

Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules

Second Edition

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Contents

<i>Foreword to the Second Edition</i>	vii
<i>Foreword to the First Edition</i>	xi
<i>Author's Note to the Second Edition</i>	xiii
<i>Table of Cases and Opinions</i>	xxvii
<i>Table of Legislation</i>	xli

Part One

Introduction 1

1 Introduction and Framework for Analysis	3
I. Introduction	3
A. The Current Situation from a Competition Law Perspective	7
B. The Current Situation from a Public Procurement Law Perspective	10
C. Overall Perspective	12
II. General Approach to the Interrelationship between Competition and Public Procurement Law	13
III. Aim of the Study	14
IV. Structure of the Study and General Overview	15
A. General Overview	15
B. Foundations and Principles: On the Economic and Legal Basics of Public Procurement and Competition Law	15
C. General Part: Public Procurement Viewed from a Competition Perspective, and Competition Elements of Public Procurement Rules—The Building Blocks of the Framework for the Competition Analysis of Public Procurement	16
D. Special Part: Operationalisation of the General Framework through Current Public Procurement Rules—Proposals for the Further Development of a More Pro-Competitive Public Procurement System	17
E. General Conclusions	19
V. Methodology: An Eclectic and Heuristic Multi-Disciplinary and Functional Approach to EU Law	19
VI. Normative Assumptions	24
VII. Delimitation of the Study: Exclusions and Limitations	26
A. Exclusions from the Object of Study	27
B. Limitations on the Sources Used in the Study	30

	Part Two	
	Foundations and Principles: The Economic and Legal Basics of Public Procurement and Competition Law	35
2	An Economic Approach to Public Procurement and Competition	37
	I. Introduction	37
	II. Types of 'Public Procurement Markets'	39
	A. 'The Limitations of the 'Public Market' Paradigm	39
	B. A More Detailed 'Taxonomy of 'Public Procurement Markets'	41
	i. The 'Regulatory Situation' of Public Procurement Markets	41
	ii. The Relative Importance of the Public Buyer in the Market: Exclusive, Dependent, Commercial and Private Markets	43
	iii. Temporal Considerations of Relevance for Public Procurement Markets	47
	iv. Relevance of the Geographic Dimension of the Market	49
	v. Other Considerations: 'Prescriptive Role' of Public Procurement and 'Adjacent' Markets	49
	C. Preliminary Conclusion as Regards the Proposed 'Taxonomy of Public Procurement Markets	51
	III. Economic Dimensions of Public Procurement	52
	A. Public Procurement as a Public Investment/Public Expense Tool	52
	B. Public Procurement as a 'Working' Tool for the Public Sector	54
	C. Public Procurement as a Tool of 'Sectoral' Regulation	56
	IV. The Role of Public Authorities as Purchasing and Contracting Authorities	56
	A. Public Buyers as Agents	56
	B. Public Buyers as Gatekeepers	58
	C. Public Buyers as Market-Makers	58
	V. Public Procurement as a Market Failure: Difficulties in Recreating a Competitive Scenario and Competition- Restricting Effects	60
	A. Public Procurement as a Market-Like Regulatory Instrument	62
	B. A Model for the Analysis of Public Buyer Behaviour and the Effects of Public Procurement Regulation	65
	C. Direct Competition-Distorting Effects: Waterbed Effects	69
	D. Indirect Competition-Distorting Effects: Increased Bidder Collusion and Other Effects of Price Signalling	73
	E. Other Competition-Distorting Effects	75
	VI. Conclusions to this Chapter	77
3	Basics of Competition and Public Procurement Regulation	79
	I. Introduction	79
	II. Principles Common to Competition and Public Procurement Law as Two Sets of Economic Regulation	80
	III. The Goal(s) of Competition Law	87
	A. Brief Overview of the Discussion Regarding this Topic	87
	B. Economic Goals	93
	C. Social and Political Goals	96

D.	Creation of the Internal Market, as a Purely European Goal	99
E.	Preliminary Conclusion regarding the Objective of Competition Law	100
IV.	Goals of Public Procurement	101
A.	A More Limited Discussion on the Goals of Public Procurement	101
B.	Competition (Value for Money, or Best Value)	105
C.	Efficiency (of Public Procurement Itself)	109
D.	Transparency (Oversight, Anti-Fraud Objectives)	111
E.	Market Integration as a Purely (and Transitory) European Goal	112
F.	Preliminary Conclusion regarding the Objectives of Public Procurement Law	114
V.	Conclusions to this Chapter: Common Goals of Competition Law and Public Procurement	114
	Conclusions to Part Two: Legal and Economic Normative Foundations of a More Competition-Oriented Public Procurement System	116

Part Three

General Part: The Building Blocks of a Framework for the Competition Analysis of Public Procurement 119

4	EU Competition Law and Public Procurement: The Inability of EU Competition Rules to Rein in Anti-Competitive Public Procurement	121
I.	Introduction	121
II.	The Inability of Rules on the Grant of State Aid and Special or Exclusive Rights to Tackle Anti-Competitive Public Procurement	123
A.	The Proper Award of a Public Contract Establishes a Presumption against the Existence of State Aid	124
B.	The Award of Most Public Contracts Does Not Constitute a Grant of a Special or Exclusive Right to the Government Contractor, except for Concessions	128
i.	In General: Article 106(1) TFEU	128
ii.	Different Treatment under Directive 2014/25?	130
iii.	The Coverage of All Concessions Contracts in Directive 2014/23	131
iv.	Services of General Economic Interest: Article 106(2) TFEU	132
v.	Overall, Article 106 TFEU is Largely Irrelevant for the Purposes of Reigning in Anti-Competitive Public Procurement Activities	134
III.	The Inapplicability of 'Core' EU Antitrust Rules to Public Procurement:	
A.	Jurisprudentially Created Gap in EU Competition Law	135
A.	In General, the Concept of 'Undertaking' as the Key Element of Analysis	135
B.	The Carrying Out of an Economic Activity as the Distinctive Criterion: The General Functional Approach to the Concept of 'Economic Activity'	137
C.	The Approach to Purchasing Activities As Such: A Departure from the General Functional Approach to the Concept of 'Economic Activity'	140

	D. The Gap Generated by the Adoption of Too Narrow a Concept of Economic Activity—Which Excludes Procurement Activities As Such	141
IV.	The Insufficiency of State Action Doctrine to Capture Most of the Anti-Competitive Public Procurement Regulations and Practices	142
	A. The Potential for Publicly Created Distortions of Competition as the Rationale behind the Development of the State Action Doctrine	142
	B. A Quick Overview on the Development of the State Action Doctrine	143
	C. The Current Formulation and Boundaries of the State Action Doctrine	147
	D. Assessment of the State Action Doctrine under its Current Formulation	149
V.	Preliminary Conclusions: The Insufficiency of Current Competition Institutions and Potential Improvements to Achieve Better Results	152
VI.	A Revision of Current Doctrine to Achieve Better Results (1): A More Economic Approach to the Concept of ‘Economic Activity’ in the Public Procurement Field	156
	A. The Current Approach: The Analysis of Public Procurement Activities Is Pegged to the Subsequent Use of the Purchased Goods or Services	156
	B. An Assessment of the Current Approach in the EU Case law	158
	i. The FENIN–Selex Doctrine Runs Contrary to Previous Practice in Several Member States	159
	ii. The FENIN–Selex Doctrine Runs Contrary to Alternative Approaches Previously Suggested to the EU Judicature	161
	iii. The FENIN–Selex Doctrine Runs Contrary to the General Functional Approach to the Concept of ‘Undertaking’	161
	iv. The FENIN–Selex Doctrine Makes Poor Economic Sense	163
	v. A Possible Justification to the FENIN–Selex Doctrine: Aiming to Afford a Different Competition Treatment to Social and Other Public Interest Activities	166
	C. Sketch Proposal for the Review of the Current Case Law	171
	D. What Scope for a More Stringent Approach by Member States?	172
VII.	A Revision of Current Doctrine to Achieve Better Results (2): Setting the Proper Bounds to the State Action Doctrine	173
	A. The State Action Doctrine in the US as a Benchmark	173
	i. Brief Description of the US State Action Doctrine	174
	ii. Scope for a ‘Market Participant Exception’ under US State Action Doctrine	176
	iii. Comparative Assessment of the State Action Doctrine in the US and the EU	177
	B. Setting the Proper Bounds of the State Action Doctrine (1): Bringing Sovereignty to the Centre of the Doctrine, and Developing a ‘Market Participant Exception’	179
	i. General Approach: ‘Sovereignty’ and ‘Legitimacy’ as Ruling Criteria	179
	ii. Anti-Competitive Public Procurement Legislation and Regulation as Instances of the Exercise of Public Powers or Sovereign Activities	181

iii.	Anti-Competitive Public Procurement Decisions and Practices as Instances of the Exercise of Economic Powers or Non-Sovereign Activities by the State	182
iv.	Excluding Activities with Weak Sovereignty and Legitimacy Implications from the Scope of the State Action Doctrine: the 'Market Participant Exception'	184
C.	Setting the Proper Bounds to the State Action Doctrine (2): The Complex Issue of Balancing EU and Member States' Conflicting Policies	185
i.	General Framework	185
ii.	Criteria for the Balancing of Conflicting Policy Goals and Effects	187
iii.	The Impact on the Public Procurement Field	191
VIII.	Conclusions to this Chapter	193
5	The Principle of Competition Embedded in the EU Public Procurement Directives	195
I.	Introduction	195
II.	The Competition Principle Embedded in the pre-2014 EU Public Procurement Directives	196
A.	The Recognition of the Existence of a Competition Principle Embedded in the pre-2014 EU Public Procurement Directives and their Interpreting Case Law	196
B.	Delimiting the Competition Principle Embedded in the pre-2014 EU Public Procurement Directives	203
C.	The Link between the Competition Principle Embedded in the pre-2014 EU Public Procurement Directives and General EU Competition Law	206
III.	The Principle of Competition Consolidated in Article 18(1) of Directive 2014/24: A Critical Assessment of the Interpretative Difficulties it Creates	207
A.	The Problematic Conflation of Competition and Corruption Issues Related to Unequal Treatment	208
B.	The Introduction of a Subjective Element of 'Intention' and the Need to 'Objectify' It	210
C.	Preliminary Conclusion: Towards an Objective Interpretation of the Principle of Competition as Consolidated in Article 18(1) of Directive 2014/24	214
IV.	Implications of the Competition Principle for the Shaping of Public Procurement Rules by Member States: The General Obligation to Develop a Pro-Competitive Public Procurement Framework	215
A.	The Competition Principle as a Rule of Self-Construction for EU Public Procurement Directives	216
B.	The Competition Principle and the Transposition of the EU Directives on Public Procurement by Member States	217
C.	The Competition Principle and the Consistent Interpretation of Domestic Public Procurement Legislation	218
i.	Consistent Interpretation as a Rule of Construction of EU Law	218

ii.	Consistent Interpretation of the EU Public Procurement Directives with the Competition Principle	222
D.	Extension of the Competition Principle to Procurement Conducted Outside the Blueprint of the EU Directives: Competition as a General Principle	223
E.	Residual Application of the Principle of Competition	226
V.	The Principle of Equal Treatment and the Principle of Competition Distinguished	227
A.	A First Approximation: The Close Links between the Principles of Equal Treatment and Competition	227
B.	A Closer Look: The Principles Impose Different Requirements, and Competition Concerns should Modulate the Application of the Principle of Equality	228
C.	Emphasis on the Distinction of both Principles in the Area of Internal Market	232
VI.	Conclusions to this Chapter	235
	Conclusions to Part III: Sketching a Legal Framework to Discipline the Market Behaviour of the Public Buyer and to Guarantee Undistorted Competition in Public Procurement	237
Part Four		
	Analysis of Competition Distortions Caused by Public Procurement	241
6	A Critical Assessment of the 2014 EU Public Procurement Directives and the Existing Case Law from a Competition Perspective: Preventing Competitive Distortions by the Public Buyer	243
I.	Introduction	243
II.	A Competition Appraisal of Potential Distortions Derived from Public Procurement Processes	245
A.	Assessment of Unnecessary Restrictions of Access to the Procurement Process	247
i.	Make-or-Buy Decisions and Public–Public Cooperation Mechanisms (or Cooperate-or-Buy Decisions)	248
ii.	Unnecessary Use of Closed or Non-Competitive Procedures, Particularly In-House Schemes, and the Associated Restrictions on the Publicity of the Procurement Processes	258
iii.	Sale of Bid Documents as a Barrier to Entry	280
iv.	Delays and Other Restrictions in the Disclosure of Information Required to Prepare and Submit a Bid	282
v.	Grounds for Exclusion of Potential Bidders: In General, Establishment of Additional and Excessively Restrictive Disqualification Grounds	284
vi.	Grounds for Exclusion of Potential Bidders: In Particular, Consideration of Previous Breaches of Competition Law as Offences against Professional Conduct	296
vii.	Excessive Qualitative Selection Criteria: Early Restriction of Competition	301

viii.	In Particular, the Use of Previous Experience and Past Performance as Qualification Requirements	306
ix.	Restrictive or Discriminatory Short-Listing or Invitation of Candidates	312
x.	More Precise Rules Governing Reliance on the Capacities of Other Entities	315
xi.	Excessive Documentary Requests for the (Non-)Exclusion and Qualitative Selection of Candidates, and the European Single Procurement Document as an Intended Solution	318
xii.	More Scope For a Power/Duty to Seek Clarifications and Additional Information from Tenderers at Qualitative Selection Stage	321
xiii.	Official Lists of Contractors and Certification Systems	323
xiv.	Excessive Participation Guarantees (Bid Bonds or Bid Deposits)	326
xv.	Use of Restrictive Technical Specifications	327
xvi.	Teaming and Joint Bidding: Formation of Bidding Consortia	336
xvii.	Prohibition on Multiple Bidding	340
xviii.	Bundling and Aggregation of Contracts	347
xix.	Induced and Mandatory Subcontracting	353
xx.	Framework Agreements	355
xxi.	Dynamic Purchasing Systems	363
xxii.	Electronic Auctions	366
xxiii.	Electronic Catalogues	368
B.	Assessment of Unnecessary Restrictions in the Evaluation of Bids and Award of the Contract	369
i.	In General, the Adoption of a Neutral and Possibilistic Approach to Bid Evaluation and Contract Award	369
ii.	Appraisal of Bids Submitted by Advantaged Parties: The Issue of Involvement of Project Consultants	373
iii.	Selection and Application of Award Criteria	378
iv.	Treatment of Non-Fully Compliant Bids and, in particular, of Variants	391
v.	Treatment of Abnormally Low Tenders	400
vi.	Awarding Constraints	410
vii.	Path Dependence (or Consolidation of Current Commercial Relationships)	412
viii.	In Particular, the Problem of Switching Costs in Public Procurement	413
ix.	Conduct of Renegotiations Prior to or Immediately after Contract Award	418
x.	Restrictive Cancellation of the Tendering Procedures	421
C.	Assessment of Unnecessary Restrictions after Award of the Contract	424
i.	Excessive Guarantees (Performance Bonds)	425
ii.	Renegotiation of the Main Conditions of the Contract and its Modification	426
iii.	Extensions and Award of Additional Works	429

iv.	Termination and Re-tendering	434
v.	Setting Up Ineffective Bid Protest Mechanisms	438
III.	Two Examples of Potential Distortions Derived from the Exercise of Public Entities' Market Power	446
A.	'Squeezing' Public Contractors	447
B.	Rules on Transmission of Intellectual Property Rights or Know-How Related to or Derived from the Procurement Process	449
IV.	Conclusions to this Chapter	451
7	Complementary Proposals for the Development of a More Competition-Oriented Public Procurement Framework	459
I.	Introduction	459
II.	Complementary Proposals Aimed at Limiting Publicly Created Restraints of Competition	460
A.	Progressive or Incremental Enhancement of Competition Requirements in Public Procurement	460
B.	Secondary or Dual Sourcing Policies in Public Procurement	462
C.	The 'Market Economy Buyer Test' as a Yardstick for the Evaluation of Public Procurement Decisions	466
III.	Complementary Proposals Aimed at Limiting Privately Created Restraints of Competition	468
A.	Mandatory Reporting of Suspected Competition Law Violations	469
B.	Suspension and Debarment of Competition Infringers	470
IV.	Complementary Measures Aimed, in General, at Strengthening the Relationships between Competition and Procurement Authorities	474
A.	Appointment of Competition Advocates or Liaison Officers	475
B.	Granting Competition Authorities Oversight Competences over All or Some Public Procurement Decisions	477
V.	Conclusions to this Chapter	478
Part V		
General Conclusions		481
8	Conclusions: Towards a More Competition-Oriented Procurement System	483
References		489
Books		489
Periodical Materials and Contributions to Collective Works		498
Working Papers and Other Academic Works		548
Official Documents and Sectoral Reports		552
European Commission		552
United States		554
OECD		554
Other		554
<i>Index</i>		557