European Company Law in Accelerated Progress

Edited by

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Table of Contents

Forev	vord	xix
Toker	oter 1 EC Directive on Takeover Bids: Opting in as a n of Good Corporate Governance M. Bartman	1
I. II. III. IV. V.	Introduction Primacy of the Shareholders as the Leading Principle Revision after Five Years Opting In and Corporate Governance Requirements Summary and Conclusions	1 3 4 5 7
	ming United Kingdom Company Law in a European ext: a Long And Winding Road	9
I. II.	Background Themes and Features of British Company Law A. One Body of Law for all Companies	10 12 12
	B. Sources of the Law – An Unwieldy Mass?C. Contract-Based Law	12 13
	D. The Interests of the CompanyE. EuropeF. Self-Regulation	13 14 15

III.	The Process of Reform	15
	A. Objectives of the Review	16
	B. Terms of Reference	16
	C. The Work of the Steering Group and the Response	
	of Government	17
IV.	The Key Areas of Reform	18
	A. The Interests of the Company and the Duties of	
	Company Directors	18
	1. The Core Duty of Company Directors –	
	Version One	19
	2. The Core Duty of Company Directors –	
	Version Two	19
	B. Corporate Governance	21
	C. Deregulation and the Needs of Small Companies	23
	D. The Rights of Shareholders	25
	E. The Use of Technology	25
	F. Disclosure and Audit	25
	G. Formation of Companies and Capital Maintenance	
	Rules	26
V.	Concluding Thoughts	27
	A. The Range of Business Entities	28
	B. Europe	29
Cha	pter 3	
	porate Governance Codes: Origins and Perspectives	31
	aan F.M. Dorresteijn and Cornelis de Groot	
	•	
I.	Introduction	31
	A. Definition of Corporate Governance	31
	B. The Origins of the Corporate Governance Debate	33
II.	Reducing the Costs of the Separation of Ownership	
	and Control	36
III.	Codes and Alternative Legal Techniques	37
	A. Sources of Corporate Governance	37
	B. Varieties of Corporate Governance Codes	38
	C. The Extent to which Corporate Governance Codes	40
	are Legally Binding	40
IV.	EU-Codes and EU-Ambitions	41
V.	The Centre of Discussion: The Board of Directors	44
	A. The Board in Corporate Governance Codes	44
	B. The Role of the Board: In Whose Interest?	45
	C. The Responsibilities of the Board	47
	D. The Responsibilities of the Supervisory Board in a	47
	Two-Tier Board Structure	47

<u>Table</u>	e of Contents	vi
	E. Director Independence	49
	F. (Mandatory) Committees and Committee Member	
	Îndependence	5
	G. Management, the CEO and the Chairman of	
	the Board	53
VI.	Perspectives	54
VII.	Conclusion	50
Com	pter 4 pany Law Harmonization Reconsidered:	
	at Role for the EC?	59
Luca	t Enriques	
т	Later de d'an Terre de Consul Proposition de Consta	
I.	Introduction: Toward a General Framework for the	
	Assessment of Harmonization Initiatives in the	50
TT	Company Law Area	59
II.	Rationales for Harmonization	61
	A. Preventing a Race to the Bottom	61
	B. Correcting Market Failures	65
	C. Market Integration	66
	1. Company Law-Related Obstacles to the Four	
	Freedoms	66
	2. Divergence as an Obstacle to Market	
	Integration	68
	a. Level Playing Field	69
	b. Lower Transaction Costs from	69
	Harmonization?	
	c. Standard-Setting	70 72
	D. Scale Economies in Law Production?	73
	E. Correcting Government Failures E. Summary	74
III.	F. Summary Harmonization's Drawbacks	74
111.		75
	A. Harmonization as a Cartel	75
	1. Over-Regulation, Excessive Innovation	77
	2. Less Experimentation	78
	B. What Price Uniformity?	/ 6
	C. The Problems with Real-World Company Law	78
	Harmonization	79
	Higher Complexity and Uncertainty Output Description:	79
	2. Petrification	75

D. The Costs of the Harmonization Process
E. Summary
Conclusions

IV.

80 81

81

	pter 5	
	opean Company Law and Conflicts of Interests Lennarts	83
τ.	T. d. Tardian	02
I. II.	Introduction The Present: What Does European Company Law Do To	83
11.	The Present: What Does European Company Law Do To Regulate Related Party Transactions?	84
III.	Ghosts from the Past: European Rules on Related Party	04
111.	Transactions that Might Have Been	87
IV.	The Future: Measures Still to be Implemented	90
V.	Assessment: Is it Enough?	93
	pter 6 Provision of Equity Capital to Companies and Partnerships:	
	omparison between the Law and Economics and the	
	nparative European Law Perspectives	95
Chri	istiaan A. Schwarz	
I.	Introduction: Companies and Firms	95
II.	The Evolution of Legal Personality	97
III.	The Law and Economics Perspective	100
IV.	Decision Rights Strategy and De Facto Management	102
V.	In Summary	105
Cha	pter 7	
	Golden Mean or a Dead End? The Takeover Directive	
in a	Shareholder versus Stakeholder Perspective	107
Bea	te Sjåfjell	
I.	'The Takeovers Directive is a Failure'	107
1.	A. A Question of Perspective	107
II.	Shareholder Primacy, the Stakeholder Approach – And My	10.
	Perspective	109
	A. The Never-Ending Debate	109
	B. Shareholder Primacy	109
	C. Stakeholder Theory	110
	D. The Nordic Perspective	111
	1. In Between?	111
	2. Norway and Sweden: So Near and Yet So	
	Far Apart?	112
	E. Not Such a Deep Divide After All?	114
	F. A Consensus on Values?	115

	G.	More on My Perspective	115
		1. Integrating Sustainable Development	115
***	C1	2. Consequence for My Analytical Approach	116
III.		areholders and Stakeholders in Takeovers	117
	A.	The Shareholders	117
	B.	The Stakeholders	117
		1. A Takeover Issue?	117
TT 7	ani.	2. The Board as a Possible Stakeholders' Trustee	118
IV.		e Takeover Directive: What It Does and Does Not Do	119
	A.	General Protection of Shareholders and Stakeholders	119
3 7	B.	Does the Directive Take a Stand?	120
V.		areholder Protection	121
	A.	The Neutrality and Breakthrough Rules: Protection	101
	~	of Shareholders?	121
T /T	B.	Squeeze-Out and Sell-Out Rights	122
VI.		nority Protection and the Mandatory Bid Rule	122
	Α.	Highly Prioritized in the Takeover Directive	122
	В.	And Loved by Member States and (Some) Companies	100
	~	Alike	123
	C.	What is the Directive Trying to Do with the Mandatory Bid?	124
		1. Protect Minority Shareholders?	124
		2. Protect the Market by Enabling Takeovers Through the	100
		Mandatory Bid Rule?	126
		3. The Market for Corporate Control as the Corporate	400
		Governance Solution	128
		4. Protect the Market – Although Hindering Takeovers?	128
VII.		keholder Protection	132
	Α.	The Employees	132
	В.	The Local Community	133
	C.	The National Interest	133
	D.	The Objective of Sustainable Development	134
		1. The Sustainable Development Objective in EC	
		and EU Law	134
		2. Sustainable Development and Takeovers	135
		3. Integrating Sustainable Development in the	
		Takeover Rules	136
		4. The Member States' Implementation of the Directive	136
		5. Obligations on the Bidder?	137
		6. A Lacking Integration of the Sustainable	
		Development Objective	137
VIII.		tection Beyond the Directive	138
	A.	The Member States' Legislative Room after the	
		Takeover Directive	138
	B.	So, What Then?	139

Table	of	Contents

4	,	
	۲.	

IX. X.	A Golden Mean or a Dead End? References	140 140
'Law Mark	oter 8 as a Product' – Regulatory Competition in the Common ket and the European Private Company stoph Teichmann	145
I. II.	Introduction Regulatory Competition – Lessons To Be Drawn	145
	From the US-American Experience	146
III.	Corporate Forms Available in the Common Market	147
	A. National Corporate Forms	147
	1. Free Choice of Corporate Law Rules	147
	2. Transaction Costs for SMEs in the European Market	
	for Corporate Forms	148
	B. The European Company (SE) – An Option for SMEs?	149
IV.	The European Private Company	150
	A. The EPC – A Private Sector Initiative	151 151
	 Demand Articulated by SMEs and Their Representatives Basic Features of the Proposal for a European 	131
	Private Company	152
	B. Feasibility Study Commissioned by the European Union	152
	1. The General Approach	152
	2. The Three Types of a European Legal Statute	
	Considered by the Study	154
	3. Pros and Cons of the Different Types of European Statute	155
V.	A look forward: drafting a European statute for SMEs	156
VI.	Conclusion	157
	oter 9 SE as a Legal Form for Financial Companies Werlauff	159
I.	General Features of the SE	159
1,	A. The Need for a Common European Company	159
	B. Aims Still to be Achieved	160
	C. The SE's Equal Treatment With Other Public Limited	100
	Companies	161
	D. The Four Methods of Formation	162

	E.	Employees' Co-Decision Rights must be Determined	
		before an SE can be Registered	165
	F.	Cross-Border Transfer of Domicile of an SE	168
II.	The	e SE as Corporate Vehicle for Companies in the Financial	
	Sec	etor	170
	A.	A Cross-Border Scandinavian Merger where the SE could	
		have been Applied in a Corporate Form Afterwards: Swedish	
		Handelsbanken AB Takes Over Danish Midtbank A/S	170
	B.	A Pan-Scandinavian Merger where the SE must be	
		Applied, but the Road is Blocked at the Moment: Nordea	
		AB to Take Over its Own Scandinavian subsidiaries by	
		way of Cross-Border Merger	171
	C.	Swedish Investment Companies: Interpretation of the	
		Currency Provisions in the SE Regulation	173
	D.	Is the SE as a Legal Form a Good Idea for Financial	
		Companies?	173
	E.	Other Scandinavian Countries	174
Ш	Ove	erall Conclusion	174