 95
5.2 Hare-Quota Method with Residual Fit by Greatest Remainders 96
5.3 Greatest Remainders and the Select Split 97
5.4 Shift-Quota Methods 97
5.5 Max-Min Inequality 98
5.6 Shift-Quota Methods and Stationary Divisor Methods 100
5.7 Authorities 100
5.8 Quota Variants 101
5.9 Residual Fit Variants 102
5.10 Quota Method Variants 103

6 Targeting the House Size: Discrepancy Distribution 107
6.1 Seat Total and Discrepancy 107
6.2 Universal Divisor Initialization 108
6.3 Recommended Divisor Initialization 109
6.4 Distributional Assumptions 111
6.5 Seat-Total Distributions 113
6.6 Hagenbach-Bischoff Initialization 114

6.7 Discrepancy Probabilities: Formulas 116
6.8 Discrepancy Probabilities: Practice 118
6.9 Discrepancy Representation by Means of Rounding Residuals 121
6.10 Invariance Principle for Rounding Residuals 122
6.11 Discrepancy Distribution 124

7 Favoring Some at the Expense of Others: Seat Biases 127
7.1 Seat Excess of a Party 127
7.2 Rank-Order of Parties by Vote Shares 128
7.3 Vote Share Thresholds 128
7.4 Seat Bias Formula 129
7.5 Biasedness Versus Unbiasedness 130
7.6 House Size Recommendation 132
7.7 Cumulative Seat Biases by Subdivisions into Districts 133
7.8 Total Positive Bias: The Stronger Third, the Weaker Two-Thirds 134
7.9 Alliances of Lists 135
7.10 Proof of the Seat Bias Formula 139
7.11 Proof of the Seat Bias Formula for List Alliances 144
7.12 Seat Biases of Shift-Quota Methods 145

8 Preferring Stronger Parties to Weaker Parties: Majorization 149
8.1 Bipartitions by Vote Strengths 149
8.2 Majorization of Two Seat Vectors 150
8.3 A Sufficient Condition via Pairwise Comparisons 151
8.4 Majorization of Two Apportionment Methods 151
8.5 Majorization of Divisor Methods 152
8.6 Majorization-Increasing Parameterizations 153
8.7 Majorization Paths 154
8.8 Majorization of Shift-Quota Methods 156

9 Securing System Consistency: Coherence and Paradoxes 159
9.1 The Whole and Its Parts 159
9.2 The Sixth Organizing Principle: Coherence 160
9.3 Coherence and Completeness of Divisor Methods 161
9.4 Coherence Theorem 162
9.5 House Size Monotonicity 163
9.6 Vote Ratio Monotonicity 165
9.7 Retrieval of an Underlying Signpost Sequence 167
9.8 Proof of the Coherence Theorem in Sect. 9.4 168
9.9 Coherence and Stationary Divisor Methods 172
9.10 Coherence and the Divisor Method with Standard Rounding 175
9.11 Violation of Coherence: New States Paradox 177
9.12 Violation of House Size Monotonicity: Alabama Paradox 179

9.13 Violation of Vote Ratio Monotonicity: Population Paradox 181
9.14 Violation of Voter Monotonicity: No-Show Paradox 183

10 Appraising Electoral Equality: Goodness-of-Fit Criteria 185
10.1 Optimization of Goodness-of-Fit Criteria 185
10.2 Voter Orientation: DivStd 186
10.3 Curtailment of Overrepresentation: DivDwn 189
10.4 Alleviation of Underrepresentation: DivUpw 191
10.5 Parliamentary Orientation: DivGeo 193
10.6 Party Orientation: HaQgrR 195
10.7 Stabilization of Disparity Functions 198
10.8 Success-Value Stability: DivStd 199
10.9 Representative-Weight Stability: DivHar 200
10.10 Unworkable Disparity Functions 201
10.11 Ideal-Share Stability: DivStd 202
10.12 Ideal Share of Seats Versus Exact Quota of Seats 203

11 Tracing Peculiarities: Vote Thresholds and Majority Clauses 207
11.1 Vote Share Variation for a Given Seat Number 207
11.2 Vote Share Bounds: General Divisor Methods 208
11.3 Vote Share Bounds: Stationary Divisor Methods 209
11.4 Vote Share Bounds: Modified Divisor Methods 211
11.5 Vote Share Bounds: Shift-Quota Methods 212
11.6 Overview of Vote Thresholds 213
11.7 Preservation of a Straight Majority and Majority Clauses 215
11.8 House-Size Augmentation Clause 217
11.9 Majority-Minority Partition Clause 217
11.10 The 2002 German Conference Committee Dilemma 219
11.11 Residual-Seat Redirection Clause 220
11.12 Divisor Methods and Ideal Regions of Seats 221

12 Truncating Seat Ranges: Minimum-Maximum Restrictions 225
12.1 Minimum Representation for Electoral Districts 225
12.2 Quota Method Ambiguities 226
12.3 Minimum-Maximum Restricted Variants of Divisor Methods 227
12.4 Direct-Seat Restricted Variant of DivDwn 228
12.5 Proportionality Loss 232
12.6 Direct-Seat Restricted Variant of DivStd 232
12.7 Composition of the EP: Legal Requirements 234
12.8 Cambridge Compromise 236
12.9 Power Compromise 238
12.10 Jagiellonian Compromise 242

13 Proportionality and Personalization: BWG 2013 247
13.1 The 2013 Amendment of the Federal Election Law 247
13.2 Apportionment of Seats Among Parties 248
13.3 Assignment of Candidates to Seats 249

13.4 Initial Adjustment of the Bundestag Size 251
13.5 Alternative House Size Adjustment Strategies 252

14 Representing Districts and Parties: Double Proportionality 259
14.1 Double Proportionality: Practice 259
14.2 The 2016 Parliament Election in the Canton of Schaffhausen 260
14.3 Discordant Seat Assignments 264
14.4 Winner-Take-One Modification 265
14.5 Double Proportionality in Swiss Cantons: The Reality 265
14.6 Double Proportionality in the European Union: A Vision 266
14.7 Degressive Compositions and Separate District Evaluations 267
14.8 Compositional Proportionality for Unionwide Lists 268

15 Double-Proportional Divisor Methods: Technicalities 275
15.1 Row and Column Marginals, Weight and Seat Matrices 275
15.2 Double-Proportional Divisor Methods 276
15.3 Cycles of Seat Transfers 278
15.4 Uniqueness of Double-Proportional Seat Matrices 279
15.5 Characterization of Double-Proportional Seat Matrices 281
15.6 Existence of Double-Proportional Seat Matrices 285
15.7 A Dual View 287
15.8 Alternating Scaling Algorithm 288
15.9 Tie-and-Transfer Algorithm 292

16 Biographical Digest 297
16.1 Thomas Jefferson 1743–1826 297
16.2 Alexander Hamilton 1755–1804 298
16.3 Daniel Webster 1782–1852 299
16.4 Thomas Hare 1806–1891 300
16.5 Henry Richmond Droop 1832–1884 301
16.6 Eduard Hagenbach-Bischoff 1833–1910 302
16.7 Victor D'Hondt 1841–1901 305
16.8 Joseph Adna Hill 1860–1938 306
16.9 Walter Francis Willcox 1861–1964 308
16.10 Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz 1868–1931 309
16.11 Edward Vermilye Huntington 1874–1952 310
16.12 Siegfried Geyerhahn 1879–1960 312
16.13 Jean-André Sainte-Laguë 1882–1950 313
16.14 George Pólya 1887–1985 315
16.15 Horst Friedrich Niemeyer 1931–2007 317

Notes and Comments 319

References 331

Index 339