

Centre of European Law
King's College, London

London Institute of International
Banking, Finance & Development Law
Centre for Commercial Law Studies
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University of London

European Economic and Monetary Union: The Institutional Framework

Edited by

**Mads Andenas
Laurence Gormley
Christos Hadjiemmanuil
Ian Harden**

In cooperation with

Faculty of Law, University of Groningen
Faculty of Law, University of Sheffield
European Investment Bank
Financial Law Panel, London
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, London



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