

Table of contents

Introduction — 1

1 Relevance — 9

- 1.1 Introduction — 9
- 1.2 Some assumptions — 10
- 1.3 The Gricean background — 11
- 1.4 Relevance theory: a prologue — 14
- 1.5 Cognition and communication — 15
- 1.6 The definition of relevance — 16
- 1.7 Implicit and explicit meaning, construction of context — 18
- 1.8 The comprehension procedure and its problems — 20
- 1.9 Is it possible that cognitive effort does the whole job? — 23
- 1.10 Expectations about the type of cognitive effects and mutual adjustment process — 25
- 1.11 Recognition of goals is back again — 27
- 1.12 Conclusions — 29

2 Associative and inferential processes — 33

- 2.1 Introduction — 33
- 2.2 Associative and inferential processes in Recanati — 35
- 2.3 Associative and inferential in RT — 38
- 2.4 The argument against associative accounts — 42
- 2.5 Two kinds of associative accounts — 43
- 2.6 Inferences as pattern completions — 47
- 2.7 Structure of schemata and sensorimotor representations — 49
- 2.8 Hierarchies and schemata in language — 52
- 2.9 Hierarchies in action — 53
- 2.10 Schemata and goals — 55
- 2.11 Goals and the architecture of the brain — 57
- 2.12 Explicit meaning, encyclopaedic assumptions, implicit meaning: some examples — 60
- 2.13 Taking stock: RT between standard and non-standard view — 66

3 Automatic and controlled processes — 71

- 3.1 Introduction — 71
- 3.2 The role of consciousness in Recanati and RT — 74
- 3.3 Definitions of automatic and controlled — 76

3.4 Some variants of the distinction — 77

3.5 All-or-none notions? — 78

3.6 Automatic goal pursuit — 80

3.7 How automatic and controlled processes cooperate — 82

3.8 Distributed control — 84

3.9 A pragmatic issue: the prominence of speaker-related information — 85

3.10 Emergent properties and conscious attention — 91

3.11 Conclusions — 94

4 Mindreading, pragmatics, and modularity — 97

4.1 Introduction — 97

4.2 Forward and backward inferences in action — 98

4.3 Shared intentional contexts — 100

4.4 Intentions and other mental states — 103

4.5 Mental concepts and nativism — 106

4.6 Mental concepts and world models — 108

4.7 The modularity issue — 112

4.8 Modularity and consciousness in RT — 115

4.9 Modularity and associationism in RT — 118

4.10 Mindreading and RT: some conclusions — 123

5 Rational and cognitive: an opposition? — 135

5.1 Introduction — 135

5.2 Divorce or isomorphism? The normativity issue — 141

5.3 Divorce or isomorphism? The cognitive issue — 147

5.4 Schematic and direct associations: a continuum — 156

5.5 Lexical meaning — 166

5.6 Inferences or impressions? How consciousness makes a difference — 171

Conclusions — 175

References — 179

Name index — 189

Subject index — 191