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Rings in Auctions

An Experimental Approach



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Contents

1	Introduction	1
2	The Experiment	5
2.1	Introduction and Related Literature	6
2.2	Experimental Design	8
2.3	Theory of Collusion in First-price Auctions	12
2.4	Experimental Results	15
2.4.1	Do Experimental Subjects Cooperate?	15
2.4.2	Observed Mechanisms	18
2.4.3	Winners' Bids and Payoff Shares	21
2.4.4	Two-Player Coalition versus One Individual Bidder	22
2.4.5	Summing Up	22
2.5	Theoretical Predictions versus Data	26
2.5.1	The Announcement Mechanism	27
2.5.2	Announcement Mechanism: The Behavior of Players Who Cheat	32
2.5.3	Announcement Mechanism: Optimality	36
2.5.4	Bid-bargain Mechanism	39
2.5.5	Bid-Bargain Mechanism: Optimality	41
2.5.6	Lattice Mechanism	44
2.5.7	Lattice Mechanism: Optimality	45
2.5.8	First-Price Auction Mechanism	46
2.5.9	Summing Up	46
2.6	Other Mechanisms	47
2.7	Strategic Behavior and the End Effect	49
3	A Descriptive Model	53
3.1	Conditional Probabilities	53
3.2	The Model	57

4	Mechanisms of Collusion	63
4.1	The Distribution Function	63
4.2	Announcement Mechanism	65
4.3	Bid-bargain Mechanism	77
4.3.1	(Non-)Optimality	81
4.4	Lattice Mechanism	83
4.4.1	Optimality	88
4.4.2	The Best Lattice With Four Intervals	90
4.5	First-Price Auction Mechanism	91
4.6	Summing Up	94
5	Two Extensions	97
5.1	Lattice With Continuous Bids	97
5.2	Two-player Coalition	99
6	Conclusion	103
	Bibliography	107
A	Instructions and Forms	113
B	Experimental Data	117
C	Experimental Data	135
D	Non-cooperative Bidding	155
E	Player 2's Equilibrium Strategy	157
	List of Figures	169
	List of Tables	171